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Abstract 
This thesis comprises three empirical studies that investigate the effects of director 
networks and corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance and CEO 
compensation. The first empirical study (chapter three) describes the extent of board 
networks among non-financial FTSE 350 firms listed on the London Stock 
Exchange during 2007-2010. We use the concept of the “centrality” from social 
network analysis to examine whether board networks are related to firm 
performance. We find that firms whose directors are more central in a network are 
associated with better financial performance. Consistent with the “Reputation 
Hypothesis” (Fama and Jensen, 1983), the number of director connections may 
proxy for director reputation. Directors are motivated to improve their reputation 
since they can use their directorships to signal to the market that they are good at 
decision-making, and at providing advice and monitoring management. 
 
The second empirical study (chapter four) investigates the effects of director 
networks on CEO compensation among non-financial FTSE 350 firms listed on the 
London Stock Exchange between 2007 and 2010, while controlling for CEO 
characteristics, corporate governance characteristics and firm characteristics. We 
first examine the impact of CEO networks (individual level) and second board 
networks (firm level) comprising all board members. We examine not only the total 
remuneration of the CEO but also two important components of the remuneration 
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package, i.e. basic salary, and long term incentive plans (LTIPs). At the individual 
level, we find that a well-connected CEO measured by “centrality” receives higher 
total compensation. Although we find a positive relationship between basic salary 
and CEO networks, we do not find evidence of a relationship between LTIP 
compensation and CEO networks. The relationship between board networks and 
CEO compensation is also examined at the firm level. The results show that board 
networks have a positive and significant effect on total compensation and LTIP 
compensation but not on basic salary compensation.   
 
The third empirical study (chapter five) examines the effects of directors’ business 
networks, directors’ social networks and corporate governance mechanisms on firm 
performance. Previous studies have considered only business networks 
(directorships), while this study explores both business networks and social 
networks, such as current and past employment, education background, and other 
types of social activities (membership of golf clubs, membership of charity 
organizations, universities alumni, etc). We find that well-connected directors seem 
to use their networks to improve firm performance and in line with the interest of 
their shareholders. We further split the effects of board networks into business and 
social networks. We find that social networks play a more important role than 
business networks in improving firm performance, consistent with social capital 
theory (Coleman, 1990) which argues that networks of social connections can 
provide firms with valuable resources and information.  
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Overall, this thesis provides empirical evidence that director networks and corporate 
governance mechanisms play an important role in affecting CEO remuneration and 
firm financial performance. The findings of this thesis suggest that regulators, firms 
and individuals should not only pay attention to business networks but also to social 
networks.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 The role of board of director networks: background 
Social networking has drawn much attention from the public, academics and 
regulators in the 21st century. Social networking can be found in the specific groups, 
like a small community or a small class. It is also exists in the workplace, 
universities, high schools and online. When we talk about online social networking, 
we normally mean a website which operates like an online community. If people 
can log into a social networking website, they are able to share their interests, news, 
hobbies and other information. For example, Facebook founded in 2004, is one of 
the most popular social networking websites. It had more than 900 million active 
users by the end of May 2012, more than half of them using Facebook on a mobile 
device (Carlson, 2012; Sengupta, 2012).  
 
Business networking is a type of social networking. The main difference is that 
individuals are connected for business reasons. For our purposes, director networks, 
also called director interlocks, are networks constructed when a director working for 
a company also sits on the board of directors of another company. Director networks 
can be categorized at two levels, namely the individual level and the company level. 
At the individual level, two directors are linked if they are sitting on the same board. 
At the firm level, two companies are connected if they share the same directors. 
Studies on director interlocks can be traced back to the 1970s and 1980s and 
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became more and more prominent in the 1990s (Mizruchi, 1996). More recently, 
studies have investigated the effects of director interlocks on firm performance, 
M&A activity, CEO compensation and CEO turnover. (Larcker et al, 2012; Cai and 
Sevilir, 2011; Renneboog and Zhao, 2011; Liu, Y, 2010) 
 
Director networks can potentially affect firm performance positively and negatively. 
According to the existing literature, the impact can arise from two main sources. 
First of all, the “Reputation Hypothesis” proposes that the number of directorships 
may proxy for director reputation (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Most outside directors 
also hold directorships in other firms. Directors can use their board positions to 
signal that they have expertise in decision-makings and can provide better advice 
and monitoring to the board; they understand the importance of the separation of 
ownership and control (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Thus, a company with more 
multiple directors may experience an increase in firm value. On the other hand, the 
“Busyness Hypothesis” (Ferris et al., 2003) states that directors who hold more 
directorships are more likely to be overcommitted and thus lack time to adequately 
monitor management, which could increase agency problem and therefore adversely 
affect firm value. 
 
Director networks can also play an important role in determining CEO 
compensation. Modern corporations are characterised by the separation of agents 
(managers) and principals (owners). Agency theory suggests that managers are 
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likely to pursue their own needs and increase their own wealth rather than 
maximizing shareholder wealth. As agency costs arise when there is conflict of 
interest between the agent and the principal, in order to align their interests, 
compensation packages are designed by companies to maximize value for 
shareholders. Employment contracts should be designed to attract talented CEOs 
and motivate them to achieve certain targets. However, according to managerial 
power theory (Bebchuk et al., 2002), weak corporate governance gives CEOs the 
chance to effectively determine their own compensation packages, resulting in 
inefficiently high levels of compensation. It suggests that powerful CEOs (part of 
which can be measured by the extent of CEO networks) can influence their own 
compensation. Well-connected CEOs may accumulate more power and establish a 
stronger negotiating position on the board and also the remuneration committee so 
that they could extract a more attractive compensation package.  
 
Awareness of corporate governance as an important issue in the UK grew in the late 
1980s and early 1990s because of a series of corporate scandals. In 1991, the 
financial reporting regulators established a committee chaired by Sir Adrian 
Cadbury, which led to the issue of a series of recommendations in 1992. The 
Cadbury Report (1992) recommended the separation of the chairman and CEO, a 
balanced composition of the board of directors, an enhanced role for non-executive 
directors, transparency of financial reporting and the need for good internal control. 
The resulting and successive codes follow the “comply or explain” principle. All 
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public listed companies need to disclosure how they comply with the code. If any 
companies decide to not apply one or more provisions of the code, they have to 
explain the reasons for that. 
 
In 1995, the Greenbury Report identifies good practice to determine the level of 
directors’ remuneration due to concerns about directors’ pay. In 1996, the Hampel 
committee was established to review the extent of compliance with the Cadbury 
Report and the Greenbury Report. As a result, the Hampel Report was published in 
1998 and to establish the framework of the Combined Code. In 2002, the Directors’ 
Remuneration Report Regulations were published to give more powers to 
shareholders regarding directors’ remuneration. As a result, shareholders were 
provided with more information about directors’ remuneration and more transparent 
disclosures. In 2003, the Combined Code reviewed the role and effectiveness of 
non-executive directors and the audit committee. More recently, the Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC) published the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) 
which takes into account the lessons learnt from the financial crisis (2007-2008).  
 
1.2 Motivations and objectives  
Since the Cadbury Report was first published in 1992, it has been updated regularly 
(e.g. the Greenbury Report 1995, the Hampel Report 1998, the Combined Code 
2003, 2006 and 2008, the Directors’ Remuneration Report 2003, the UK Corporate 
Governance Code 2010). It should be noted that some aspects of the corporate 
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governance code are relevant to director networks.  
 
In Section B.1.1 and B.1.2 of the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010), for all 
the FTSE 350 companies, at least half of the board should be independent 
non-executive directors. Directors will not be treated as “independent” if they meet 
any one of the following conditions: 
“1, has been an employee of the company or group within the last five years;  2, 
has, or has had within the last three years, a material business relationship with the 
company either directly, or as a partner, shareholder, director or senior employee of 
a body that has such a relationship with the company; 3, has received or receives 
additional remuneration from the company apart from a director’s fee, participates 
in the company’s share option or a performance-related pay scheme, or is a member 
of the company’s pension scheme; 4, has close family ties with any of the 
company’s advisers, directors or senior employees; 5, holds cross-directorships or 
has significant links with other directors through involvement in other companies or 
bodies; 6, represents a significant shareholder; 7, has served on the board for more 
than nine years from the date of their first election.” (Page 12-13) 
 
In Section B.3 of the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010), it is stated that “All 
directors should be able to allocate sufficient time to the company to discharge their 
responsibilities effectively.” (Page 14) In Section B.3.3, it is stated that “The board 
should not agree to a full time executive director taking on more than one 
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non-executive directorship in a FTSE 100 company nor the chairmanship of such a 
company.” (Page 15) As we can see from Section B.1.1, B.1.2, B.3 and B.3.3, there 
are some concerns about director interlocks. The regulators seem to think that 
director networks might adversely affect the independence of non-executive 
directors and the efficiency of executive directors.  
 
In addition, the rapid growth of executive pay has attracted much attention from the 
public, researchers and regulators over the past decade. From 1980 to 2005, the 
average pay for executives increased by 422% while the inflation rate only 
increased by 125% (Institute of Directors, 2006). Previous studies have examined 
the impact of corporate governance on executive compensation (Conyon, 1997) and 
the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance (Bebchuk 
and Fried, 2004), however relatively few studies have been undertaken to examine 
the effects of director/board networks on executive compensation.  
 
The main objective of this thesis is to fill in three gaps in the literature. First of all, 
this thesis examines the effects of board networks on firm performance. Unlike the 
conventional measure of board networks through directors’ interlocks, namely the 
total number of directorships, this study provides a comprehensive and alternative 
measure based on the concept of the “centrality” of a firm within a network. This 
concept has been widely used in sociological studies, but relatively few studies in 
other fields have investigated the effects of board networks on firm performance.  
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Secondly, this thesis investigates the effects of CEO and board networks on CEO 
compensation among non-financial FTSE 350 firms listed on the London Stock 
Exchange, while controlling for other determinants of CEO compensation. It 
examines not only the total remuneration of the CEO but also two important 
components of the remuneration package, i.e. basic salary and long term incentive 
plans (LTIPs).  
 
Thirdly, this thesis examines the effects of director networks (separating them into 
business networks and social networks) and corporate governance mechanisms on 
firm performance. This is an original work because of the way in which director 
networks are measured.  
 
1.3 Data and Research Method 
1.3.1 Data 
The director networks’ data is manually collected from the Boardex database. 
Corporate governance characteristics are collected from Fame. Accounting 
information is mainly collected from Datastream. Company’s annual reports are 
also used if there is any information missing in the other databases.  
 
The data covers the period from 2007 to 2010. Most previous studies of director 
networks use pre-2007 data. This study provides an up-to-date investigation on 
whether the corporate governance code in use at the time, the Combined Code 
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(2006) and the Director’s Remuneration Report Regulations (2002) have affected 
firm performance and CEO compensation. As some regulations and 
recommendations are not applicable to smaller firms, the sample employed in this 
thesis comprises the FTSE 350 index. The FTSE 350 index is made up of the FTSE 
100 index (the 100 largest firms that account for approximately 82% of market 
capitalization) and the FTSE 250 index (the next 250 largest firms that represent 
approximately 15% of market capitalization). In total, firms listed on the FTSE 350 
index represent about 97% of UK market capitalisation, as reported by Datastream 
in December 2008.  
 
As the financial year end for UK firms can be different, for example some firms end 
their financial year on 31 December and other firms on 31 March, we match 
financial reporting years for each firm when we collect our accounting data. 
Specifically, if firm’s financial year ends between 1 January and 31 June 2009, we 
treat the year as 2008, while we treat data as belonging to the year 2009 if firm’s 
financial year ends between 1 July 2009 and 31 December 2009.  
 
1.3.2 Research Method 
This thesis employs both panel data and cross sectional regression models to test the 
research hypotheses. For the first two empirical studies (chapter three and chapter 
four), we use panel data models to investigate the effects of director networks on 
firm performance and CEO compensation. Random effects models are employed in 
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the data analysis. For the third empirical study (chapter five), we use the cross 
sectional model. In order to mitigate the non-normality of distributions, some 
variables are transformed by taking their natural logarithms.  
 
1.4 Findings and contributions 
First of all, chapter three provides empirical evidence on board networks in the 
context of firm financial performance. According Fich and Shivdasani (2006) the 
networks of directors is mostly measured by the number of directorships. However, 
this method might not be comprehensive because it only captures the quantity of 
directors’ obligations not their quality. Hence, the number of directorships does not 
adequately capture the extent to which directors are really busy and overcommitted. 
In order to capture different aspects of director networks, we employ five network 
centrality measures, namely: degree centrality, betweenness centrality, closeness 
centrality, eigenvector centrality and information centrality. In contrast to simply 
calculating the number of directorships, centrality measures not only take into 
account the quantity of directors’ obligations but also their quality. Director 
networks are then aggregated at the firm level to measure board networks. In 
addition, we use a panel data approach and control for the effects of corporate 
governance variables and different industries, while previous studies typically 
employ cross-sectional data and only focus on specific industries (Ferris et al., 2003; 
Meeusen and Cuyvers, 1985).  
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We find evidence that board networks increase firm value. This finding implies that 
the positions of firms within a network are important. According to the social 
network analysis, the centrality of a node (e.g. firm) depends upon the number of 
connections with other nodes (e.g. firms). Thus, well-connected firms normally 
occupy very central position in the network. A firm that occupies central position is 
able to accumulate significant power and influence and therefore increase its value.  
Secondly, chapter four investigates the effects of CEO and board networks on CEO 
compensation among non-financial FTSE 350 firms listed on the London Stock 
Exchange, while controlling for other determinants of CEO compensation. Unlike 
most previous studies, this thesis examines not only the total remuneration of the 
CEO but also two important components of the remuneration package, i.e. basic 
salary and long term incentive plans (LTIPs). In addition, in order to capture 
different aspects of director networks, the same five network centrality measures 
used in chapter three are employed. These measures are more comprehensive than 
those used in previous studies (e.g. Renneboog and Zhao, 2011 and Horton et al., 
2012).  
 
At the individual level, we find that the more central the position of the CEO, the 
higher the CEO total compensation. This result supports the managerial power 
theory (Bebchuk et al., 2002) which suggests that powerful CEOs have the ability to 
effectively set their own compensation. We also investigate the effect of CEO 
networks on two components of CEO compensation, i.e. basic salary and LTIPs 
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compensation. We find a positive relationship between basic salary compensation 
and CEO networks, but we do not find evidence of a relationship between LTIPs 
compensation and CEO networks. The findings suggest that as directors have too 
much managerial power, they are very likely to raise their compensation, especially 
their basic salary, rather than long term incentive compensation. Since the former 
does not require additional efforts while the latter does require. At the firm level, we 
find a positive relationship between board networks and CEO total compensation 
and LTIPs compensation. However, we find no evidence that CEO basic salary is 
positively correlated with board networks. The results suggest that if a firm has 
better access to resources and information through the entire network provided by 
all directors, it is likely to compensate the CEO less for their own network 
connections. Therefore, the firm is likely to reward the CEO less on the basis of 
basic salary but more on the basis of firm performance. 
 
Thirdly, we examine the effects of directors’ business and social networks and 
corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance in chapter five. To the best 
of our knowledge, this is the first such study that has been carried out for a large 
sample of UK firms. In terms of the measure of director networks, most previous 
studies have considered only business networks (e.g. directorships) while this study 
explores a multitude of business and social networks, including current and past 
employment, education background, and other types of social activities 
(membership of golf clubs, membership of charity organizations, universities 
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alumni, etc). We then aggregate the director networks at the firm level to measure 
board networks. We find a positive relationship between board networks and firm 
performance. This suggests that well-connected boards use their networks to 
improve firm performance and so is in line with the interest of their shareholders. 
Board networks allow firms access to information and capital which is particularly 
valuable when the financial situation becomes unstable, as during the financial crisis 
period.  
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
This chapter has briefly introduced the background to board of director networks, 
highlighted the motivations and objectives, discussed sample selection and 
methodology and presented the major findings and contributions. The remainder of 
the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter two explains the terminology and 
methodology used in this thesis. Chapter three examines the relationship between 
board networks and firm performance. Chapter four examines the relationship 
between director networks and CEO compensation. Chapter five investigates the 
effects of directors’ business and social networks and corporate governance 
mechanisms on firm performance. Chapter six presents the conclusions, limitations 
and suggestions for future research.  
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Chapter 2 Terminology and Methodology 
2.1 Basic Terminology 
Social network analysis (SNA) is defined as the analysis of a set of socially-relevant 
nodes connected by one or more relations (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). It is based 
on an assumption about the importance of relations among interacting nodes. A 
node could be a person, organization, or workplace, but basically any units that can 
be connected to other units can be classified as nodes. These could be countries, 
departments within organizations, web pages, journal articles, etc. In this study we 
restrict our attention to networks among boards of directors and adopt the following 
conventions and notations. 
 
Networks, also known as graphs, can be used to represent a multitude of phenomena. 
For example, family ties, networks of friendship and information among firms. 
Wasserman and Faust (1994) defined a graph G = (V, E) which includes a set of 
vertices (V), and a set of edges (E) which establish connections between two 
vertices. Two vertices are adjacent if they are connected by an edge, and they are 
called the ends of this edge. N is denoted as the number of vertices and M as the 
number of edges. A graph is called simple graph if there are no multiple edges 
between vertices and no loops, otherwise it is called a multi-graph. It is called 
complete graph if there is an edge linking each pair of vertices. Note that the 
number of edges of a simple complete graph is equal to n (n−1)/2.  
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A graph G (Wasserman and Faust, 1994) is bipartite if its vertex set V is partitioned 
into two subsets V1 and V2 such that each edge has one end in V1 and one end in V2. 
It is denoted by G = (V1, V2, E). Affiliation networks are instances of bipartite 
graphs and they are described below. The degree d (v) of a vertex v is the number of 
edges incident with it. If G is a simple graph, then d (v) is the number of neighbours 
of v. A vertex with degree equal to 0 or only connected to itself by a loop is isolate. 
An ego network is the sub graph induced by some given focal node (the ego) and its 
neighbours. A path of length l from the vertex v0 to the vertex v1 in a graph G, or a 
v0v1 path, is a sequence < v0, e1, v1, e2, ..., ei, vi > where v0, v1, ..., vi are vertices of 
G, e1, e2, ..., ei are edges of G, vi−1 and vi are the ends of ei for i = 1, ..., l. If G is a 
simple graph, this path is completely specified by the sequence of vertices < v0, 
v1, ..., vi >. A graph is connected if any two of its vertices are connected by a path, 
and a connected component is a maximal connected sub graph. For example, Figure 
2.1 represents a graph consisting of two components. One has node v1, v2 and v3. 
Another consists of node v4, v5, v6, v7. The geodesic distance d (x, y) between two 
nodes x and y in a graph is the length of a shortest path; otherwise their distance is 
defined to be infinite.  
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Figure 2.1: Graph Consisting of Two Components 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If we need to distinguish the role of the ends of the edges of a graph and to orient its 
edges, this graph is called a directed graph or a digraph (Wasserman and Faust, 
1994) and each edge has an initial end and a terminal one, otherwise the graph is 
undirected. For any vertex v of a digraph, its degree d(v) is the sum of its out degree 
d
+
(v), which is the number of edges whose v is the initial end, and the in degree 
d
-
(v), the number of edges whose v is the terminal end. The underlying graph of a 
digraph D is the graph obtained from D by ignoring the orientations of its edges. An 
oriented graph is a digraph whose underlying graph is simple. The adjacency matrix 
A (D) of a digraph D is the matrix (auv) whose rows and columns are indexed by the 
vertices of D and where auv is the number of edges from u to v. Similarly, one can 
define the adjacency matrix of an undirected graph G by the (symmetric) adjacency 
matrix of the digraph obtained by splitting each edge of G in two opposite oriented 
edges. Moreover, if G is a simple graph, its adjacency matrix is a binary matrix. 
Usually one represents graphically a graph by drawing a dot for each node and a 
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line between two such dots if they are connected by an edge. In case of digraphs, the 
orientation of edges is indicated by an arrow. 
 
2.2 CEO and Board Networks Measures 
An important concept used in the study of networks is that of “centrality” (Freeman, 
1979) which describes how central a node is relative to other nodes in a network. 
Nodes occupying a central position will have better access to information and other 
resources than nodes in less favourable positions. As a result, nodes will have power 
and influence over other nodes by occupying central positions in the network. In 
fact some nodes are not only more connected than others but their position in a 
network allows them to play a role in mediating information from one part of the 
network to another. Other nodes have to rely on these central nodes to communicate 
with other nodes. In social network analysis, centrality measures are used to 
characterize the importance and the role of particular nodes in the larger network by 
analyzing their position within the network. We use five centrality measures in this 
study; degree, closeness, betweenness, eigenvector and information centrality. In the 
following definitions, we consider an undirected graph G = (N, E), with n nodes and 
e edges, and described by an n×n adjacency matrix A= (aij). We describe five 
measures of the centrality of nodes in a network as developed by Freeman (1979), 
Bonacich (1987) and Stephenson and Zelen (1989). 
 
2.2.1 CEO Network Measures (Individual level) 
2.2.1.1 Degree Centrality 
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Freeman (1979) developed elementary measures of the centrality of nodes based on 
their “degree”. In this study, the degree centrality of a director is the number of 
direct links that a director have through sitting on the same board. The Degree 
centrality (CD) of node ni is: 
CD(ni) = dn                             2-1 
A director has high degree centrality when she is a board member of several firms. 
To allow us to compare the connectedness across different networks, we standardize 
the measure, dividing the number of direct links by the maximum number of links 
that a director could have. A normalized degree centrality (CD,norm) measure in a 
simple network is defined by  
CD,norm(ni) = dn/(n-1)                     2-2 
 
2.2.1.2 Betweenness Centrality 
Betweenness centrality measures how often a given node sits ‘between’ others. The 
betweenness centrality CB of node ni is given by: 
CB(ni)= ∑(gjk(ni)/gjk)                     2-3 
A normalized betweenness measure is described by: 
CB,norm(ni)= 2∑(gjk(ni)/gjk)/(n-1)(n-2)              2-4 
Where gjk is number of the shortest paths linking j and k. For three nodes, j, k, and i, 
gjk(ni) is the number of shortest paths between j and k that contain i. The 
Betweenness centrality measures the relevance of non-direct links in a network, 
capturing the importance of a director linking other directors. If a director has high 
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Betweenness centrality, she is likely able to control information flows and behave 
as a “broker” of connections (information) in the network.  
 
2.2.1.3 Closeness Centrality 
Closeness centrality (Freeman, 1979) measures how close a node is to the other 
nodes in the network. In this study, the Closeness centrality measures how close a 
director is to other directors in the network. It is the inverse of the sum of the 
shortest paths to all other directors. The Closeness centrality (CC) of node ni is given 
by: 
CC(ni)= 1/[∑d(ni,nj)]                     2-5 
And a normalized closeness (CC,norm) centrality measure is given by  
               CC,norm(ni)= (n-1)/[∑d(ni,nj)]                    2-6 
Where d (ni,nj) is equal to the shortest length between director i and j. The sum of 
all shortest paths from director i to all other j’s is called farness. Cc closeness is 
equal to the inverse of farness. Those with high closeness are those who can reach 
many directors in fewer steps. A director with high closeness can reach many other 
directors in fewer steps. 
 
2.2.1.4 Eigenvector Centrality 
Bonacich (1972, 1987) suggests a refined version of Freeman’s degree centrality 
called “Eigenvector” or “Bonacich” centrality. Degree centrality is based on the 
view that nodes with more connections are more likely to be powerful because they 
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can influence more nodes. But it does not consider the situation where having the 
same degree centrality does not necessarily make nodes equally powerful. Bonacich 
(1972, 1987) argues that a node’s centrality should take account of how many 
connections a node has and also how many connections the node’s neighbourhoods 
have. A node is likely to be more influential if it is connected to more nodes, since 
that node can quickly obtain more information from the other nodes. But if other 
nodes are well connected, they are not necessarily dependent on this node. Thus 
being connected to others makes a node central, but not necessarily powerful.  
 
The more connections the node’s neighbourhoods have, the more central the node is. 
The fewer the connections the node’s neighbourhoods have, the more powerful the 
node is (Bonacich, 1987). The idea behind eigenvector centrality is that not only is 
the number of links important but the quality of the links is also important. Firms 
that are connected to many influential firms can access more resources or 
information compared to firms connected to less influential firms.   
 
The Eigenvector (Bonacich Power) centrality CE of node ni is defined as: 
                      CE (ni) = ∑ (α+βCE(j))                         2-7 
Where α is a value used to normalize the measure. The normalization parameter α is 
automatically selected so that the sum of the squares of the vertex centralities is 
equal to the size of the network. β is an attenuation factor which reflects the 
dependence of each vertex’s centrality on the centralities of the vertices it is 
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adjacent to (see Table 2.1) According to Bonacich (1987), a value of 0 gives a 
centrality measure directly proportional to the degree of each vertex. Positive values 
give weight to being connected to powerful nodes, negative values give weight to 
being connected to low powered nodes.  
 
Table 2.1 Beta used for the calculation of Eigenvector centrality by UCINET 
Year Beta 
2007 0.04 
2008 0.04 
2009 0.03 
2010 0.05 
 
2.2.1.5 Information Centrality 
Stephenson and Zelen (1989) develop a centrality measure called “information 
centrality” which is based on all the paths between pairs of points. They note that 
the degree, betweenness and closeness centrality measures developed by Freeman 
have a common feature, namely, the shortest path. By only considering the shortest 
path these measures assume that communications only occur along this path. 
However, it is possible that information is not necessary pass through the shortest 
path but take a more circuitous route, for example by random communication, or it 
may be intentionally channelled through intermediaries which are not captured by 
the shortest path. Stephenson and Zelen (1989) define information centrality for two 
nodes i and j where there are Kij paths connecting i and j. These paths are denoted 
by Pi,j (1), Pi,j (2),…, Pi,j (Ki,j). The number of lines in path Pi,j(s) is defined as Di,j(s) 
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and the information measure Ii,j(s) is the reciprocal of the distance measure, i.e.  
Ii,j(s)= 1/ Di,j(s). The procedure for determining the centrality of any point (i) is to 
first determine the information measure of point (i) with respect to all of the other 
points, i.e., Ii1, Ii2, …, Iin. The information centrality of point (i) is defined as the 
harmonic mean of the information associated with the path from (i) to the other 
points. Specifically, if Ii refers to the centrality or information of (i), then  
Ii= n/ ∑1/Iij                                       2-8 
Information centrality captures the director’s connections to other directors along all 
paths not just along the shortest paths.  
 
2.2.2 Board Network Measures (Firm level) 
To calculate the centrality of board networks (firm level), each firm is considered as 
a node in the network and two firms are connected if they share at least one director. 
We first calculate five centrality measures for each board member and then 
aggregate these at the firm level to measure overall board network centrality. The 
calculation of five centrality measures is identical to that of the individual level 
calculation. More specifically, the degree centrality of a firm is the number of other 
firms it connects to through director interlocks. Firms that have many direct links 
compared to other firms can take advantage of them to influence other firms or use 
their links to access resources. However, degree centrality is entirely local and is 
unrelated to how a firm is positioned in the whole network. The betweenness 
centrality of a firm measures how often a firm can sit between two other firms 
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through director interlocks. If a firm sits between many other firms it may act like a 
“keeper” and control the flow of information through the network. The closeness 
centrality of a firm measures how close it is to all the other reachable firms. Firms 
that are more central according to closeness centrality can access resources or 
information faster than other firms. Unlike degree centrality, this measure is not just 
a local measure but uses information from the whole network. The eigenvector 
centrality of a firm measures, not only the number of other firms it connects to, but 
also the quality of the other firms it connects to. The information centrality of a firm 
captures it’s direct or indirect connections, not only through the shortest paths but 
also any other possible paths to other firms. Hence, firms that are more central using 
this measure can enjoy more resources or information compared to the measure of 
closeness centrality which only considers the shortest paths.  
 
2.2.3 Illustration of Five “Centrality” Calculations at the Firm Level 
Consider the simple graph shown in Figure 2.2, which contains 7 firms (nodes) and 
7 connections (edges). Table 2.2 illustrates the values of normalized degree 
centrality, betweenness centrality, closeness centrality, eigenvector centrality and 
information centrality for the network represented by Figure 2.2.  
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Figure 2.2: Degree, Betweenness, Closeness, Eigenvector, Information 
Centrality Measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2 Centrality Measures 
Node Degree Betweenness Closeness Eigenvector Information 
CSR 0.17 0 0.38 0.17 5.62 
BP 0.17 0 0.38 0.17 5.62 
HMV 0.50 0.36 0.09 0.39 7.85 
ITV 0.33 0.29 0.60 0.53 6.51 
TESCO 0.50 0.29 0.09 0.81 7.85 
WH SMITH 0.33 0 0.40 0.65 6.51 
NEXT 0.33 0 0.40 0.65 6.51 
 
HMV and TESCO are both directly connected to 3 firms and thus have the highest 
normalized degree measure of 3/ (7−1) = 0.5. However, they do not have the same 
betweenness measure in this network. The calculation of betweenness centrality 
involves identifying the shortest paths between all other pairs on the network. The 
denominator used for standardization is (7-1) (7-2)/2 = 15. In this graph, HMV has 
the highest betweenness measure of 0.36 ((16/3)/15). It acts as a “broker,” joining 
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two parts of the network together. The connections are fewer but more important, 
because they give HMV control over information flows from one end of the 
network to the other. In this graph, without HMV, CSR and BP will be isolated 
from the rest of the graph. In terms of the closeness centrality measure, WH Smith 
and Next have the highest value of 0.4. It takes Smith and Next at least four steps to 
reach BP and CSR, three steps to reach HMV, two steps to reach ITV, and one step 
to reach everyone else. Therefore, CC (Smith/Next) = 1/4+4+3+2+1+1 = 0.07 and 
CCnorm (Smith/Next) = (7 − 1) × 0.07 = 0.4. Although they have fewer direct 
connections than HMV does, the pattern of their links allows them to quickly reach 
everyone else in the graph. Tesco has a higher eigenvector value than HMV 
although it has the same direct connections as HMV. This is because the firms 
connected to Tesco are more well-connected than the firms connected to HMV. 
Eigenvector centrality not only measures direct connections but also the quality of 
connections. ITV has the highest information centrality since it sits in the most 
central position of the network and therefore can control the information flowing 
through the whole network. Table 2.3 presents a brief summary of each of the five 
centrality measures. 
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Table 2.3 Summary of Five Centrality Measures 
 
Centrality Measure Summary 
Degree It captures all of the direct connections to a given firm. 
Betweenness It captures “how many times” a given firm sits between 
other firms.   
Closeness It captures “how quickly” a given firm can reach other 
firms.  
Eigenvector It captures not only the direct connections between firms 
but also the quality of connections. 
Information It captures a firm’s connections to other firms along all 
paths not just the shortest paths. 
 
2.2.4 N-Score 
Since the five centrality measures capture slightly different aspects of the 
importance of nodes in a network, we adopt a comprehensive centrality measure 
called “N-Score” suggested by Larcker et al. (2012) in order to consider the overall 
influence of centrality on firm performance. Firstly, we rank all of the firms into 
quintiles according to market value. Secondly, within each market value quintile, 
firms are sorted into sub quintiles based on the five centrality measures (Degree, 
Betweenness, Closeness, Eigenvector and Information). Highest (lowest) values of 
centrality are given values of five (one). The N-Score is defined as follows:    
N-Score = 1/5 {Quintile (Degree) + Quintile (Betweenness) + Quintile 
(Closeness) + Quintile (Eigenvector) + Quintile (Information)}          2-9 
The N-Score is rounded to the nearest integer, ranging from 1 to 5. 
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2.3 Panel Data Analysis 
A panel data model allows the analysis of both cross sectional and time series data. 
The most common panel data estimations are fixed effects and random effects 
models. We follow Verbeek (2009) for most of the discussion below about the fixed 
effects and the random effects models. Before discussing fixed effects and random 
effects models and how to choose between them, we should explore the advantages 
of using panel data models compared with cross sectional and time series models.  
 
2.3.1 Advantages of panel data model 
Baltagi (1995) explains a number of benefits of using panel data. First, panel data 
can control for individual heterogeneity. Every cross section unit in the panel data 
set, i.e. individuals, firms, states or countries are heterogeneous. Econometric 
models using purely cross section or time series data are unable to control these 
individual effects. Some variables are difficult to be observed like cultural factors or 
business practices across companies can also be controlled in panel data models.  
 
Second, panel data can include variables at different levels of analysis (i.e. students, 
schools, districts, states) suitable for multilevel or hierarchical modeling. Moreover, 
including both cross sectional data and time series observations, panel data provide 
more informative data, less collinearity among variables and more efficiency.  
 
Third, by studying the repeated cross section of observations, panel data are suited 
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to study the dynamics of change, such as the effects of policy changes, job turnover 
and labour mobility.  
 
2.3.2 The fixed effects model 
The fixed effects model is a static linear regression model which assumes the 
intercept terms vary over the individual units i, i.e. 
        yit = αi +β    + εit,  εit ~ IID (0,  ε
 )                         2-10 
 
Where yit is the dependent variable, αi is the intercept term, β is coefficients of the 
independent variables, and     represents on independent variable, εit is the error 
term, t = 1,…, T; i = 1, …, N. Equation 2-10 assumes that all xit are independent of 
all εit.  
 
2.3.3 The random effects model 
An alternative to the fixed effects model is the random effects model. In regression 
analysis, all factors that affect the dependent variable, but not included in the model 
can be explained by an error term. In this case, this leads to the assumption that the 
αi are random factors, independently and identically distributed over individuals. 
Thus the random effects model can be written as 
       yit = μ +β     + αi +       εit ~ IID (0,   
 ), αi ~ IID (0,   
 ),          
2-11 
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Where yit is the dependent variable, μ is the intercept term, β is coefficients of the 
independent variables, and     represents on independent variable, αi + εit is an error 
term consisting of two components: an individual specific component assumes does 
not change over time, and a remainder component is assumed to be uncorrelated 
over time. This means that all correlation of the error terms over time is attributed to 
the individual effects αi. t = 1,…, T; i = 1,…, N. 
 
2.3.4 Fixed effects or Random effects? 
The choice between fixed effects and random effects depends on the assumption we 
make about the correlation between the error components εit and X regressors    . If 
the assumption is that εit and     are correlated, the fixed effects model should be 
used. However, if the assumption is εit and     are not correlated, then the random 
effects model may be appropriate. Gujarati (2003) provides some suggestion on 
how to choose between fixed effects and random effects. First, if the number of 
cross-sectional units (N) is small and the number of time series data (T) is large, the 
values of the parameters estimated by the two models are very small. The fixed 
effects model may be appropriate in terms of computational convenience. Second, if 
N is large and T is small, the values of the parameters estimated by the two models 
will be significantly different. In the random effects model, εit is a random 
component, while in the fixed effects model εit is treated as fixed. If we believe that 
the individual units in our sample are selected randomly from a large sample, we 
should choose the random effects model. However, if the individual units in the 
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sample are not randomly selected, the fixed effects model is preferred. Third, if N is 
large and T is small, and the assumptions of random effects hold, the estimators of 
the random effects are more efficient than the fixed effects model. Fourth, unlike the 
random effects model, fixed effects model cannot estimate time-invariant variables 
such as gender. As our sample includes over 700 observations (N) and only 4 years 
(T), we prefer to use the random effects estimator in the regression models 
containing all dummy variables and invariant variables.  
 
In practice, we use the Hausman (1978) test to examine if unobserved effect (εit) and 
explained variable (   ) are correlated or not. The null hypothesis of Hausman test is 
that unobserved effect (εit ) is uncorrelated with explained variable (   ). If the 
results of the Hausman test show that there is a correlation between εit and    , then 
the null hypothesis is rejected and we should the use fixed effects model. Otherwise, 
we should choose the random effects model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 30 
 
Chapter 3 Board networks and firm performance 
3.1 Introduction 
The board of directors is an important part of any corporate governance structure. 
An important feature of boards is that they are often connected to each other by a 
shared director. Most previous studies of boards of directors focus on directors’ 
interlocks, where people sit on several boards thereby creating connections between 
companies. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the number of connections may 
proxy for director reputation. Directors have the motivations to improve their 
reputation since they can use their directorships to signal to the market that they are 
good at making decision, providing good advice and monitoring to the board. Thus, 
a firm with more multiple directors could lead to an increase in firm value. There 
are several studies that suggest that board interlocks are positively associated with 
firm performance. Mizruchi and Stearns (1994) argue that board interlocks are 
beneficial for firms to monitor each other. For example, if there is an interlock 
between a financial firm and a non-financial firm, financial firm can better monitor 
the non-financial firm and therefore reduce the risk of providing capital to the 
non-financial firm. Schonlau and Singh (2009) find that well-connected boards are 
related to better acquisition performance, higher ROA and abnormal returns 
compared with the performance of less-connected boards for a sample of U.S. firms 
between 1991 and 2005. 
 
However, a number of studies also suggest that directors’ interlocks can hurt firm 
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performance. Since they require the director to monitor several firms, interlocks 
reduces the time that the director can allocate to each firm. Therefore, such directors 
might be too busy to monitor each firm adequately. Consistent with this idea, Fich 
and Shivdasani (2006) find that firms with busy boards are correlated with a lower 
market to book ratio based on a sample comprising Forbes 500 largest firms from 
1989 to 1995, with a busy boards defined as one for which more than half of the 
directors hold three or more directorships.  
 
Unlike the conventional measure of board networks through directors’ interlocks, 
namely the total number of directorships, this chapter provides a comprehensive and 
alternative measure based on the concept of the “centrality” of a firm within a 
network. This concept has been widely used in sociological studies, but relatively 
few studies in other fields have investigated the effects of board networks on firm 
performance. This chapter sheds light on the empirical relationship between these 
two variables.  
 
Using social network analysis, this chapter describes the extent of board networks 
measured by centrality among non-financial FTSE 350 firms and whether board 
network centrality is related to firm performance, while controlling for corporate 
governance characteristics, industry dummies and time dummies. Following Ferris 
et al. (2003), both Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) are used to 
measure firm performance. Five centrality measures (degree, closeness, 
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betweenness, eigenvector and information) are employed in this chapter. The 
centrality of boards of directors is measured using the UCINET software for social 
network analysis. Centrality is an important concept among sociologists who study 
social relations. For the purpose of this chapter, a network represents the 
connections among directors of companies who sit on different boards and therefore 
communicate with each other.  
 
Overall, this chapter makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, in 
order to capture different aspects of board networks, we employ five different 
network centrality measures which represent a more comprehensive approach to 
that used by Horton et al. (2012). Second, while many studies employ 
cross-sectional data and only focus on specific industries, we use a panel data 
approach and include a range of industries. We also include data from the recent 
financial crisis period. Last but not least, we offer evidence on the types of board 
network centrality that influences firm performance.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section two reviews the 
literature and develops the hypotheses. Section three describes the sample and 
research design. Section four presents the results. The final section concludes.  
 
3.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses 
There is an area of existing literature focusing on board networks and examining the 
 33 
 
effects of board networks on economic outcomes.  
 
Camelia (2006) examines the business connections between fund directors and 
advisory firms using panel data for U.S. open-end mutual funds for the period 
1993-2002. Camelia (2006) finds that social connections of fund directors are 
playing an important role in contracting decisions. For example, as advisory firms 
have new mutual funds, it is quite possible that fund board seats are offered to more 
connected directors. Also, when advisory firms look for a new advisor, they are 
more likely give the portfolio management contract to an advisor who has had more 
connections to the fund’s directors in the past. Advisors are usually paid a higher 
payment when they are well-connected to the fund’s directors. Moreover, Camelia 
(2006) argues that although directors’ social networks play an important role on 
decision making, it has a negative effect on the quality of actions taken by these 
agents measured by fund performance. 
 
Farina (2008) studies the incidence of interlocking directorates among listed banks 
and non-financial firms in Italy and tests the effects of directors’ interlocking on 
firm performance measured by ROA and ROE. Farina (2008) finds that banks are 
the most powerful nodes measured by centrality among the network and the 
relationship between centrality and firm financial performance are positive 
correlated. The results suggest that banks occupying the central positions in the 
networks can improve firm performance. Moreover, according to the resource 
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dependency perspective, as banks can control financial capital in the network, the 
most of time firms have to dependent on banks, which give banks some power to 
control other firms. 
   
Musacchio (2008) investigates the board interlocking between banks and other 
firms in Brazil, Mexico and the United States by using three ways to measure 
centrality between bank and other firms. The first of these, and the most basic, is 
“degree” centrality, which calculates the total number of interlocks a firm or bank 
has. He found that Brazilian banks exhibited less centrality than Mexican and 
United States’ banks. The second measure he used is “betweenness” centrality, 
which measures how often a node is in the path that links two banks or companies 
in the network. He found that banks are very central in Mexico and the United 
States. However, Brazil was found to be different from the Mexican and the United 
States cases. He did not find a large proportion of banks within the most central 
companies in the network. In addition, interlocks with banks were not very popular 
among Brazilian firms. The last measure is “Bonacich” centrality, which takes into 
account a node’s connections depending on the connections it is related to. The 
results are similar to degree and betweenness centrality. In summary, he finds that 
connections between banks and other firms are more important in Mexico and the 
United States than in Brazil.  
 
Santella et al. (2009) investigate director interlocks in the Italian, French, German, 
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UK and US firms using the methods of social network analysis (SNA) to measure 
the firms’ network position. Specifically, they examine the largest forty firms 
among these five countries, by capitalization. A total of 2,718 directorships are 
taken into account. They describe the features of firms connected to each other in 
each country and compare the country networks in terms of Freeman’s degree and 
betweenness centrality. They find that the number of firms connected to each other 
through a very small number of well-connected directors in France, Germany, and 
Italy are higher than other countries. In addition, UK firms are less connected to 
each other through directors who have no more than two directorships. US firms are 
also well connected to each other through director interlocks, but their directors tend 
to only have two directorships at the same time, like the UK. 
 
Conyon and Muldoon (2006) study the social network structure of corporate boards 
using data from the US, the UK and Germany. They find that the random graph 
model
1
 is suitable to explain board network structure and connections in these 
countries. In particular, the social network of boards can be described as a “small 
world” under two certain conditions. First, there is network with high clustering. 
This is caused by the boards connected to each other when they share same director. 
Second, the distances between any two boards are relatively short. This suggests 
that any two boards can be reached in a few steps. They find that the ” small world” 
aspects of corporate boards are no more obvious than would be expected in the 
                                                             
1
 A random graph is constructed by starting with a set of nodes and placing edges between them randomly. Each 
pair of nodes has an independent probability p. 
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random graph model.  
 
Schonlau and Singh (2009) apply the method of social network analysis called 
“centrality” to measure board networks using U.S. data between 1991 and 2005. 
They argue that more central boards have better access to valuable information 
through their networks, therefore alleviating information asymmetry when making 
takeover decisions. They find that boards occupying more central positions in their 
networks are related to better acquisition performance, stronger improvements in 
ROA and higher abnormal returns compared to less central boards.  
 
Larcker et al. (2012) map the board networks using “closeness centrality” and 
“eigenvector centrality” from social network analysis. They argue that board 
networks can improve firm performance through several ways, such as information 
accessibility, reducing information asymmetric, shared contacts, good management 
practices and collusion. They find that firms with the well-connected boards of 
directors earn superior risk adjusted stock returns and high future growth measured 
by ROA. Their results are consistent with “Reputation hypothesis” research, which 
argues that the number of connections may proxy for director reputation. Directors 
are motivated to improve their reputation since they can use their directorships to 
signal to the market that they are good at decision-making, and at providing advice 
and monitoring management. 
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The existing literature also shows that board networks may adversely affect 
corporate governance. For example, based on data from the Paris Stock Exchange 
over the period of 1992-2003, Kramarz and Thesmar (2006) study the social 
networks between the CEO and directors. They find that former high ranking civil 
servants account for a large percentage of board composition and CEOs who are 
former civil servants are less likely to be fired even if they run the company very 
badly. CEOs who are former bureaucrats tend to hold more directorships and the 
relationship between directorships and firm performance is negatively correlated, 
which could suggest that those CEOs are too busy to manage their business. They 
argue that networks enable better access to subsidies and lower local taxes, so even 
if CEOs do not run the firms very well, they still remain in power.  
 
Wong and Gygax (2009) investigate the relation between board interlocks and the 
CEO remuneration packages among interlocked board using a large sample of U.S. 
firms in 2003. They find that board interlocks are positively correlated with 
similarity in the design of CEO remuneration packages, especially for the 
stock-based component. They argue that boards are likely to borrow some idea from 
their interlocked boards when designing the compensation packages for the CEOs.  
 
Cesare and Geoffrey (2008) construct network connections between directors and 
CEOs use a sample of S&P 1,500 firms. They use four different measures of CEO 
power: an entrenchment index, consolidation of the titles CEO, CEO duality and 
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CEO tenure. They find that powerful CEOs are more likely to appoint new directors 
are connected with the CEO, which might adversely affect the effectiveness of 
corporate governance. Besides, they find that firms with more connections between 
directors and CEOs take more acquisitions which destroying the firm value and 
have lower market valuations. 
 
Christian and Mirco (2010) examine the relationship between firm performance and 
the board networks position in the network. Using a sample of 133 German firms 
between 2003 and 2006, they find that well-connected boards are experiencing 
lower firm performance and lower accounting performance. Besides, they also find 
that well-connected boards paying higher compensation to their directors.  
 
From the previous section we have reviewed arguments that suggest that a firm 
have better connected directors is more likely to obtain different kinds of 
information and resources, so we expect it to be associated with relatively better 
performance. However, according to the preceding arguments well-connected firms 
may also reduce the effectiveness of corporate governance due to high directors’ 
salaries and loss of director’s independence. Hence the null hypothesis and 
alternative hypotheses are as follows:  
 
The null hypothesis is: 
  H0: There is no relationship between board network centrality and firm 
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performance 
The alternative hypothesis is: 
H1: Board network centrality is positively associated with firm performance. 
  H2: Board network centrality is negatively associated with firm performance. 
The alternative hypothesis is two-tailed, i.e. it allows for the possibility of board 
network centrality to negatively (and positively) affect firm performance.  
 
3.3 Data and methodology 
3.3.1 Sample and Data 
Based on a comprehensive sample of the non-financial UK FTSE 350 firms 
covering the four year period 2007-2010, we collect networks and corporate 
governance data from the BoardEx database on board network, board size, CEO 
duality, average directorships of inside (outside) directors, executive (non-executive) 
director’s age, executive (non-executive) director’s tenure, and audit committee, 
nomination committee and remuneration committee membership. In addition, we 
source accounting data from Datastream and FAME, collecting data on accounting 
performance, leverage, and market value. We measure firm performance using both 
Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE), as in Core et al. (1999) and 
Tian and Lau (2001). Return on assets (ROA) measures the efficiency with which a 
firm uses its assets to generate earnings. Return on equity (ROE) measures the 
efficiency of a firm in using shareholders’ equity to generate earnings. Financial 
firms are excluded because they are subject to greater external regulation by bodies 
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such as the FSA (Financial Services Authority). This is consistent with many 
previous corporate governance studies (e.g. Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; McKnight 
and Weir, 2009). 
 
Table 3.1 shows the time and industry distribution of sample firms. The sample is 
made up of 781 firm-year observations during 2007-2010. Industries are classified 
by the four-digit code based on the SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) Code 
collected from Datastream. 
 
Table 3.1 
Panel A: Time Distribution of Sample Firms 
Year Number of Firms 
2007 178 
2008 196 
2009 201 
2010 206 
Total Firm Years 781 
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Panel B: Industry Classification of Sample Firms 
Industry Number of Firm Percentage 
Mining and Quarrying  52 6% 
Manufacturing  274 35% 
Wholesale and Retail  126 16% 
Transportation and Communication 120 15% 
Utilities 41 5% 
Construction 77 9% 
Other 99 14% 
Total 781 100% 
 
3.3.2 Methodology 
3.3.2.1 Matrix method for the calculation of board level connections 
We have a set of nodes (boards of directors), and a single, non-directional relation 
(the existence of a shared director) measured on every pairs of nodes. For the 
purpose of explanation, we construct a symmetric matrix in an Excel file (See Table 
3.2). We put the firm’s name in the rows and columns. Let X refers to the matrix of 
social network data. In each cells there is a binary variable, which is equal to one if 
firm A and firm B share one director, and 0 otherwise. Moreover, we construct a 
“value matrix” when two firms share more than one director with each cell 
recording the number of shared directors. Networks derived from these matrices are 
undirected.  
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Table 3.2 Examples of matrices for calculating board level connections 
Panel A: Binary Matrix 
 A B C 
A 0 1 0 
B 1 0 1 
C 0 1 0 
 
Panel B: Value Matrix 
 A B C 
A 0 2 0 
B 2 0 3 
C 0 3 0 
In the first network (Panel A), firm A has a tie with firm B, but not with C and itself. 
Firm B has a tie with A and C, firm C has a tie with firm B. In the second network 
(Panel B), firm A shares two directors with firm B. Firm B shares two directors with 
firm A, three directors with firm C. Firm C shares three directors with firm B. Once 
we construct an annual director network for each year in an Excel file and we are 
able to calculate the centrality measures by importing the Excel file into the social 
network analysis software (UCINET).  
 
3.3.2.2 Empirical estimation 
This study uses the random effects model to estimate the effects of board network 
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position on firm performance. Gujarati (2003) suggests that if N (781 for this study) 
is large and T (4 for this study) is small, the estimators of the random effects are 
more efficient than the fixed effects model. However, the Hausman test is also 
employed in this study to confirm that the random effects model is superior to the 
fixed effects model. It basically tests whether the X variables are correlated with the 
errors: 
The null hypothesis is:  
H0: The X variables are not correlated with the errors (Random Effects). 
The alternative hypothesis is:  
H1: The X variables are correlated with the errors (Fixed Effects). 
 
Based on the Hausman test (Table 3.3), the Chi Square value is not significant. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis is not rejected and random effects model should be 
chosen.  
Table 3.3 The Hausman Test Results 
Ho: difference in coefficients is not systematic 
 Chi2(10)  = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
=12.46 
Prob>chi2 = 0.7552 
 
Where b represents the coefficients of the fixed effects model, B represents the 
coefficients of the random effects model, V_b-V_B is the difference between the 
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variences of b and B, b-B is the difference between the coefficients from fixed 
effects and random effects model. 
 
We use Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) as performance 
indices. ROAit or ROEit= F(Netit, Govit, Cit). By regressing board network position 
(board centrality), corporate governance variables, and control variables on firm’s 
financial characteristics, the full model is specified as follows: 
ROAit or ROEit = ß0+ ß1Centralityit+ ß2Board_Sizeit+ ß3Busy_Boardit+ 
ß4Board_Indepit+ ß5CEO_Dualityit+ ß6Remun_Committeit+ ß7Nomini_Committeit+ 
ß8Audit_Committeit+ ß9Market_Valueit + ß10Leverageit+ ß11Industry_Dummyit+ 
ß12Year_Dummyit                                                  3-1 
 
Here: 
Firm performance is measured by Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity 
(ROE). ROA and ROE are generally used as measures of accounting performance. 
ROA is calculated by the ratio of net income to total assets. ROE is calculated by 
the ratio of net income to total equity. 
 
Centralityit refers to variables representing the firm network measures (board 
centrality). This set of variables includes “Degree centrality”, “Eigenvector 
centrality”, “Closeness centrality”, “Betweenness centrality” and “Information 
centrality” 
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Corporate governance variables include board size, busy board, board independence, 
CEO duality and the total number of members of the remuneration committee, 
nomination committee and audit committee. Firm characteristics variables include 
market value and leverage. 
 
Raheja (2005) argues that optimal board structure should reflect a trade off between 
the benefits of increased monitoring and the costs of monitoring. Board size can 
vary from small (five members) to a very large number (fifteen members). Optimal 
board composition may differ with firm specific characteristics and there is no 
consensus on whether small or large boards can provide effective monitoring. 
Larger boards are better than smaller boards because they can have more 
commercial connections and can very easily obtain scarce resources and 
information (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Larger board also possess more 
specialized skills and opinions compared to a smaller board (Agrawal and Knoeber, 
2001). However, larger boards could suffer from coordination and communication 
problem and thus reduce the effectiveness of governance. Conyon and Peck (1998) 
find a negative correlation between board size and firm performance using a sample 
from the UK, France, Netherlands, Denmark and Italy between 1992 and 1995.  
 
Firms with a high percentage of non-executive directors are regarded as following 
good corporate governance practice (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989) and they are 
supposed to have a positive impact on firm performance. However, most prior 
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empirical studies do not find significant positive relationship between board 
independence and firm performance. For example, Bhagat and Black (2002) find 
that there is no relationship between board independence and firm performance as 
measured by Tobin’s Q, ROA, sales to assets ratio and market adjusted stock price 
returns using a large sample of U.S. firms in 1991. Baysinger and Butler (1985) also 
find no significant correlation between board independence and firm financial 
performance measured by Return on Equity (ROE) for a sample of 266 U.S. firms 
between 1970 and 1980. 
 
The definition of busy boards defined by Fich and Shivdasani (2006) is employed 
here, namely that more than half of the directors hold three or more directorships. 
Busy boards should adversely affect firm performance because the directors do not 
have enough time to monitor each firm effectively. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find 
that the Forbes 500 largest firms with busy boards are correlated with lower market 
to book ratios from 1989 to 1995.  
 
The separation of CEO and chairman is considered to positively influence 
performance because such an arrangement increases board’s independence and 
leads to the effective monitoring and oversight (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Cadbury 
(1992) suggest that the role of chairman should be separated from the role of CEO 
because if one person holding two roles at the same time is considered as 
concentration of power which might reduce the board independence. Therefore, we 
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expect that the separation of CEO and chairman will have a positive effect on firm 
performance. 
 
A greater number of directors on remuneration, nomination and audit committees is 
regarded as being consistent with good corporate governance practice (Lorsch and 
MacIver, 1989; Levy, 1993; the UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010) so the size 
of these committees should be positively associated with firm performance. Table 
3.4 lists all of the control variables and their definitions. 
Table 3.4 Control Variable Definitions 
Variable Name (Abbreviation) Definition 
Board size (BS) The total number of directors on the board 
Board Independence (BI) Number of non-executive directors divided by the total 
number of directors 
Duality A dummy variable taking the value of one if the roles 
of CEO and Chairman are split, zero otherwise 
Busy Board (BB) A dummy variable taking the value of one if more than 
half of the directors hold three directorships and zero 
otherwise 
Audit Committee (AC) The total number of members of the board Audit 
committee 
Nomination Committee (NC) The total number of members of the board Nomination 
committee 
Remuneration Committee (RC) The total number of members of the board 
Remuneration committee 
Market Value (MV) Market capitalization of the firm 
Leverage Total debt divided by total equity 
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3.4 Empirical results 
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.5 presents the summary statistics for all of the variables used in the 
empirical analysis. The average board degree centrality is 0.28 with a median of 
0.35. The average board Eigenvector centrality is 1.35 with a median of 1.60. The 
average board Betweenness centrality is 0.15 with a median of 0.21. The average 
board Closeness centrality is 0.45 with a median of 0.48. The average board 
Information centrality is 5.26 with a median of 6.52. The average board size in the 
sample is 9.00 (mean=8.98) and ranges from 5.00 to 19.00. The percentage of 
non-executive directors, measured by the BI variable, is about 64% in our sample. 
In terms of CEO duality, about 95% of firms separated the role of CEO and 
Chairman, which was strongly recommended by the UK Corporate Governance 
Code (2010). The average value of the Busyboard variable is 0.46, which indicates 
that in 46% of firms more than half of the directors hold more than three 
directorships. The average audit committee size is 3.55, which is smaller than the 
nomination committee size (4.69) and the remuneration committee size (3.83). The 
average market value is £5.2 million and leverage is 0.17 (i.e. a 17% debt to equity 
ratio). 
 
Table 3.6 depicts the Pearson correlation matrix for the key variables employed in 
the study. The correlation coefficient is used to test the strength of the relationship 
between the independent variables and thus detect the possible presence of 
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multicollinearity. Variables that are highly correlated with each other increase the 
standard errors of their partial regression coefficients, leading to low t-statistics. 
This makes it more difficult to reject the null hypothesis if multicollinearity is 
present. The worse-case scenario of high multicollinearity will make some variables 
statistically insignificant whereas they might be significant in reality. We find that 
degree centrality has a strong positive correlation with eigenvector centrality (0.55) 
as we expected. Board size is positively and significantly correlated with degree 
(0.41), eigenvector (0.32), betweenness (0.38), closeness (0.41) and information 
(0.55) centrality. Firm size measured by market value is found to be positively and 
significantly correlated with board size (0.48), which indicates that larger firms tend 
to have bigger boards, as one would expect. As we do not observe high correlation 
coefficients in the Pearson correlation matrix, multicollinearity does not appear to 
be a significant problem in our model. However, in order to double check that 
multicollinearity is not a significant problem, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
test is employed to test the level of multicollinearity (see Table 3.7). If a VIF is 
more than 10 or a tolerance (1/VIF) is less than 0.10 then multicollinearity may be a 
problem (O'Brien, 2007). Table 3.7 shows that none of the independent variables 
had VIF values greater than 10 (or tolerance values less than 0.10) with a mean VIF 
value of 2.40 and an overall tolerance value of 0.41, which confirms that 
multicollinearity is not a significant problem in our regression model. 
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Table 3.8 presents the top 10 most central FTSE 350 non-financial firms in 2007 
based on the five different centrality measures. It can be seen that some firms 
feature prominently in all five centrality rankings. RIO TINTO, for example, a 
multinational metals and mining company. However, firms like Bunzl only can be 
found in degree and eigenvector centrality, which suggests that firms that dominate 
in one or two centrality measures do not necessarily have high values for other 
centrality measures. 
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Table 3.5 Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics for all the variables used in this study. Degree, 
Eigenvector, Betweenness, Closeness and Information centrality are calculated by UCINET 
6 (Social Network Analysis Software). Board size is the number of directors on the board. 
BI stands for the percentage of non-executive directors sitting on the board. Duality is a 
dummy variable taking the value of one if the roles of CEO and Chairman are split, zero 
otherwise. BusyBoard is a dummy variable, which equals one if more than half of directors 
holding three or more directorships, otherwise is zero. Audit, Nomination and 
Remuneration are the number of board members serving on Audit, Nomination and 
Remuneration Committees. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to the book value of equity. 
MV is the market capitalization. 
 
Variable Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev 
Degree 0.28  0.35 0.00  3.85  0.85  
Eigenvector 1.35  1.60 0.00  48.61  2.26  
Betweenness 0.15  0.21 0.00  7.84  0.39  
Closeness 0.45  0.48 0.00  0.85  0.25  
Information 5.26 6.52 0.00 9.60 0.78 
Board Size 8.98  9.00 5.00  19.00  2.36  
BI 0.64 0.67 0.24  0.93  0.12 
Duality 0.95 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.22 
BusyBoard 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 
Audit 3.55 3.00 2.00 8.00 0.90 
Nomination 4.69 5.00 0.00 10.00 1.60 
Remuneration 3.83 4.00 2.00 8.00 1.00 
Leverage 0.17 0.18 0.00 0.48 0.11 
MV (million) 5,160 1,224 108 114,583 12,652 
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Table 3.6 Pearson Correlation Matrix  
This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for all the variables used in this study. Degree, Eigenvector, Betweenness, Closeness and Information 
are five different centrality measures. Board size is the number of directors sitting on the board. BI stands for the percentage of non-executive directors sitting 
on the board. Duality is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the roles of CEO and Chairman are split and zero otherwise. BusyBoard is a dummy 
variable, which equals one if more than half of directors holding three or more directorships, otherwise it is zero. Variables 10 to 12 represent the number of 
board members serving on Audit, Nomination and Remuneration Committees. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total equity. MV is the market 
capitalization. The asterisks ***, ** and * show statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
(1)Degree 1 
         
 
  
 
(2)Eigenvector 0.5535*** 1 
        
 
  
 
(3)Betweenness 0.4862*** 0.3238*** 1 
       
 
  
 
(4)Closeness 0.3339*** 0.1866*** 0.0323** 1 
      
 
  
 
(5)Information 0.3726*** 0.3957*** 0.3227** 0.6079** 1 
     
 
  
 
(6)Board Size 0.4103*** 0.3233*** 0.3804** 0.4129** 0.5505** 1 
    
 
  
 
(7)BI 0.1483** 0.1682** 0.1016** 0.0157 0.1315** 0.0873* 1 
   
 
  
 
(8)Duality -0.0036 -0.0085 -0.026 -0.0263 -0.0295 -0.0658* 0.1673* 1 
  
 
  
 
(9)BusyBoard 0.1047** 0.1457** 0.1274** 0.0069 0.1116** 0.1636* 0.3000* -0.0533 1 
 
 
  
 
(10)Audit 0.2505** 0.2138** 0.2240** 0.0625** 0.3561** 0.4317* 0.2638* 0.0441 0.1087* 1  
  
 
(11)Nomination 0.2908** 0.2234** 0.2818** 0.0764** 0.3361** 0.3128* 0.0916* 0.0950* -0.0349 0.4624* 1 
  
 
(12)Remunaration 0.2806** 0.2325** 0.2533** 0.0819** 0.3167** 0.3071* 0.2449* 0.1039* 0.0592* 0.7031* 0.4748* 1 
 
 
(13)Leverage 0.1279** 0.0926** 0.1364** 0.0067 0.1531** 0.1406* 0.0535 -0.0206 0.0421 0.1492* 0.0738* 0.1475* 1  
(14)MV 0.2634** 0.2709** 0.1791** 0.0755** 0.3543** 0.4845* 0.2633* 0.0402 0.2544* 0.2819* 0.0518 0.1677* 0.0500 1 
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Table 3.7 Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Test Results 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Information 6.20 0.16 
Degree 5.40 0.19 
Eigenvector 2.93 0.34 
Betweenness 2.71 0.37 
Closeness 2.45 0.41 
Audit 2.24 0.44 
Remuneration 2.19 0.46 
Board Size 1.84 0.54 
MV 1.53 0.65 
Nomination 1.51 0.66 
BI 1.25 0.80 
Busyboard 1.19 0.84 
Duality 1.06 0.95 
Leverage 1.05 0.96 
Mean 2.40 0.41 
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Table 3.8 Top 10 Central Firms 
Panel A: Firms with the highest Degree centrality 
Company Name CD 
TAYLOR WIMPEY 3.85 
ITV 3.76 
THOMAS COOK GROUP 3.25 
RIO TINTO 3.04 
BERKELEY GROUP HDG 2.91 
BAE SYSTEMS 2.83 
BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO 2.81 
RIYAL DUTCH SHELL 2.54 
TESCO 2.52 
ROLLS ROYCE 2.51 
 
 
Panel B: Firms with the highest Eigenvector centrality 
Company Name CBo 
BERKELEY GROUP HDG 48.61 
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL 46.17 
BUNZL 44.66 
SMITH(DS) 41.90 
NEXT 37.81 
RANK GRP 36.27 
BELLWAY 34.56 
RIO TINTO 32.10 
BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO 28.69 
TESCO 26.28 
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Panel C: Firms with the highest Betweenness centrality 
 
Company Name CB 
NATIONAL GRID 7.84 
BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO 7.36 
MARKS AND SPENCER 7.25 
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL 7.20 
RIO TINTO 7.19 
SAINSBURY 7.18 
ITV 6.17 
BP 6.13 
BAE SYSTEMS 6.11 
EURASIAN NATURAL RESOURCES 6.10 
 
Panel D: Firms with the highest Closeness centrality 
 
Company Name CC 
BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO 0.85 
THOMAS COOK GROUP 0.77 
BP 0.75 
BAE SYSTEMS 0.73 
TESCO 0.71 
RIO TINTO 0.69 
JOHNSON MATTHEY 0.66 
SAINSBURY 0.63 
BT GRP 0.63 
MARKS AND SPENCER 0.62 
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Panel E: Firms with the highest Information centrality 
 
Company Name CC 
BHP BILLITON PLC 9.60 
BAE SYSTEMS  9.45 
BP 8.42 
VODAFONE GROUP PLC 8.15 
RIO TINTO 8.09 
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL 8.06 
BT GRP 7.98 
SAINSBURY 7.86 
MARKS AND SPENCER 7.48 
JOHNSON MATTHEY  7.42 
 
Figure 3.1 shows the degree centrality of firms by industry between 2007 and 2010. 
The industry with the highest centrality is manufacturing, with an average degree 
centrality of 0.45 whereas ‘other’ industries has the lowest centrality of 0.07. Apart 
from ‘manufacturing’, the highest centrality industries are ‘wholesale and retail’, 
‘construction’ and ‘mining and quarrying’ with degree centrality measures ranging 
from about 0.32 to 0.40. Figure 3.2 shows the eigenvector centrality of firms by 
industry between 2007 and 2010. As we can see, ‘manufacturing’, ‘wholesale and 
retail’, and ‘mining and quarrying’ have the highest centrality measures, which are 
similar to degree centrality. Figure 3.3 shows the betweenness centrality of firms by 
industry between 2007 and 2010. In contrast to the degree and eigenvector centrality, 
‘wholesale and retail’ has the highest centrality of 0.28, while ‘manufacturing’ has 
the lowest centrality of 0.06. Figure 3.4 shows the closeness centrality of firms by 
industry between 2007 and 2010. The industries with the highest centrality are 
‘manufacturing’, ‘wholesale and retail’, ‘mining and quarrying’ and ‘transportation 
and communication’. Figure 3.5 shows the information centrality of firms by 
industry between 2007 and 2010. ‘wholesale and retail’, ‘manufacturing’ and 
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‘mining and quarrying’ have the highest centrality. In summary, it is evident that 
‘wholesale and retail’ and ‘manufacturing’ have the highest centrality across all five 
centrality measures.   
Figure 3.1: Degree centrality classified by industry for the non-financial FTSE 
350 firms between 2007 and 2010 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Eigenvector centrality classified by industry for the non-financial 
FTSE 350 firms between 2007 and 2010 
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Figure 3.3: Betweenness centrality classified by industry for the non-financial 
FTSE 350 firms between 2007 and 2010 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Closeness centrality classified industry for the non-financial FTSE 
350 firms between 2007 and 2010 
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Figure 3.5: Information centrality classified by industry for the non-financial 
FTSE 350 firms between 2007 and 2010 
 
 
 
Figures 3.6 – 3.9 present the networks linking all sample firms listed on the London 
Stock Exchange for each year between 2007 and 2010. In 2007, there were only 
four firms isolated from the whole network, but this number increased to twelve in 
2008 and to thirty in 2009. In 2010, we found that firms isolated from the whole 
network decreased to seven. In 2009, four firms (No 10, 65, 84, and 212) were 
isolated from the main network and became two small branches. It can be seen that 
the firm (No 108) connected with two firms (No 146 and 175) in 2007. However, it 
was isolated from the whole network in 2008 and 2009. In 2010, it connected with 
two firms (No 32 and 224) again. In addition, we observe that the directors’ network 
in 2007 is denser than networks in 2008 and 2009. The likely reasons behind this 
phenomenon are that directors lacked the time to devote to board duties, which grew 
heavier during the global financial crisis (Wong, 2012). Second, the probability of 
directors’ resignation (e.g. CEO, CFO, etc) was much higher during financial crisis 
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period. According to a 2008 Wall Street Journal analysis, nearly 50 non-executive 
directors who were full time CEOs or CFOs elsewhere resigned their posts that year 
in troubled financial services, retail and home construction sectors (Wong, 2012). 
Besides, the number of FTSE 100 finance directors who remained in their jobs 
during the financial crisis period (2008-2009) decreased by 16 percent from 94 to 
79 compared with the year 2008 (Groom, 2009).  
 
 
Figure 3.6 The network of 190 firms listed on London Stock Exchange (2007) 
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Figure 3.7 The network of 194 firms listed on London Stock Exchange (2008) 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8 The network of 196 firms listed on London Stock Exchange (2009) 
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Figure 3.9 The network of 201 firms listed on London Stock Exchange (2010) 
 
3.4.2 Board networks and firm performance 
There are two different opinions existing in the literature. On the one hand, director 
networks reflect the reputation of directors (Fama and Jenson, 1983). Firms with 
well-connected directors have more opportunities to access different information 
and resources and therefore improve firm performance. On the other hand, 
well-connected directors are sometimes overcommitted and lack the time to 
scrutinize their businesses effectively. Thus, firms with well-connected directors 
have lower performance. In order to test these two competing hypotheses, 
multivariate analysis is applied. Director interlocks or networks are mostly 
measured by the number of directorships in the existing literature. However, this 
method only captures the quantity of directors’ obligations, not their quality. It 
cannot be explained by the extent whether directors are really busy and 
overcommitted. For example, a director who holds five directorships in small firms 
is not necessarily busier than a director who holds, say, three directorships in larger 
firms. Therefore, we suggest that a more accurate measure of networks can be 
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obtained from the concept of centrality employed in social network analysis. Board 
network centrality is therefore applied to measure the position of firms in entire 
networks of firms.  
 
We find that all board centrality measures have positive and significant effects on 
firm performance when we regress them in same model (see Table 3.9). Specifically, 
Table 3.9 column (1) shows that there is a positive and significant relationship 
between degree centrality and firm performance (ROA) at the 5% level. Also, firm 
performance is found to be positively and significantly associated with Eigenvector, 
betweenness, closeness and information centrality at 5%, 10%, 5%, and 5% 
significance levels respectively. The results do not support the null hypothesis but 
they do support alternative hypothesis 1 (H1) that board network centrality is 
positively associated with firm performance. We also find that board size is 
negatively and significantly associated with firm performance at the 5% level, 
which suggests that large boards tend to perform poorly. Board independence is 
found to be positively and significantly associated with firm performance. The 
results support the argument that the majority of the board should be composed of 
non-executive directors. We also observe that busy board is negatively and 
significantly associated with firm performance. This result suggests that busy 
directors are unable to effectively contribute to all of the businesses where they 
occupy board positions. When we measure firm performance by ROE, we find 
similar results (see Table 3.9 column (2)). Leverage has a significant negative effect 
on firm performance. This is consistent with the argument of McConnell and 
Servaes (1995) that firms may have to forego expenditure on projects with positive 
net present values (underinvest) if they have excessive debt.  
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Table 3.9 Board Networks Position and Firm Performance 
This table presents the regression results of the impact of board networks position on firm 
performance. The dependent variables are ROA and ROE. Degree, Eigenvector, 
Betweenness, Closeness and Information Centrality are calculated by UCINET 6 (Social 
Network Analysis Software). BoardSize is the number of directors sitting on the board. BI 
stands for the percentage of non-executive directors sitting on the board. Duality is a 
dummy variable taking the value of one if the roles of CEO and Chairman are split, zero 
otherwise. BusyBoard is a dummy variable, which equals one if more than half of directors 
holding three or more directorships, otherwise it is zero. Audit, Nomination and 
Remuneration are the number of board members serving on Audit, Nomination and 
Remuneration Committees. Leverage is the ratio of Total Debt to Total Equity. MV is the 
market capitalization. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) 
levels. 
 
 Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable: (1)Return on Assets (2)Return on Equity 
Degree 5.422** 
(2.563) 
3.985** 
(2.341) 
Eigenvector 7.319** 
(2.331) 
6.439** 
(2.296) 
Betweenness 
 
Closeness 
6.322* 
(1.843) 
10.342** 
(2.674) 
4.498* 
(1.673) 
5.285** 
(2.164) 
Information 8.432** 
(2.436) 
6.849** 
(2.135) 
BoardSize -1.943** 
(-2.574) 
-0.424* 
(-1.612) 
BI 2.235** 
(2.892) 
1.427** 
(2.577) 
Duality 0.235 
(0.453) 
1.928 
(0.984) 
BusyBoard -4.345*** 
(-3.258) 
-5.484*** 
(-3.128) 
Audit 1.423 
(0.467) 
2.857 
(0.768) 
Nomination 4.343 
(0.879) 
3.847 
(0.984) 
Remuneration 3.335 
(0.562) 
3.26 
(0.662) 
Leverage -12.327** 
(-2.128) 
-10.482** 
(-2.478) 
MV 4.354 
(0.135) 
2.484 
(0.148) 
Intercept -12.453 -10.485 
Industry and Time Dummies Yes Yes 
Adj R
2
 0.32 0.26 
 
F 
 
3.65 
 
3.15 
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Table 3.10 Board Networks Position and Firm Performance Measured by ROA 
This table presents the regression results of the impact of Board Networks Position on firm 
performance. The dependent variable is ROA. Centrality measures are calculated by 
UCINET 6. Board size (BS) is the number of directors sitting on the board. BI stands for 
the percentage of non-executive directors sitting on the board. Duality is a dummy variable 
taking the value of one if the roles of CEO and Chairman are split, zero otherwise. 
BusyBoard is a dummy variable, which equals one if more than half of directors holding 
three or more directorships, otherwise it is zero. Audit, Nomination and Remuneration are 
the number of board members serving on Audit, Nomination and Remuneration 
Committees. Leverage is the ratio of Total Debt to Total Equity. MV is the market 
capitalization. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Degree 5.561** 
(2.762) 
    
Eigenvector  7.467*** 
(2.465) 
   
Betweenness   4.473* 
(1.787) 
  
Closeness    10.746** 
(2.946) 
 
Information     9.842** 
(2.318) 
BoardSize -1.656** 
(-2.523) 
-1.899*** 
(-2.888) 
-2.646** 
(-2.583) 
-0.667*** 
(-2.876) 
-2.858*** 
(-2.985) 
BI 2.685** 
(2.474) 
2.859** 
(2.371) 
2.768** 
(2.985) 
2.847** 
(2.475) 
3.212** 
(2.146) 
Duality 0.483 
(0.484) 
0.657 
(0.378) 
0.489 
(0.125) 
0.589 
(0.487) 
0.674 
(0.849) 
BusyBoard -2.623*** 
(-3.654) 
-3.454*** 
(-2.879) 
-4.878*** 
(-2.988) 
-3.767*** 
(-2.634) 
-4.378*** 
(-3.411) 
Audit 0.984 
(1.263) 
-0.782 
(-1.656) 
-0.767 
(-1.223) 
-0.456 
(-1.774) 
-0.837 
(-1.327) 
Nomination 1.556 
(1.885) 
-2.998 
(-1.874) 
-0.456 
(-0.993) 
-0.578 
(-0.996) 
-0.396 
(-0.132) 
Remuneration 0.674 
(0.775) 
2.858 
(0.825) 
0.873 
(1.489) 
0.532 
(1.673) 
0.463 
(1.410) 
Leverage -8.387*** 
(-2.788) 
-8.587*** 
(-2.865) 
-9.998*** 
(-4.984) 
-8.582*** 
(-4.665) 
-9.314*** 
(-4.414) 
MV 3.784 
(0.786) 
2.847 
(0.776) 
0.083 
(0.856) 
0.088 
(0.985) 
0.183 
(0.849) 
Intercept -0.015** 
(2.53) 
-0.016** 
(2.73) 
-0.016** 
(2.14) 
-0.017** 
(2.56) 
-0.042** 
(2.35) 
Industry and 
Time Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R
2 
0.32 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.35 
F 3.32 3.44 3.87 3.99 3.96 
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Table 3.11 Board Networks Position and Firm Performance Measured by ROE 
This table presents the regression results of the impact of Board Networks Position on firm 
performance. The dependent variable is ROE. Centrality measures are calculated by 
UCINET 6. Board size (BS) is the number of directors sitting on the board. BI stands for 
the percentage of non-executive directors sitting on the board. Duality is a dummy variable 
taking the value of one if the roles of CEO and Chairman are split, zero otherwise. 
BusyBoard is a dummy variable, which equals one if more than half of directors holding 
three or more directorships, otherwise it is zero. Audit, Nomination and Remuneration are 
the number of board members serving on Audit, Nomination and Remuneration 
Committees. Leverage is the ratio of Total Debt to Total Equity. MV is the market 
capitalization. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Degree 8.536** 
(2.793) 
    
Eigenvector  7.423** 
(2.444) 
   
Betweenness   6.677* 
(1.868) 
  
Closeness    10.532** 
(2.856) 
 
Information     9.283** 
(2.567) 
BS -1.569** 
(-2.776) 
-2.839** 
(-2.538) 
-1.332** 
(-2.609) 
-2.485** 
(-2.491) 
-1.349** 
(-2.586) 
BI 2.556** 
(2.244) 
2.829** 
(2.271) 
1.428** 
(2.565) 
2.829** 
(2.429) 
3.491** 
(2.244) 
Duality 0.652 
(0.419) 
0.657 
(0.398) 
0.399 
(0.305) 
0.279 
(0.297) 
0.639 
(0.139) 
BusyBoard -2.649*** 
(-3.374) 
-3.454*** 
(-2.289) 
-3.948*** 
(-2.688) 
-3.729*** 
(-2.294) 
-4.491*** 
(-3.441) 
Audit 0.734 
(1.153) 
-0.372 
(-1.496) 
-0.967 
(-1.323) 
-0.106 
(-1.294) 
-0.832 
(-1.324) 
Nomination 1.486 
(1.495) 
-2.878 
(-1.694) 
-0.436 
(-0.203) 
-0.498 
(-0.940) 
-0.331 
(-0.429) 
Remuneration 0.895 
(0.645) 
2.856 
(0.885) 
0.849 
(1.221) 
0.291 
(1.367) 
0.449 
(1.429) 
Leverage -8.389*** 
(-2.198) 
-7.492*** 
(-2.584) 
-9.478*** 
(-4.284) 
-8.584*** 
(-4.281) 
-9.193*** 
(-4.384) 
MV 3.482 
(0.402) 
2.692 
(0.759) 
0.294 
(0.583) 
0.482 
(0.932) 
0.393 
(0.812) 
Intercept -0.073** 
(-2.654) 
-0.079** 
(-2.266) 
-0.071** 
(-2.562) 
-0.593** 
(-2.431) 
-0.492** 
(-2.631) 
Industry and 
Time Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R
2 
0.28 0.25 0.22 0.23 0.28 
F 2.77 2.88 3.56 2.88 2.93 
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Table 3.12 
Board Networks Position measured by N-SCORE and Firm Performance 
This table presents the regression results of the impact of N-SCORE on firm performance. 
The dependent variable is ROA and ROE. N-SCORE is calculated by taking the average 
quintile rank in each of the four centrality measures. BS is the number of directors sitting on 
the board. BI stands for the percentage of non-executive directors sitting on the board. 
Duality is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the roles of CEO and Chairman are 
split, zero otherwise. BusyBoard is a dummy variable, which equals one if more than half 
of directors holding three or more directorships, otherwise it is zero. Audit, Nomination and 
Remuneration are the number of board members serving on Audit, Nomination and 
Remuneration Committees. MV is the market capitalization. Leverage is the ratio of Total 
Debt to Total Equity. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) 
levels. 
 
 Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable (1)Return On Assets (2)Return On Equity 
 N-Score 1.492** 
(2.201) 
2.425** 
(2.693) 
BS -0.398** 
(-2.314) 
-1.941** 
(-2.591) 
BI 1.223*** 
(3.484) 
1.589** 
(2.983 
Duality 0.489 
(0.082) 
0.743 
(0.099) 
BusyBoard -0.492** 
(-2.491) 
-2.648** 
(-2.533) 
Audit -0.594 
(-0.491) 
-9.291 
(-0.748) 
Nomination 1.840 
(1.819) 
2.311 
(0.493) 
Remuneration 1.349 
(1.259) 
5.493 
(1.145) 
Leverage -11.314** 
(-3.319) 
-15.429** 
(-2.593) 
MV 0.597 
(0.402) 
3.524 
(0.524) 
Intercept 
 
Industry and Time Dummies 
Adj R
2 
 
F 
0.593** 
(2.456) 
Yes 
0.25 
 
2.65 
0.420** 
(2.325) 
Yes 
0.32 
 
2.97 
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We then test the effects of five centrality measures on firm performance separately 
(see Table 3.10). Table 3.10 column (1) shows that there is a positive and 
significant relationship, at the 5% level, between degree centrality and firm 
performance after controlling for corporate governance characteristics, firm 
characteristics and other control variables. Column (2) of Table 3.10 shows a 
positive influence of eigenvector centrality on firm performance, significant at the 1% 
level. This implies that not only the number of ties is important, but the quality of 
ties is also important.  
 
Third, we examine the effect of Betweenness centrality on firm performance (Table 
3.10, Column (3)) and find that it has a positive and significant effect on firm 
performance after controlling for industry and other control variables, although the 
significance is only at the 10% level. Betweenness is based on communication. If a 
firm lies on the shortest path between two other firms, information between these 
firms will likely pass by on its way through the network. Therefore, this firm can 
control information flows to an extent, giving it power over other firms. Fourth, we 
test the effect of closeness centrality on firm performance. We find that the 
relationship between them is positive and significant at the 5% level (see Table 3.10, 
Column (4)). Finally, we test the effect of information centrality on firm 
performance and find that it has a strong positive association with firm performance, 
also significant at the 5% level. This suggests that information or resources may not 
only flow through the shortest path but could travel via other circuitous routes. 
Based on the above results, alternative hypothesis 1 (H1), which argues that firms 
with well-connected directors are associated with better firm performance, is 
supported. 
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In order to test the robustness of these results, we examine the relationship between 
board network centrality and firm performance using ROE instead of ROA as the 
dependent variable. The results, reported in Table 3.11, are consistent with prior 
results. However, although the magnitudes of the regression coefficients are larger 
in Table 3.11, the adjusted R
2
 values are slightly lower. It is worth noting that in 
both Tables 3.10 and 3.11 the partial regression coefficient with the greatest 
magnitude is that for closeness centrality. Firm performance as measured by ROA 
and ROE will improve by 10.75% and 10.53% respectively as the closeness 
centrality measure increases by 1%. The results suggest that the shortness of the 
paths linking firms to other firms has the greatest economic impact on firm 
performance. 
 
Table 3.12 contains the results from regressing the aggregate N-Score value of 
network centrality on firm performance. The regression results demonstrate that the 
N-Score values are significantly related to firm performance at the 5% level, when 
controlling for the other variables. We also find that board independence is 
positively and significantly associated with firm performance, while board size, 
busy board and leverage are negatively and significantly related to firm performance, 
consistent with our previous findings. 
 
3.4.3 Endogeneity 
It may be argued that endogeneity is a potential issue that needs to be accounted for 
in our regressions. In addition to noting that the problem of reverse causality, 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) argue that the issue of endogeneity can also be 
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divided into two categories: equilibrium and out-of-equilibrium explanations. For 
example, some empirical studies show that there is a negative relation between 
board size and firm performance. Based on the out-of-equilibrium explanation, large 
boards may be difficult to manage and thus reduce the effectiveness of boards and 
firm value. However, the equilibrium explanation suggests that other factors which 
haven’t been controlled for in the explanatory model could affect board size and 
firm performance simultaneously, so that it’s hard to say which one affects which. In 
this study, firstly, we must recognize that good companies will be inclined to hire 
well-connected directors. Thus, there could be a reverse causality from firm 
performance to board networks. Secondly, some specific firm characteristics (such 
as previous firm performance) could affect firm value and board networks 
simultaneously.  
 
In order to examine the potential endogeneity issue, firstly, we use one year lagged 
values of the centrality measures in the following regression model (3-2). The idea 
is that although firm performance can affect board networks and vice versa, it is 
unlikely that firm performance can influence the past values of board networks. 
Secondly, we also include lagged values of firm performance to control for the 
effect of past performance on current board composition (Wooldridge, 2003) (see 
model 3-2). This approach is also consistent with previous studies (e.g. Bohren and 
Strom, 2005 and Horton et al, 2012). 
ROAit or ROEit = ß0+ ß1Centralityit-1 + ß2Performanceit-1+ ß3Board_Sizeit+ 
ß4Busy_Boardit+ ß5Board_Indepit+ ß6CEO_Dualityit+ ß7Remun_Committeit+ 
ß8Nomini_Committeit+ ß9Audit_Committeit+ ß10Market_Valueit + ß11Leverageit+ 
ß12Industry_Dummyit+ ß13Year_Dummyit   3-2 
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It can be seen from Tables 3.13 - 3.14 that the results of the one year lagged values 
of the centrality measures are still consistent with our previous findings, which 
suggests that boards with well-connected directors positively affect firm 
performance. Since the lagged value of the centrality measures still remain 
statistically significant, we conclude that the centrality measures do not suffer from 
the endogeneity issue in our regressions.  
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Table 3.13 Lagged Board Networks Position and Lagged Firm Performance  
This table presents the regression results of the impact of Board Networks Position (one year 
lagged) on firm performance. The dependent variable is ROA. Performance (Lagged) is one 
year lagged values of firm performance. Board size is the number of directors sitting on the 
board. BI stands for the percentage of non-executive directors sitting on the board. Duality is a 
dummy variable taking the value of one if the roles of CEO and Chairman are split, zero 
otherwise. BusyBoard is a dummy variable, which equals one if more than half of directors 
holding three or more directorships, otherwise it is zero. Audit, Nomination and Remuneration 
are the number of board members serving on Audit, Nomination and Remuneration Committees. 
Leverage is the ratio of Total Debt to Total Equity. MV is the market capitalization. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Degree 3.105** 
(2.490) 
    
Eigenvector  3.578** 
(2.563) 
   
Betweenness   2.197* 
(1.791) 
  
Closeness    5.225** 
(2.841) 
 
Information     4.585** 
(2.291) 
Performance 
(Lagged) 
0.773*** 
(4.599) 
0.854*** 
(5.582) 
0.738*** 
(5.221) 
0.847*** 
(6.565) 
0.651** 
(2.584) 
BoardSize -2.950** 
(-2.662) 
-1.482** 
(-2.557) 
-2.592** 
(-2.655) 
-1.895*** 
(-2.825) 
-2.645*** 
(-2.889) 
BI 2.583** 
(2.558) 
2.494* 
(1.858) 
2.291** 
(2.657) 
2.497** 
(2.587) 
2.764** 
(2.574) 
Duality 0.488 
(0.284) 
0.756 
(0.292) 
0.291 
(0.468) 
0.696 
(0.484) 
0.578 
(0.982) 
BusyBoard -3.173*** 
(-3.879) 
-2.633*** 
(-2.692) 
-4.592*** 
(-2.592) 
-3.294*** 
(-2.592) 
-2.482*** 
(-3.875) 
Audit 0.375 
(1.032) 
-0.949 
(-1.225) 
-0.768 
(-1.592) 
-0.858 
(-1.239) 
-0.583 
(-1.258) 
Nomination 1.343 
(0.784) 
-1.296 
(-0.499) 
-0.569 
(-0.685) 
-0.347 
(-0.558) 
-0.591 
(-0.567) 
Remuneration 0.955 
(0.274) 
1.258 
(0.375) 
0.792 
(1.359) 
0.592 
(1.491) 
0.479* 
(1.949) 
Leverage -3.480*** 
(-2.866) 
-5.482*** 
(-2.683) 
-4.458*** 
(-4.849) 
-7.458*** 
(-3.284) 
-6.258*** 
(-4.654) 
MV 1.094 
(0.756) 
2.592 
(0.768) 
0.548 
(0.338) 
0.285 
(0.496) 
0.594 
(0.527) 
Intercept -0.033** 
(2.694) 
-0.028** 
(2.492) 
-0.049** 
(2.867) 
-0.033** 
(2.578) 
-0.058** 
(2.322) 
Industry and 
Time Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R
2 
0.30 0.33 0.34 0.31 0.29 
F 3.12 3.45 3.79 3.58 3.11 
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Table 3.14 Lagged Board Networks Position and Lagged Firm Performance  
This table presents the regression results of the impact of Board Networks Position (one year 
lagged) on firm performance. The dependent variable is ROE. Performance (Lagged) is one 
year lagged values of firm performance. Board size is the number of directors sitting on the 
board. BI stands for the percentage of non-executive directors sitting on the board. Duality is a 
dummy variable taking the value of one if the roles of CEO and Chairman are split, zero 
otherwise. BusyBoard is a dummy variable, which equals one if more than half of directors 
holding three or more directorships, otherwise it is zero. Audit, Nomination and Remuneration 
are the number of board members serving on Audit, Nomination and Remuneration Committees. 
Leverage is the ratio of Total Debt to Total Equity. MV is the market capitalization.  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Degree 4.383** 
(2.647) 
    
Eigenvector  3.112** 
(2.482) 
   
Betweenness   3.484* 
(1.512) 
  
Closeness    3.491** 
(2.667) 
 
Information     3.349* 
(2.228) 
Performance 
(Lagged) 
0.492*** 
(5.291) 
2.383*** 
(5.689) 
1.447*** 
(4.382) 
1.449*** 
(5.402) 
1.585*** 
(7.212) 
BoardSize -1.456* 
(-2.373) 
-1.492** 
(-2.647) 
-1.542* 
(-2.213) 
-2.298** 
(-2.484) 
-1.558** 
(-2.772) 
BI 1.592** 
(2.594) 
2.335** 
(2.502) 
1.495** 
(2.942) 
2.859** 
(2.301) 
3.586** 
(2.876) 
Duality 0.291 
(0.583) 
0.852 
(0.596) 
0.664 
(0.621) 
0.658 
(0.487) 
0.524 
(0.598) 
BusyBoard -3.592*** 
(-3.887) 
-3.527*** 
(-2.878) 
-2.956*** 
(-3.282) 
-3.494*** 
(-2.699) 
-3.756*** 
(-3.494) 
Audit 0.492 
(1.259) 
-0.479 
(-1.286) 
-1.530 
(-1.789) 
-0.350 
(-1.627) 
-0.265 
(-1.529) 
Nomination 1.792 
(1.576) 
-2.694 
(-1.675) 
-0.695 
(-0.232) 
-0.258 
(-0.492) 
-0.688 
(-0.647) 
Remuneration 0.529 
(0.958) 
2.485 
(0.829) 
0.453 
(1.659) 
0.998 
(1.332) 
0.583 
(1.002) 
Leverage -3.543** 
(-2.846) 
-5.658*** 
(-2.529) 
-5.502*** 
(-4.948) 
-4.599*** 
(-3.887) 
-6.555*** 
(-4.563) 
MV 2.591 
(0.268) 
2.668 
(0.760) 
0.575 
(0.821) 
0.520 
(0.936) 
0.998 
(0.576) 
Intercept -0.055** 
(-2.962) 
-0.066** 
(-2.439) 
-0.068** 
(-2.758) 
-0.397** 
(-2.482) 
-0.682** 
(-2.629) 
Industry and 
Time Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R
2 
0.31 0.29 0.29 0.25 0.28 
F 2.33 2.96 3.98 2.46 2.76 
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3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have investigated the relationship between board networks and 
firm performance. Specifically, we examine whether firm performance is affected 
by firms with more connected directors.  
 
Based on a sample of the non-financial UK FTSE 350 firms between 2007 and 2010, 
we find that firms with more connected directors presents better firm performance 
while controlling for corporate governance characteristics, firm characteristics and 
other variables. The results provide support for the “Reputation Hypothesis” (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983), the number of connections may proxy for director reputation. 
Directors are motivated to improve their reputation since they can use their 
directorships to signal to the market that they are good at decision-making, and at 
providing advice and monitoring management. Therefore, a board with 
well-connected directors could lead to an increase in firm value.  
 
The results for the busy board as control variable indicate that directors with 
multiple directorships hurt the firm performance as expected. This evidence may be 
valuable to the regulator as it supports the idea of restricting of the number of 
directorships each director can hold.  
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Chapter 4 Director Networks and CEO Compensation 
4.1 Introduction 
The growth in executive pay over past decades has attracted considerable public 
attention and generated ongoing debate about the effectiveness of the board of 
directors and the high compensation that directors receive. Many investors have 
questioned whether executives are worth their substantial pay packages and, 
particularly since the start of the financial crisis, this concern has been widely 
shared around the world. 
 
The main duties of the board of directors are to monitor and govern the organization, 
to set the salaries and compensation of company management and to protect the 
interests of shareholders (McNamara, 2008). Some authors argue that corporate 
governance weaknesses hamper the board effectiveness. For instance, Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) argue that boards of directors are not able to effectively monitor 
management and directors’ performance because of information asymmetry 
problems that exist between management and the board. Yermack (1996) finds that 
board size is negatively correlated to firm performance. This implies that large 
boards are difficult to monitor which could affect the effectiveness of board and 
thus decreasing firm performance. Furthermore, Core et al. (1999) find that firms 
with gray, interlocked and busy directors are linked with high CEO compensation 
and low firm performance.  
 
This chapter investigates the effects of director networks on CEO compensation 
among non-financial FTSE 350 firms listed on the London Stock Exchange, while 
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controlling for other determinants of CEO compensation. Unlike most previous 
studies, it examines not only the total remuneration of the CEO but also two 
important components of the remuneration package, i.e. basic salary and long term 
incentive plans (LTIPs). We also investigate two levels of director networks, i.e. 
CEO networks (individual level) and board networks (firm level). Using Social 
Network Analysis, this chapter describes the extent of director networks among 
non-financial FTSE 350 firms and whether director networks centrality is related to 
CEO compensation. 
 
This chapter makes several contributions to the literature. First, in order to capture 
different aspects of director networks, it employs five different network centrality 
measures (degree, betweenness, closeness, eigenvector and information) which are 
more comprehensive than the measures used in previous U.K. studies (Renneboog 
and Zhao, 2011; Horton et al., 2012). Second, while many studies employ 
cross-sectional data and only focus on specific industries, this chapter uses a panel 
data approach and also includes data from the financial crisis period. This chapter 
documents whether CEO compensation decreased as expected during this period. 
Third, the effects of director networks centrality on two important components of 
CEO compensation, i.e. basic salary and long term incentive plans (LTIPs), rather 
than just CEO total compensation, are examined. Fourth, director networks are 
studied at both the individual level (CEO) and the firm level (board), while most 
previous studies only examine them at the individual level. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section two briefly reviews 
the relevant literature and develops the hypotheses. Section three describes the 
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methodology. A description of the data is presented in Section four. The empirical 
results of the study are presented in Section five. Finally, Section six provides the 
summary and conclusions. 
 
4.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses 
4.2.1 Theoretical background: Agency theory 
There is a phenomenon known as “the separation of ownership and control” existing 
in the modern corporations. The firms’ shareholders/owners, also called the 
principals, provide capital for the company and own its residual claims, but they do 
not involve in the day-to-day management of the company. On the other hand, the 
firms’ managers/executives, called the agents, are contracted by the shareholders to 
deal with the firm’s day-to-day decision making and control (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). In return, they are paid rent for their labour and time. It has been argued that 
this separation of roles is an efficient form of economic organization (Fama, 1980). 
However, agency problems could arise because sometimes the objectives of the 
principals (shareholders) and the agents (managers) are not perfectly aligned, which 
might lead to difficulty for the principals in monitoring the actions of the agents. 
Agency theory suggests that managers are likely to pursue their own interests and 
increase their own wealth rather than maximising shareholders’ wealth. In order to 
maintain the linkage between managers’ actions and the interests of shareholders, 
the design of the managers’ compensation contract is crucial. Optimal contracting 
theory argues that remuneration packages should be designed by the board of 
directors to maximize shareholders’ value. The board of directors should make sure 
that the contracts are enough to attract talented CEOs and provide motivations for 
them to exert effort and exploit opportunities when it appears.  
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4.2.2 Director networks and CEO compensation 
4.2.2.1 Introduction 
The validity of optimal contracting theory has been questioned by the rapid increase 
in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting approach, the board tries 
to maximize shareholders interests and the compensation plan is designed to reduce 
agency costs and align the interests between directors and shareholders. However, 
according to managerial power theory (Bebchuk et al., 2002), CEOs having power 
over the board of directors will be in a stronger negotiation position for their 
compensation package. This could result in inefficiently high levels of 
compensation and CEO pay being less sensitive to firm performance. It suggests 
that powerful CEOs (one measure of which is the extent of their networks) can 
influence their own compensation. Well-connected CEOs may accumulate more 
power and establish a stronger negotiation position on the board and the 
remuneration committee so that they are able to extract a more attractive 
compensation package. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) also argue that CEOs who 
prove to be very successful will have sufficient bargaining power to request higher 
compensation. Kuhnen and Zwiebel (2009) provide support for managerial power 
theory in their investigation of 1,724 U.S. firms and 2,383 CEOs during 1992-2005, 
finding that CEOs are able to manipulate their pay including both observable (salary) 
and unobservable (perks, pensions and pet projects) components, subject to the 
constraint that too much rent extraction will get them replaced.  
 
Networks not only increase the power of directors, but they could also provide 
companies with additional skills, knowledge and information, which may improve 
firm performance. According to resource dependency theory directors serve to link 
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their organizations with the external environment and gain access to key resources 
such as information and capital, which can reduce uncertainty (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). Directors who sit on multiple boards can gain access to broader corporate 
networks and thereby improve financial performance (Waddock and Graves, 1997). 
 
Schoorman et al. (1981) suggest that director networks bring four benefits to firms. 
First, firms can gain access to information regarding pricing, advertising and 
research and development. Second, firms can reduce the sources of uncertainty 
regarding its inputs and outputs. Third, firms can benefit from the experience and 
skills that directors bring to their board if the directors also serve on outside boards. 
Fourth, directors serving on outside boards act as a signal of managerial quality. 
Firms with prestigious directors on their board convey information to other firms 
regarding their value. Chuluun et al. (2010) suggest that information transmission in 
better connected firms could lower information asymmetries, lowering the 
perceived risk of their bonds. More specifically, they study a sample of 5,402 
bond-year observations in U.S. S&P 1,500 firms from 1994-2006. They find that 
well-connected firms benefit from lower borrowing costs. Engelberg et al. (2009) 
argue that firms can benefit from CEO networks by accessing information. A CEO 
who connected to lots of people can be regarded as a resource of information and 
influence, which give the firm chance to make better decisions. Therefore, the 
information value created through the CEO’s networks should be reflected in their 
compensation. 
 
4.2.2.2 Empirical studies of the relationship between director networks and 
CEO compensation  
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Recently several studies have investigated the relationship between CEO 
compensation and networks. Overall, these studies can be separated into two 
categories: individual level studies and firm level studies.  
 
4.2.2.2.1 CEO networks (Individual level) 
First, at the director level, Hallock (1997) finds that CEOs who are interlocked with 
other CEOs through their board of directors earn significantly higher salaries than 
non-interlocked CEOs, in his investigation of the boards of directors of the top 500 
U.S. firms and CEO compensation in 1992. Kramarz and Thesmar (2006) using 
data on the executive and non-executive directors of firms listed on the Paris Stock 
Exchange from 1992 to 2003 find that CEOs’ social networks affect board 
composition and that CEOs with active networks are less likely to be replaced even 
when they underperform. Kramarz and Thesmar (2006) note that usually a director 
is defined as independent if he/she was previously not an employee, customer or 
supplier. However, he/she could be well connected with the CEO through social 
networks, which can affect board independence, leading the authors to draw a 
distinction between ‘formal’ independence and ‘real’ independence. Therefore, 
Kramarz and Thesmar (2006) suggest that instead of raising the minimum fraction 
of independent directors, transparency in the director recruitment process may be 
more important.  
 
Brown et al. (2009) extend the conventional measure of CEO networks through 
directorships to include all the networks generated by a CEO’s past and current 
employment, education and other types of social activities (e.g. golf clubs, charity 
organizations, etc). They find that CEO social networks are positively correlated to 
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the level of CEO compensation and negatively correlated to pay-performance 
sensitivity, using U.S. data for the 2005 fiscal year. Crespi-Cladera and 
Pascual-Fuster (2011) find a positive relationship between CEO network centrality 
and CEO compensation using a data set of Spanish listed firms from 2004-2008. In 
particular, they show that directors’ compensation is higher for firms with dispersed 
ownership compared to firms with concentrated ownership. They suggest that when 
firms are controlled by top management due to dispersed ownership, directors can 
set their own compensation. However, when shareholders control the firm because 
of concentrated ownership they tend to reward directors’ networking activity if it is 
profitable for them.  
 
Renneboog and Zhao (2011) study the relation between CEO compensation and 
networks of directors using data for all UK listed firms from 1996 to 2007. In 
contrast to previous studies, they classify networks into two types: direct networks 
(measured by degree centrality) and indirect networks (measured by closeness 
centrality). Director networks mainly enable CEOs to achieve managerial power 
over boards, as degree centrality measures the connectedness of a director in a 
network based on adjacent connections. Indirect networks enable CEOs to collect 
information that can be beneficial to the firm, as closeness centrality measures a 
director’s position in a network based on distances between the director and other 
directors. They find that both direct and indirect networks are positively associated 
with CEO compensation. They also test the pay-for-performance sensitivity (which 
is measured by performance and the interaction term between networks and 
performance) of CEO compensation. They find that as the number of direct 
connections increases, the change in total compensation becomes less sensitive to 
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stock price performance. Another UK study by Horton et al. (2012) analyses a 
sample of 4,278 listed UK firms that comprises 31,495 directors over the period 
2000-2007 and they find a positive relationship between CEOs networks (measured 
by closeness centrality and brokerage position, a measure that quantifies the degree 
to which a director serves as an effective broker in a network) and total 
compensation. They also find that there is a strong positive relation between 
executive compensation and future firm performance after controlling for past 
performance and other governance characteristics. Their results do not support the 
opinion that directors use their connections to extract rents but rather that they are 
paid for the resources or the connections they bring to the firm. 
 
According to managerial power theory, executive directors have power to 
manipulate their own pay, and they use that power to extract rents. In this study, 
CEO power is measured by five network centrality measures. The first hypothesis 
is:  
H1: The greater the network centrality of a CEO the greater the level of total 
compensation.  
 
We also investigate the effect of director networks on two components of CEO 
compensation. If directors have too much managerial power, they are very likely to 
raise their compensation, especially their basic salary, rather than long term 
incentive-based compensation. Salary is a kind of fixed income which does not 
require any additional effort from the CEO, as opposed to incentive-based 
compensation (LTIPs) which is normally linked to firm performance. Hence, 
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hypotheses 2 and 3 are as follows: 
H2: The greater the network centrality of a CEO the greater the level of basic 
salary component of CEO compensation.  
H3: The greater the network centrality of a CEO the lower the level of 
incentive-based CEO compensation. 
 
4.2.2.2.2 Board networks (Firm level) 
Secondly, at the firm level, using a sample of 460 Fortune 1,000 firms, Geletkanycz 
et al. (2001) find that firms reward CEO social capital (CEO director networks) in 
accordance with the firm’s needs and requirements. Geletkanycz et al. (2001) argue 
that external networks provide many types of strategic benefits to firms. First, 
external networks help firms to secure critical resources and reduce the level of 
uncertainty surrounding external resource dependencies. Second, external networks 
enable directors to gain greater access to strategic information and opportunities. 
Finally, external networks confer legitimacy and prestige. Directors serving on 
outside boards convey a signal of managerial quality, so the firm’s attractiveness 
among employees, customers, and suppliers is increased. In summary, external 
networks are strategically valuable to firms, and so they should be reflected in 
executive compensation.  
 
Barnea and Guedj (2009) collected data for the entire network of directors in the 
S&P 1,500 index between 1996 and 2004. They find strong evidence that in firms 
whose directors are more central in the network, measured by degree and closeness 
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centrality, CEO pay is higher. Hwang and Kim (2009) study a sample of the Fortune 
100 firms between 1996 and 2005. In contrast to conventional measures of board 
independence, they classify a director as independent only if he or she is both 
conventionally and socially independent, with the latter defined as directors and the 
CEO sharing at least two of the following ties: military service, alma mater, 
regional origin, academic discipline, industry of primary employment, or third-party 
connection through another director. They find that CEO compensation is higher in 
companies where directors are more socially connected to CEOs.  
 
According to resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) director’s 
networks can bring useful information and resources to the firm, hence the firm 
should reward directors with higher compensation. Therefore, we formulate the next 
hypothesis as follows: 
H4: Firms with greater network centrality award a higher level of total 
compensation to their CEOs.  
 
If a firm has better access to resources and information through the entire network 
provided by all directors, it is likely to compensate the CEO less for their own 
network connections. The firm is also likely to reward the CEO less on the basis of 
basic salary compensation and more on the basis of firm performance. Therefore, 
we formulate the hypotheses 5 and 6 as follows: 
H5: Firms with greater network centrality award a lower level of basic salary to 
their CEOs.  
H6: Firms with greater network centrality award a higher level of 
incentive-based compensation to their CEOs.  
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4.2.3 Other variables related to CEO compensation 
CEO compensation is not only affected by director networks but also by other CEO 
characteristics, corporate governance characteristics, firm characteristics and 
performance characteristics. 
 
CEO characteristics include tenure, age, education and gender. According to 
managerial power theory, CEOs with longer tenure have greater influence over their 
own compensation. We use CEO’s age to represent their experience. We also 
include a CEO’s education as another factor that could affect CEO compensation. If 
CEOs have more professional qualifications or degrees, they should receive higher 
compensation in recognition of these achievements. In terms of gender, Kulich et al. 
(2011) find that only 3% of executive directors among the listed UK firms are 
women and they receive lower compensation than men. Bertrand and Hallock (2001) 
also find a similar situation in U.S. firms over the period of 1992 to 1997, when 
women only accounted for 2.5% of top executive directors and earned 45% less 
than men. They suggest that this gender compensation gap can be explained by 
ability differences and discrimination. 
 
Corporate governance variables include board size, board independence, busy board, 
CEO duality and the total number of members of the Remuneration committee, 
Nomination committee and Audit committee. Larger firms usually pay their CEO 
higher compensation and board size is positively correlated with firm size. We 
expect that the relationship between board size and compensation should be positive. 
Boards with : (a) a high proportion of non-executive directors; (b) the separation of 
CEO and Chairman; (c) the presence of remuneration, nomination and audit 
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committees are regarded as having good corporate governance (Lorsch and MacIver, 
1989; Levy, 1993), so they should be negatively related to CEO compensation. In 
other words, we should expect firms which are well governed not to award 
excessive compensation to their CEOs. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) examine 
the impact of new rules introduced in response to the corporate scandals in the 
United States in 2001 and 2002 that enhanced board independence and they find 
that board independence had a significant effect on CEO compensation. Specifically, 
they find that CEO compensation decreases if firms comply with the new 
regulations that listed companies much have a majority of independent directors 
sitting on the board.  
 
There are a number of definitions of a “busy board”. The definition of Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006) is employed here, namely that more than half of the directors 
hold three or more directorships. Busy boards should in theory be less compensated 
because the directors do not have enough time to monitor each firm effectively.   
 
Firm characteristics include firm size (measured by market value), risk (measured 
by leverage) and firm performance (measured by the market to book ratio). 
According to Murphy (1998), firm size has a significantly positive effect on 
executive compensation. This is reasonable as larger firms are more difficult to 
manage, so the rewards should be higher compared to smaller firms. CEOs may ask 
for high compensation as risky, or even financially distressed, firms are usually 
difficult to manage, so we expect risk to be positively correlated with executive 
compensation. 
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There are two views in the literature about the relationship between firm 
performance and CEO compensation. According to the agency theory (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983), the objective of executive compensation is to align the interests of 
managers and shareholders, so as to make sure that managers maximize 
shareholders’ wealth. Hence, there is a positive relationship between firm 
performance and CEO compensation. On the other hand, according to managerial 
power theory (Bebchuk et al., 2002), executive directors can accumulate power and 
establish a stronger negotiation position on the board in order to extract a more 
attractive compensation package. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) find that executive 
compensation is not related to firm performance. Table 4.1 lists all the control 
variables and their definition. 
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Table 4.1 Control Variable Definitions 
Variable Name (Abbreviation) Definition 
Audit Committee (AC) The total number of members of the board audit 
committee 
Nomination Committee (NC) The total number of members of the board Nomination 
committee 
Remuneration Committee (RC) The total number of members of the board remuneration 
committee 
Board size (BS) The total number of directors on the board 
Board Independence (BI) Number of non-executive directors divided by the total 
number of directors 
Duality A dummy variable taking the value of one if the roles of 
CEO and Chairman are split, zero otherwise 
Tenure The total number of years the CEO has held the position 
of CEO at firm  
Age The age of the CEO 
Education  The number of qualifications held by the CEO. This is a 
count of all qualifications of degree level including all 
professional qualifications 
Gender A dummy variable taking the value of one if CEO is 
male, zero otherwise 
Busy Board (BB) A dummy variable taking the value of one if more than 
half of the directors hold three directorships and zero 
otherwise 
Market Value (MV) Market value of the firm 
Market to book value (MTBV) Market value divided by book value 
Leverage Total debt divided by total equity 
 
4.3 Methodology 
To test hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 we employ multivariate analysis that controls for CEO 
characteristics, corporate governance mechanisms and firm specific characteristics. 
We use random effect models rather than fixed effect models to investigate if the 
director network is associated with higher total CEO compensation, higher basic 
salary and lower incentive-based compensation due to the following reasons. First, 
the fixed effects model assumes that each individual has an unobservable individual 
effect, while the random effects model takes account of individual effects such as 
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random deviations from a mean individual effect (Wooldridge 2003). The random 
effects model requires a large cross-section of data compared to the sample period’s 
length. Wooldridge (2003) argues that the estimator of the random effects model is 
consistent and asymptotic normal when the cross sectional units (N) get larger with 
a same time dimension (T). In this study, the number (N) is 781 with a T of only 4 
years. Second, the fixed effects model does not consider time constant variables. In 
our study, some variables such as the industry dummy, the time dummy and gender 
are important. Lastly, the random effects model is a weighted average of between 
and within estimators, while the fixed effects model only takes account of within 
group estimators. Therefore, the random effects model also considers the 
differences between individual averages. In addition, we use the Hausman test to 
choose between the fixed effects model and the random effects model. The results 
(see Table 4.2) show that the regressors are not correlated with the errors. Thus, the 
random effects model should be chosen.  
 
Table 4.2 The Hausman Test Results 
Ho: difference in coefficients is not systematic 
 Chi2(11)  = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
=10.27 
Prob>chi2 = 0.7158 
 
Where b represents the coefficients of the fixed effects model, B represents the 
coefficients of the random effects model, V_b-V_B is the difference between the 
variences of b and B, b-B is the difference between the coefficients from fixed 
effects and random effects model. 
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The regression model is written as follows: 
(1) The effect of director networks on the level of the CEO compensation (director 
level) 
CEO compensation it = ß0+ ß1CEO Networks it+ ß2CEO Characteristics it + 
ß3Corporate Governance Measures it + ß4Firm Characteristics it + ß5Industry 
Dummies it+ ß6Year Dummies it                                    4-1 
 
Here the dependent variable CEO compensation it refers to compensation received 
by the CEO of firm i at time t. To test hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 we define 
compensation in three different ways: (1) CEO total compensation which includes 
salary, bonus, pension, other and LTIPs;  (2) CEO basic salary;  (3) CEO long 
term incentive-based compensation, which includes share plans, share matching 
plans, options plans and cash plans.  
 
The explanatory variable CEO Networks it refers to variables representing CEO 
networks centrality. This set of variables includes “Degree centrality”, 
“Betweenness centrality”, “Closeness centrality”, “Eigenvector centrality” and 
“Information centrality”.  
 
The control variables used are as follows: CEO characteristics include tenure, age, 
education and gender. Corporate governance measures include dummy variables 
such as CEO duality, the total number of members of remuneration, Nomination 
committee and Audit committee. Firm characteristics include market value, leverage 
and the market to book ratio. 
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To test hypotheses 4, 5 and 6, we employ the following regression model to 
investigate if board networks are associated with lower total CEO compensation, 
lower salary and higher incentive-based compensation. The regression model is 
written as follows: 
(2) The effect of board networks on the level of CEO compensation (firm level) 
CEO compensation it = ß0+ ß1Board Networks it+ ß2CEO Characteristics it+ 
ß3Corporate Governance Measures it + ß4Firm Characteristics it + ß5Industry 
Dummies it+ ß6Year Dummies it                                    4-2 
 
As for regression model 1, CEO compensation it refers to compensation received by 
the CEO of firm i at time t. We define compensation in three different ways: (1) 
CEO total compensation which includes salary, bonus, pension, other and LTIPs; (2) 
CEO basic salary; (3) CEO long term incentive-based compensation, which 
includes share plans, share matching plans, options plans and cash plans. The key 
explanatory variable used in this model is board networks instead of CEO networks. 
Similar to regression model 1, model 2 also includes CEO characteristics, corporate 
governance and firm characteristics as control variables. 
 
4.4 Sample and Data 
We undertake a detailed empirical analysis of CEO and board networks by 
examining a sample of non-financial UK FTSE 350 firms covering the four year 
period 2007-2010. CEO compensation data and board characteristics are collected 
from Boardex. We also hand collect a number of data items from firms’ annual 
reports in cases where some data is missing from Boardex. CEO compensation data 
contains the British Pound values of base salaries, cash bonuses, D.C. pensions, 
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other and long term incentive plans (LTIPs). Base salaries are a key component and 
represent the fixed component in the compensation package. Cash bonuses are 
related to accounting performance and usually paid based on short-term (one year) 
performance. D.C. pensions are employer's contribution towards the director's 
pension scheme. Other includes annual direct payments such as relocation, fringe 
benefits, etc. Long-term incentive plans are similar to bonuses which are related to 
accounting performance, but are based on long-term (typically five year) cumulative 
performance rather than short-term (one year) performance. BoardEx assumes that 
the maximum award will be achieved when calculating the value of LTIPs which 
includes cash, equity, equity matched, or option plans. Option is a contract which 
gives the managers the right to buy a share of stock at an exercise price. Option can 
usually be exercised four years after they are granted. Opting pricing model (Black 
and Scholes, 1973) is used to calculate the price of options. Other firm 
characteristics and accounting information are collected from the Datastream and 
Fame databases. Table 4.3 shows the time and industry distribution of the sample 
firms. 
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Table 4.3 Time and Industry Distribution of Sample Firms 
The sample is made up of 781 firm-year observations during 2007-2010. Industries 
are classified by the four-digit code based on the SIC (Standard Industrial 
Classification) Code collected from Datastream. 
 
Panel A: Time Distribution of Sample Firms 
Year Number of Firms 
2007 178 
2008 196 
2009 201 
2010 206 
Total Firm Years 781 
 
Panel B Industry Classification 
Industry Number of Firms Percentage 
Mining and Quarrying  52 6% 
Manufacturing  274 35% 
Wholesale and Retail  126 16% 
Transportation and Communication 120 15% 
Utilities 41 5% 
Construction 77 9% 
Other 99 14% 
Total 781 100% 
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Figure 4.1 shows the level and components of total CEO compensation from 
2007-2010. In 2007, the total compensation for CEOs was £2.8 million on average, 
and decreased in 2008 because of the financial crisis, but rose to £3 million in 2010. 
Over the entire sample period, the total compensation remained very high at £2.68 
million on average and almost doubled compared to the £1.5 million in 1996 
reported by Renneboog and Zhao (2011).  
 
Figure 4.1 
The level and components of Total CEO Compensation (£) over the sample period 
2007-2010. 
 
 
 
Table 4.4 Panel A and Figure 4.2 report the descriptive statistics for CEOs’ total 
compensation from 2007-2010. The most important components of CEO 
compensation are salary, bonus and LTIPs (Share plan, Share matching plan, 
options plan and cash plan). On average, CEOs received £1.53 million as LTIPs, 
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which accounted for 55% of total compensation. The median value of LTIPs, at 
£0.67 million, is much lower, indicating that the distribution is skewed toward the 
right end of the scale. On average, £1 million was paid to CEOs each year as salary 
(19%) and bonus (18%) compensation, or 37% of the total compensation. Pension 
and others are only marginal components and account for 8% of the total 
compensation.  
 
Panel B of Table 4.4 presents summary statistics for the five centrality measures. 
The degree centrality of a CEO has an average value of 0.19. The average closeness 
centrality is 0.09 and between centrality is 0.07. The average eigenvector and 
information centrality is 0.39 and 4.78. Panel C of Table 4.4 shows that the average 
age of a CEO was 51.37 and the average tenure was 5.3 years. Age and tenure will 
enable us to test if compensation depends on the CEO’s experience. The average 
value of gender is 96%, which means that 96% of the CEOs are male, with only 4% 
female. Panel D of Table 4.4 indicates that on average there were 9 directors sitting 
on the board, 64% of whom were non-executive directors. Virtually all firms (95%) 
separated the role of CEO and Chairman, which was encouraged by the UK 
Corporate Governance Code, which also requires that a firm have audit, nomination 
and remuneration committees. In Table 4.4 panel E, it can be seen that firms on 
average had 4 board members on the audit committee, 5 on the nomination 
committee and 4 on the remuneration committee.   
 
Table 4.5 depicts the Pearson correlation matrix for all the variables used in this 
study. The Pearson correlation matrix is used to assess the extent of any 
multicollinearity in our model, for the reasons described in Chapter 3, Section 4. 
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Basic salary is found to be positively and significantly correlate with degree (0.43) 
and eigenvector (0.42) and information (0.46) centrality. Board size is positively 
correlated with firm size (0.48) measured by market value, which indicates that 
larger firms tend to have bigger boards. In terms of director networks, measured by 
degree, betweenness, closeness, eigenvector and information centrality, the results 
show that all of the centrality variables are negatively correlated to directors’ career 
paths measured by CEO’ tenure. This means that more specialized directors have 
less central positions in their social networks, since directors spent their career in 
only a few firms and therefore had less opportunity to build their social network. 
The positive correlation (0.56) between board independence and busy board 
suggests that busy boards usually have more non-executive directors. None of the 
correlation coefficients are large enough to suggest that multicollinearity is a 
significant problem. We also use the Variance Inflation Factor to examine whether 
multicollinearity is a significant problem (see Table 4.6). O'Brien (2007) suggests 
that there is a problem with multicollinearity if the VIF is more than 10 or the 
tolerance level (1/VIF) less than 0.10. Table 4.6 shows that none of the VIFs are 
greater than 10 and none of the tolerance levels are less than 0.10. The mean VIF 
value is 2.10 and the overall tolerance level is 0.48. The results indicate that 
multicollinearity is not a significant problem in our model. 
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Table 4.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A presents CEO Compensation including different components for the 
non-financial FTSE 350 firms from 2007-2010 (781 firm years).  
 
Panel A CEO Compensation 
Variable (£) Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev. 
Salary 555,609 504,000 10,000 2,023,000 270,925 
Bonus 523,087 362,500 0 5,000,000 624,967 
Pension 83,919 22,000 0 2,550,000 187,669 
Other 89,681 45,321 0 390,000 60,774 
LTIPs  1,532,166 671,500 0 42,406,000 1,467,837 
Total 
Compensation 
2,697,215 1,695,500 10,000 43,282,000 1,267,894 
 
Panel B presents the five centrality measures (Degree, Closeness, Betweenness, 
Eigenvector and Information) of the CEO in the sample.  
 
Panel B Centrality Measures 
Variable Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev. 
Degree 0.19 0.08 0.00 1.25 0.43 
Closeness 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.19 0.58 
Betweenness 0.07 0.04 0.00 1.65 1.09 
Eigenvector 0.39 0.42 0.00 35.38 0.59 
Information 4.78 5.42 0.00 32.16 0.61 
 
Panel C presents CEO Characteristics including Tenure, Age, Education and Gender 
for the non-financial FTSE 350 firms from 2007-2010. Tenure is the number of 
years of CEO at the firm as CEO. Age is the CEO’s age. Education stands for the 
number of degrees the CEO has. Gender equals to 1 if CEO is male, zero otherwise. 
 
Panel C CEO Characteristics 
Variable Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev. 
Tenure 5.30 3.70 0.00 34.40 5.32 
Age 51.37 51.00 34.00 75.00 6.48 
Education 1.76 2.00 0.00 5.00 1.09 
Gender 0.96 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.20 
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Panel D presents board characteristics for the whole sample period from 2007-2010. 
BoardSize (BS) is the total number of directors sitting on the board. Board 
Independence (BI) is the percentage of non-executive directors sitting on the board. 
Duality is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the roles of CEO and 
Chairman are split, zero otherwise. BusyBoard is a dummy variable, which equals 
to 1 if more than half of directors holding three or more directorships, otherwise it is 
zero. 
 
Panel D Board characteristics 
Variable Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev. 
BoardSize 8.98 9.00 5.00 19.00 2.36 
BoardIndependence 0.64 0.67 0.24 0.93 0.12 
Duality 0.95 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.22 
BusyBoard 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 
 
Panel E presents the number of board members serving on Audit, Nomination and 
Remuneration Committees for the whole sample period from 2007-2010.  
 
Panel E Membership of Board Committees 
Variable Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev. 
Audit 3.55 3.00 2.00 8.00 0.90 
Nomination 4.69 5.00 0.00 10.00 1.60 
Remuneration 3.83 4.00 2.00 8.00 1.00 
 
 
Panel F presents firm characteristics for the whole sample period from 2007-2010. 
MV stands for market value (Millions). MTBV is calculated by market value 
divided by book value. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total equity. 
 
Panel F Firm Characteristics 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Max Min 
MV 5160.48 1224.45 12652.31 114583.60 108.74 
MTBV 2.37 2.27 32.06 247.45 -589.39 
Leverage 0.17 0.18 0.11 0.48 0.00 
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Figure 4.2 
 
The percentage of each compensation component in CEO total compensation for the 
non-financial FTSE 350 firms between 2007 and 2010. 
 
 
 
Salary, 19% 
Bonus, 18% 
Pension, 3% 
Other, 5% 
LTIPs,55% 
CEO Total Compensation in non-financial 
FTSE 350 firms between 2007 and 2010 
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Table 4.5 Pearson Correlation Matrix 
This table presents the correlation coefficients for all the variables used in this study. Salary, bonus, pension and LTIPs are different components of CEO compensation. Degree, 
Closeness, Betweenness, Eigenvector and Information are five different centrality measures. BS is the total number of board member sitting on the board. BI stands for the percentage of 
Non-Executive directors sitting on the board. Duality is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the roles of CEO and Chairman are split and zero otherwise. Tenure is the number of 
years of CEO at the firm as CEO. Age is the CEO’s age. Education stands for the number of degrees the CEO has. BB is a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if more than half of 
directors holding three or more directorships, otherwise is zero. MV stands for market value. MTBV is calculated by market value divided by book value. Leverage is the ratio of Total 
Debt to the book value of Equity. The asterisks ***, ** and * show statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
(1)Salary 1.00 
       
 
  
 
       
(2)Bonus 0.33** 1.00 
      
 
  
 
       
(3)Pension 0.35** 0.36 1.00 
     
 
  
 
       
(4)LTIPs 0.13** 0.27** 0.30 1.00 
    
 
  
 
       
(5)Degree 0.43** 0.31** 0.12 0.25** 1.00 
   
 
  
 
       
(6)Closeness 0.32** 0.07** 0.22 0.11** 0.29*** 1.00 
  
 
  
 
       
(7)Betweenness 0.36** 0.17** 0.14 0.12** 0.36*** 0.03*** 1.00 
 
 
  
 
       
(8)Eigenvector 0.42** 0.38** 0.17 0.31** 0.50*** 0.21*** 0.37*** 1.00  
  
 
       
(9)Information 0.46** 0.36** 0.21 0.38** 0.31*** 0.42*** 0.21*** 0.31*** 1.00 
  
 
       
(10)BS 0.33** 0.09** 0.10 0.22** 0.42*** 0.14*** 0.25*** 0.13*** 0.31** 1.00 
 
 
       
(11)BI 0.18** 0.14** 0.42 0.56** 0.20** 0.15** 0.20** 0.31** 0.31** 0.15* 1.00  
       
(12)Duality 0.04* 0.12* 0.08* 0.15 0.12* 0.08* 0.04* 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.04 1.00 
       
(13)Tenure 0.04 0.29 -0.14 0.01 -0.34 -0.04 -0.21 -0.36** -0.03 -0.18* -0.20* 0.03 1.00 
      
(14)Age 0.07 0.29 0.40 0.17 -0.01 -0.10 -0.02 -0.12** -0.13 -0.06* 0.22* 0.05* -0.30* 1.00 
     
(15)Education 0.05 -0.21 0.02 0.16 0.39** 0.13** 0.49** 0.43** 0.34** 0.13 0.13 0.04 0.06* -0.58* 1.00 
    
(16)BB -0.25** -0.22** 0.24 0.13** 0.19** 0.24** -0.09** 0.17** 0.21** 0.02 0.56 0.07* -0.44 0.48* -0.29 1.00 
   
(17)MV 0.52** 0.43** -0.44 0.37** 0.35** 0.31** 0.32** 0.15** 0.21** 0.48* 0.13* 0.12* 0.07 0.04* 0.08 -0.29 1.00 
  
(18)MTBV -0.19** -0.07** -0.04 0.39** -0.57** 0.31** -0.56** -0.42** 0.24** -0.06* -0.08* 0.02* 0.03* -0.30 0.00 -0.07 -0.09 1.00 
 
(19)Leverage 0.55** 0.33** -0.33 0.06** 0.31** 0.13** 0.32** 0.08** 0.11 0.31* 0.08* 0.05 -0.01 0.02* 0.27 -0.25 0.53 -0.50 1.00 
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Table 4.6 Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Test Results 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Information 6.14 0.16 
Degree 5.27 0.19 
Eigenvector 2.93 0.34 
Betweenness 2.69 0.37 
Closeness 2.19 0.46 
BS 1.65 0.61 
MV 1.48 0.68 
Tenure 1.31 0.77 
BI 1.30 0.77 
Age 1.18 0.85 
BB 1.16 0.86 
Education 1.07 0.93 
Duality 1.04 0.96 
MTBV 1.03 0.97 
Leverage 1.02 0.98 
Mean 2.10 0.48 
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Table 4.7 
Panel A: Top 10 Best Paid CEOs in 2007 
Company Name CEO Salary (£) Bonus (£) Pension (£) Other (£) LTIPs (£) Total (£) 
CAIRN ENERGY Sir Bill Gammell 480,000 240,000 72,000 84,000 42,406,000 43,282,000 
RECKITT BENCKISER GROUP Bart Becht 912,000 3,257,000 271,000 112,000 17,210,000 21,762,000 
TESCO  Sir Terry Leahy 1,293,000 1,192,000 0 95,000 15,325,000 17,905,000 
HOME RETAIL GROUP Terry Duddy 708,000 744,000 0 341,000 14,593,000 16,386,000 
GLAXOSMITHKLINE Doctor Jean-Pierre Garnier 909,000 1,361,000 0 762,000 12,024,000 15,056,000 
BG GROUP Frank Chapman 992,000 900,000 0 9,000 10,252,000 12,153,000 
ICAP  Mike Spencer 360,000 2,870,000 18,000 13,000 5,548,000 8,809,000 
ANGLO AMERICAN  Cynthia Carroll 900,000 641,000 270,000 1,126,000 6,353,000 9,290,000 
DIAGEO Paul Walsh 1,035,000 1,533,000 0 36,000 4,897,000 7,501,000 
RIO TINTO Tom Albanese 751,000  642,000  0  161,000  5,578,000  7,132,000  
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Panel B: Top 10 Best Paid CEOs in 2008 
 
Company Name CEO Salary (£) Bonus (£) Pension (£) Other (£) LTIPs (£) Total (£) 
RECKITT BENCKISER GROUP Bart Becht 949,000 3,387,000 282,000 133,000 17,967,000 22,718,000 
GLAXOSMITHKLINE Andrew Witty 687,000 999,000 22,000 92,000 9,454,000 11,254,000 
BURBERRY GROUP Angela Ahrendts-Couch 850,000 2,908,000 255,000 420,000 6,241,000 10,674,000 
VODAFONE GROUP Arun Sarin 1,310,000 2,130,000 393,000 155,000 5.521.000 9,509,000 
THOMAS COOK GROUP Manny Fontenla-Novoa 633,000 1,364,000 0 5,040,000 2,171,000 9,208,000 
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL Doctor Jeroen Van der Veer 1,842,000 3,588,000 0 24,000 3,750,000 9,204,000 
BHP BILLITON Doctor Marius Kloppers 842,000 907,000 337,000 37,000 6,926,000 9,049,000 
XSTRATA  Mick Davis 1,485,000 0 2,550,000 314,000 4,509,000 8,858,000 
BG GROUP Frank Chapman 1,082,000 1,400,000 0 5,000 5,229,000 7,716,000 
BP Doctor Tony Hayward 998,000 1,496,000 0 15,000 4,444,000 6,953,000 
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Panel C: Top 10 Best Paid CEOs in 2009 
 
Company Name CEO Salary (£) Bonus (£) Pension (£) Other (£) LTIPs (£) Total (£) 
RECKITT BENCKISER GROUP Bart Becht 987,000  3,523,000  296,000  83,000  2,0602,000  25,408,000  
AFREN  Doctor Osman Shahenshah 304,000  325,000  30,000  11,000  1,7550,000  18,209,000  
WPP  Sir Martin Sorrell 1,007,000  406,000  401,000  345,000  12,326,000  14,140,000  
BHP BILLITON Doctor Marius Kloppers 1,145,000  990,000  458,000  23,000  10,266,000  12,859,000  
SABMILLER  Graham Mackay 1,145,000  1,580,000  344,000  111,000  8,957,000  12,026,000  
BG GROUP Frank Chapman 1,143,000  1,944,000  0  5,000  8,620,000  11,707,000  
TESCO  Sir Terry Leahy 1,398,000  1,340,000  0  115,000  8,227,000  10,965,000  
XSTRATA  Mick Davis 1,219,000  1,237,000  1,951,000  293,000  6,282,000  10,689,000  
BP Doctor Tony Hayward 1,045,000  2,090,000  0  23,000  7,104,000  10,239,000  
VODAFONE GROUP Doctor Vittorio Colao 932,000  0  280,000  171,000  8,739,000  9,951,000  
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Panel D: Top 10 Best Paid CEOs in 2010 
 
Company Name CEO Salary (£) Bonus (£) Pension (£) Other (£) LTIPs (£) Total (£) 
RECKITT BENCKISER GROUP Bart Becht 1,006,000 2,727,000 315,000 130,000 21,568,000 25,616,000 
XSTRATA  Mick Davis 1,200,000 1,234,000 2,313,000 320,000 20,087,000 24,834,000 
WPP  Sir Martin Sorrell 1,009,000 1,900,000 400,000 374,000 17,574,000 20,883,000 
BERKELEY GROUP HDG Tony Pidgley 750,000 1,500,000 128,000 29,000 12,480,000 14,858,000 
BG GROUP Frank Chapman 1,174,000 1,135,000 0 7,000 8,862,000 11,171,000 
VODAFONE GROUP Doctor Vittorio Colao 975,000 0 292,000 146,000 9,705,000 10,972,000 
DIAGEO Paul Walsh 1,155,000 1,975,000 0 45,000 7,114,000 10,244,000 
REED ELSEVIER  Erik Engström 1,000,000 999,000 6,000 29,000 7,952,000 9,957,000 
ANGLO AMERICAN  Cynthia Carroll 1,125,000 411,000 338,000 37,000 7,779,000 9,653,000 
SHIRE  Angus Russell 705,000 604,000 207,000 20,000 7,779,000 9,295,000 
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Table 4.7 presents the top 10 best paid CEOs among non-financial FTSE 350 firms 
between 2007 and 2010. It shows that Sir Bill Gammell of CAIRN ENERGY 
earned the highest pay £43 million in 2007, of which more than £42 million from 
LTIPs, others included salary (£480,000), bonus (£240,000), pension (£72,000). In 
contrast, Tom Albanese of RIO TINTO only earned £7 million for his total pay 
including salary (£751,000), bonus (£642,000) and LTIPs (£5.5 million) in 2007.  
 
4.5 Empirical results 
4.5.1 The effects of CEO networks on CEO compensation 
Table 4.8 presents the results for the effects of CEO networks on CEO total 
compensation, which includes basic salary, bonus, pension, other and LTIPs 
compensation. We find that the five network centrality measures are all positively 
and significantly associated with CEO compensation. Specifically, we find that 
CEO degree, closeness, betweenness, eigenvector and information centrality are 
significantly and positively related to CEO total compensation at the 1%, 5%, 10%,  
1% and 1% levels respectively. CEOs with a high number of connections to other 
directors receive higher compensation. The results support hypothesis H1, which 
argues that a CEOs total compensation increases when the network centrality of the 
CEO increases. The magnitude of the coefficient estimated on degree centrality is 
stronger than the coefficient for the other centrality measures. CEO total 
compensation will increase by 2.12% as the degree centrality measure increases by 
1%. The results also appear to indicate that the extent to which CEOs have a direct 
influence on other directors (degree centrality) and the extent of their connections to 
other well-connected directors (eigenvector centrality) significantly affects their 
total compensation. Borgatti (2005) argues that degree centrality is similar to 
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eigenvector centrality; the only difference is that whereas degree centrality only 
measures direct influence eigenvector centrality captures not only direct but indirect 
influences.  
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Table 4.8 CEO Total Compensation and CEO Networks 
The dependent variable is the log of total compensation including salary, bonus, 
pension, other and LTIPs. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% 
(***) levels. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Degree 2.123
***
     
 (4.93)     
Closeness  1.043
**
    
  (2.67)    
Betweenness   0.053
*
   
   (1.52)   
Eigenvector    1.243
***
  
    (3.96)  
Information  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.433
***
 
(3.68) 
Audit 0.082 0.254 0.122 0.088 0.234 
 (0.35) (0.64) (0.34) (0.58) (0.67) 
Nomination 0.125 0.039 0.057 0.015 0.232 
 (0.48) (0.42) (0.37) (0.39) (0.87) 
Remuneration 0.215
**
 0.169
**
 0.192
**
 0.213
**
 0.348
**
 
 (2.78) (3.12) (2.63) (2.61) (2.98) 
BS 0.054
**
 0.055
**
 0.052
**
 0.049
**
 0.078 
 (2.84) (2.78) (2.78) (2.53) (2.78) 
BI 1.485
***
 1.419
***
 1.345
***
 1.393
***
 1.123
***
 
 (3.88) (3.68) (3.71) (3.82) (4.831) 
Duality 0.279 0.269 0.298 0.317 0.647 
 (1.20) (1.17) (1.07) (1.37) (1.28) 
Tenure 0.023 0.081 0.023 0.035 0.493 
 (1.49) (1.26) (1.65) (1.28) (1.19) 
Age 0.086 0.070 0.071 0.071 0.038 
 (1.29) (1.24) (1.20) (1.20) (1.45) 
Education 0.120
**
 0.159
**
 0.171
**
 0.272
**
 0.321
**
 
 (2.89) (2.95) (2.92) (2.97) (2.99) 
Gender 0.151 0.170 0.151 0.170 0.383 
 (0.72) (0.85) (0.72) (0.81) (0.39) 
BusyBoard -0.010 -0.044 -0.055 -0.085 -0.424 
 (-0.15) (-0.62) (-0.08) (-0.12) (-0.87) 
MV 0.278
***
 0.282
***
 0.282
***
 0.289
***
 0.456 
 (4.32) (4.43) (4.35) (4.46) (3.98) 
MTBV -0.823 -0.608 -0.821 -0.789 -0.449 
 (-0.91) (-0.71) (-0.91) (-0.87) (-0.89) 
Leverage 0.675 0.617 0.694 0.665 0.984 
 (1.21) (1.22) (1.23) (1.29) (0.98) 
Intercept 11.64
***
 11.83
***
 11.25
***
 11.45
***
 12.39
***
 
 (23.12) (23.18) (22.55) (23.87) (26.49) 
Industry and 
Time  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R
2
 0.38 0.38 0.36 0.35 0.37 
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The results also indicate that the length of time it takes information to arrive in a 
network (closeness centrality) and how information may be controlled in a network 
(betweenness centrality) have positive impacts on CEO total compensation. The 
results are consistent with the finding of Renneboog and Zhao (2011) and Horton et 
al. (2012). In addition, we find that a CEO’s access to information (information 
centrality) also affects their total compensation.  
 
In the regression model, we also control for CEO characteristics, corporate 
governance characteristics, firm characteristics and performance characteristics. We 
find that the number of members of the remuneration committee has a positive 
effect on CEO total compensation at 5% level. This suggests that CEO total 
compensation increases as the number of remuneration committee members 
increases. In all of the five models, both board size and market value have a 
significantly positive effect on total compensation. In line with previous literature, 
larger firms usually pay higher compensation to attract top managers. Board 
independence is also positively related to salary compensation, which means that 
firms with more non-executive directors award more compensation to CEOs. This 
suggests that CEOs are able to use their power to influence their director’s 
compensation decision. Education is also positively associated with CEO total 
compensation, which suggests that a CEO holding more degrees will receive more 
compensation.  
 
In Table 4.9, we investigate the impact of the CEO networks on the CEOs basic 
salary compensation. We find that all five centrality measures have positive and 
significant effects on CEO basic salary compensation. Therefore, the results support 
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the second hypothesis: the network centrality of a CEO has a positive effect on the 
basic salary level of CEO compensation. We also find the effect of the number of 
remuneration committees on CEO basic salary compensation. Both tenure and age 
have a significantly positive impact on CEO basic salary compensation, which 
suggests that CEOs with more experience receive higher basic salary compensation. 
We also find that board size, board independence and market value have 
significantly positive effects on CEO basic salary compensation, which is consistent 
with previous results. 
 
Table 4.10 shows the results for the impact of CEO networks on CEO LTIPs 
compensation. We do not find any centrality measures to be significantly related to 
CEO LTIPs compensation. Therefore, the third hypothesis is not supported, which 
suggests that the network centrality of a CEO has no effect on the level of 
incentive-based CEO compensation. However, we find that the size of the 
remuneration committee has a significantly positive effect on CEO LTIPs 
compensation. Board size and market value also have significant positive impacts 
on the CEO LTIPs compensation, which is consistent with previous results. In line 
with the managerial power theory, we do not find that board independence has any 
effect on CEO LTIPs compensation. If directors have too much managerial power, 
they are very likely to raise their salary compensation rather than long term 
incentive-based compensation. We also find that education is significantly positive 
related to CEO LTIPs compensation. This suggests that a CEO holding more 
degrees will receive higher LTIPs compensation.  
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Table 4.9 CEO Basic Salary Compensation and CEO Networks 
The dependent variable is the log of basic salary compensation. Asterisks indicate 
significance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Degree 2.339
***
     
 (3.87)     
Closeness  1.252
**
    
  (2.53)    
Betweenness   1.226
*
   
   (1.98)   
Eigenvector    2.319
***
  
    (4.22)  
Information  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.878
***
 
(3.767) 
Audit 0.076 0.037 0.083 0.073 0.337 
 (1.12) (1.45) (1.35) (1.26) (1.25) 
Nomination 0.076 0.035 0.033 0.035 0.075 
 (1.06) (1.09) (1.31) (1.33) (1.25) 
Remuneration 0.034
**
 0.014
**
 0.012
**
 0.012
**
 0.028
**
 
 (2.62) (2.63) (2.52) (2.54) (2.91) 
BS 0.072
***
 0.082
***
 0.075
**
 0.053
**
 0.047
***
 
 (3.22) (3.39) (3.83) (3.74) (3.19) 
BI 1.233
***
 0.492
***
 1.212
***
 1.133
***
 0.489
***
 
 (4.82) (4.72) (4.88) (4.84) (3.98) 
Duality 0.216 0.108 0.121 0.129 0.121 
 (1.06) (1.08) (1.20) (1.28) (1.09) 
Tenure 0.049
***
 0.019
***
 0.019
***
 0.023
***
 0.039
***
 
 (3.96) (3.85) (3.93) (4.23) (3.15) 
Age 0.084
**
 0.075
**
 0.070
**
 0.069
**
 0.391
**
 
 (2.23) (2.35) (2.11) (1.97) (2.16) 
Education 0.064 0.035 0.034 0.034 0.065 
 (1.65) (1.73) (1.45) (1.57) (1.26) 
Gender 0.067 0.049 0.051 0.060 0.219 
 (0.37) (0.38) (0.40) (0.47) (0.39) 
BB 0.033 0.062 0.040 0.058 0.059 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.09) (0.14) (0.35) 
MV 0.213
***
 0.246
***
 0.214
***
  0.219
***
 0.328
***
 
 (5.12) (5.15) (5.17) (4.97) (4.15) 
MTBV -0.281 -0.923 -0.145 -0.135 -0.393 
 (-0.24) (-0.29) (-0.30) (-0.28) (-0.29) 
Leverage 0.258 0.253 0.252 0.258 0.853 
 (1.36) (1.27) (1.27) (1.30) (0.97) 
Intercept 14.26
***
 13.33
***
 13.32
***
 13.28
***
 15.32
***
 
 (38.20) (37.27) (37.11) (38.44) (32.24) 
Industry and 
Time 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R
2
 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.38 
 112 
 
Table 4.10 CEO LTIPs Compensation and CEO Networks 
The dependent variable is the log of LTIPs compensation. Asterisks indicate 
significance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Degree 0.259     
 (0.89)     
Closeness  0.308    
  (0.65)    
Betweenness   0.362   
   (0.53)   
Eigenvector    0.602  
    (0.31)  
Information  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.887 
(0.48) 
Audit 0.326 0.335 0.282 0.197 0.535 
 (1.17) (1.15) (0.99) (1.31) (1.05) 
Nomination 0.195 0.239 0.177 0.189 0.339 
 (1.26) (1.43) (1.14) (1.23) (1.03) 
Remuneration 1.425
**
 1.365
**
 1.825
**
 1.828
**
 1.398
**
 
 (3.19) (3.29) (3.12) (3.15) (3.31) 
BS 0.703
**
 0.261
**
 0.876
**
 0.892
**
 0.219
**
 
 (3.55) (3.21) (2.69) (2.72) (2.98) 
BI 1.991 1.748 1.784 1.953 1.482 
 (0.93) (0.82) (0.83) (0.91) (0.91) 
Duality 3.356 2.221 4.416 5.497 1.473 
 (0.26) (0.17) (0.32) (0.40) (0.49) 
Tenure 0.049 0.039 0.048 0.057 0.184 
 (1.04) (0.83) (1.01) (1.20) (0.89) 
Age 0.022 0.025 0.020 0.019 0.125 
 (0.64) (0.72) (0.58) (0.56) (0.74) 
Education 0.823
***
 0.855
***
 0.837
***
 0.812
***
 0.725
***
 
 (3.90) (3.99) (3.92) (3.94) (3.85) 
Gender 1.573 1.465 1.554 1.693 1.432 
 (1.31) (1.24) (1.29) (1.41) (1.24) 
BB 0.693 0.683 0.727 0.715 0.643 
 (1.57) (1.55) (1.64) (1.62) (1.02) 
MV 0.535
*
 0.553
**
 0.655
**
 0.295
*
 0.549
**
 
 (2.46) (2.62) (2.60) (2.32) (2.18) 
MTBV -0.869 -0.505 -0.617 -0.135 -0.584 
 (-0.01) (-0.09) (-0.01) (-0.02) (-0.07) 
Leverage 1.495 1.664 1.373 1.436 1.491 
 (0.76) (0.86) (0.70) (0.74) (0.35) 
Intercept 6.331 0.956 0.332 1.152 0.492 
 (0.38) (0.33) (0.22) (0.42) (0.48) 
Industry and 
Time 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R
2
 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.24 
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4.5.2 The effect of the board networks on CEO compensation 
We not only investigate the effect of network measures at the individual level but 
also at the firm level, in which the centrality measures indicates the number of 
connections of all the board members (not just CEO). In Table 4.11, we find a 
positive relationship between all five board centrality measures and CEO total 
compensation. A firm with high network centrality has directors that have many 
connections that can bring useful information and resources to the firm, hence the 
firm should reward directors with higher compensation. This supports hypothesis 
H4 which states that well-connected firms award a higher level of total 
compensation to their CEOs.  
 
We also examine whether board centrality measures have any effect on the two 
important components of CEO compensation. In Table 4.12, we do not find any 
evidence that centrality measures have any effects on basic salary compensation. 
This suggests that hypothesis H5 is not upheld. However, in Table 4.13, we find a 
positive relationship between board’s centrality measures (degree, eigenvector and 
information) and LTIPs compensation. This evidence suggests that if a firm has 
better access to information, it will tend to award higher equity-based compensation 
rather than basic salary compensation. This supports hypothesis H6 which argues 
that well-connected firms award higher LTIPs compensation to their CEOs.  
 
We also find that other variables have an impact on CEO compensation. For 
example, both board size and market value have positive effects on total CEO 
compensation and also on basic salary compensation and LTIPs compensation. The 
CEO total compensation and LTIPs compensation increases as the number of 
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members of the remuneration committee increases. A CEO holding more degrees 
receives higher total compensation and LTIPs compensation. Overall, the results are 
consistent with the findings for CEO networks.  
 
4.5.3 Endogeneity 
As discussed in the previous chapter, endogeneity could be a potential issue in our 
regression. For example, CEOs may be paid high compensation if they managed 
their firms well in the past. They are more likely to obtain non-executive director 
positions in other companies if they have a good reputation. This implies a possible 
reverse causality from CEO compensation to CEO networks. In order to examine 
the potential endogeneity issue, we use the one year lagged values of the centrality 
measures and compensation in the following regression model (4-3) as discussed in 
section 3.4.3:  
 
The effect of director networks on the level of the CEO compensation (director 
level) 
CEO compensation it = ß0+ ß1CEO Networks it-1+ ß2Compensationit-1 + ß3CEO 
Characteristics it + ß4Corporate Governance Measures it + ß5Firm 
Characteristics it + ß6Industry Dummies it+ ß7Year Dummies it     4-3 
                              
The results are presented in Table 4.14. The coefficients of CEO centrality measures 
still remain statistically significant, consistent with the previous finding that 
well-connected CEOs receive higher compensation. Since the lagged value of the 
centrality measures still remain statistically significant, it appears that the centrality 
measures do not suffer from an endogeneity issue in our regressions. 
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Table 4.11 CEO Total Compensation and Board Networks 
The dependent variable is the log of total compensation including salary, bonus, 
pension, other and LTIPs. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% 
(***) levels. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Degree 0.254
**
     
 (2.94)     
Closeness  0.347
**
    
  (2.52)    
Betweenness   0.164
*
   
   (1.87)   
Eigenvector    0.124
**
  
    (2.39)  
Information  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.842
**
 
(2.48) 
Audit 0.073 0.155 0.049 0.065 0.266 
 (0.32) (0.36) (0.43) (0.42) (0.47) 
Nomination 0.024 0.009 0.007 0.013 0.231 
 (0.46) (0.43) (0.24) (0.35) (0.64) 
Remuneration 0.335
**
 0.422
**
 0.312
**
 0.433
**
 0.483
**
 
 (2.87) (2.85) (2.68) (2.68) (2.78) 
BS 2.063
**
 2.057
**
 2.054
**
 2.059
**
 3.494
**
 
 (2.76) (2.86) (2.83) (2.87) (2.84) 
BI 1.343
***
 1.243
***
 1.353
***
 1.343
***
 1.878
***
 
 (3.43) (3.63) (3.61) (3.42) (3.98) 
Duality 1.479 2.569 2.439 1.376 2.494 
 (1.23) (1.26) (1.24) (1.47) (0.46) 
Tenure 0.143 0.007 0.014 0.035 0.383 
 (1.49) (1.36) (1.66) (1.31) (1.02) 
Age 0.227 0.017 0.014 0.026 0.022 
 (1.29) (1.24) (1.27) (1.23) (0.94) 
Education 0.064
**
 0.039
**
 0.061
**
 0.074
**
 0.087
**
 
 (2.98) (2.55) (2.53) (2.67) (2.98) 
Gender 0.261 0.173 0.351 0.140 0.254 
 (0.72) (0.87) (0.62) (0.81) (0.64) 
BB 0.114 0.045 0.005 0.008 0.048 
 (0.15) (0.52) (0.28) (0.32) (0.84) 
MV 0.278
***
 0.382
***
 0.454
***
 0.149
***
 0.478
***
 
 (4.52) (4.43) (4.11) (4.45) (3.95) 
MTBV -0.776 -0.658 -0.851 -0.755 -0.484 
 (-0.93) (-0.51) (-0.31) (-0.56) (-0.472) 
Leverage 0.552 0.756 0.584 0.623 0.683 
 (1.21) (1.23) (1.03) (1.23) (0.47) 
Intercept 11.78
***
 11.68
***
 11.43
***
 11.78
***
 12.36
***
 
 (14.53) (15.38) (14.55) (14.46) (16.38) 
Industry and 
Time 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R
2
 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.37 
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Table 4.12 CEO Basic Salary Compensation and Board Networks 
The dependent variable is the log of basic salary compensation. Asterisks indicate 
significance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Degree 0.058     
 (0.67)     
Closeness  0.047    
  (0.49)    
Betweenness   0.214   
   (0.65)   
Eigenvector    0.293  
    (0.29)  
Information  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.028 
(0.48) 
Audit 0.031 0.037 0.047 0.083 0.032 
 (0.57) (0.51) (0.35) (0.45) (0.75) 
Nomination 0.012 0.025 0.042 0.021 0.031 
 (0.56) (0.63) (0.51) (0.63) (0.98) 
Remuneration 0.013
**
 0.015
**
 0.015
**
 0.042
**
 0.047 
 (2.52) (2.61) (2.42) (2.34) (2.74) 
BS 0.039
**
 0.052
***
 0.039
**
 0.043
**
 0.047
**
 
 (2.26) (3.29) (2.35) (2.84) (2.47) 
BI 1.283
***
 0.849
***
 1.262
***
 1.143
***
 0.498
***
 
 (4.82) (4.52) (4.41) (4.72) (3.948) 
Duality 0.126 0.168 0.221 0.329 0.492 
 (1.06) (1.28) (1.20) (1.28) (1.20) 
Tenure 0.059
***
 0.038
***
 0.049
***
 0.032
***
 0.402
***
 
 (3.56) (3.35) (3.85) (4.23) (3.75) 
Age 0.065
*
 0.085
*
 0.083
*
 0.088
*
 0.166
*
 
 (2.23) (2.45) (2.31) (1.89) (2.54) 
Education 0.035 0.038 0.044 0.054 0.047 
 (0.55) (0.53) (0.45) (0.57) (0.47) 
Gender 0.037 0.039 0.051 0.055 0.058 
 (0.37) (0.38) (0.40) (0.47) (0.47) 
BB 0.053 0.032 0.044 0.068 0.038 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.19) (0.24) (0.37) 
MV 0.211
***
 0.216
***
 0.214
***
 0.219
***
 0.473
***
 
 (5.21) (5.16) (5.17) (4.87) (3.58) 
MTBV -0.123 -0.823 -0.345 -0.235 -0.442 
 (-0.34) (-0.29) (-0.36) (-0.26) (-0.84) 
Leverage 0.369 0.353 0.352 0.354 0.482 
 (1.36) (1.27) (1.27) (1.33) (1.03) 
Intercept 11.32
***
 11.54
***
 11.74
***
 11.25
***
 12.47
***
 
 (18.19) (23.18) (25.21) (18.21) (28.43) 
Industry and 
Time 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R
2
 0.31 0.28 0.29 0.32 0.30 
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Table 4.13 CEO LTIPs Compensation and Board Networks 
The dependent variable is the log of LTIPs compensation. Asterisks indicate 
significance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Degree 0.145
**
     
 (2.58)     
Closeness  0.0428    
  (1.15)    
Betweenness   0.246   
   (1.83)   
Eigenvector    0.0724
**
  
    (2.89)  
Information  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.482
**
 
(2.87) 
Audit 0.536 0.330 0.592 0.277 0.473 
 (0.57) (0.42) (0.69) (0.41) (0.48) 
Nomination 0.391 0.217 0.217 0.389 0.731 
 (1.36) (1.41) (1.16) (1.53) (1.03) 
Remuneration 0.743
***
 0.861
***
 0.845
***
 0.878
***
 0.958
***
 
 (3.24) (3.93) (3.26) (3.35) (3.76) 
BS 0.077
**
 0.046
**
 0.097
**
 0.068
**
 0.031
**
 
 (3.35) (3.51) (2.39) (2.72) (2.86) 
BI 1.391 1.448 1.768 1.975 1.029 
 (2.63) (2.82) (2.83) (2.91) (2.49) 
Duality 2.456 2.321 1.456 2.467 1.948 
 (0.26) (0.17) (0.32) (0.43) (0.49) 
Tenure 0.069 0.079 0.058 0.055 0.049 
 (1.14) (0.87) (1.31) (1.23) (0.49) 
Age 0.032 0.035 0.032 0.039 0.049 
 (0.64) (0.72) (0.58) (0.56) (0.87) 
Education 0.862
***
 0.832
***
 0.845
***
 0.842
***
 0.948
**
 
 (3.89) (3.89) (3.82) (3.84) (2.48) 
Gender 0.543 0.665 0.564 0.663 0.498 
 (1.33) (1.44) (1.23) (1.43) (1.34) 
BB 0.793 0.643 0.723 0.745 0.585 
 (1.57) (1.55) (1.64) (1.62) (1.48) 
MV 0.565
**
 0.653
**
 0.562
**
 0.454
**
 0.492
**
 
 (2.63) (2.52) (2.40) (2.68) (2.59) 
MTBV -0.884 -0.545 -0.657 -0.335 -0.492 
 (-0.21) (-0.39) (-0.61) (-0.42) (-0.32) 
Leverage 1.394 1.654 1.473 1.446 1.309 
 (0.76) (0.88) (0.72) (0.76) (0.45) 
Intercept 1.162
**
 0.456
**
 0.532
**
 1.352
**
 1.249
**
 
 (2.42) (2.31) (2.42) (2.44) (2.39) 
Industry and 
Time 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R
2
 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.23 
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Table 4.14 CEO Total Compensation and CEO Networks (One Year Lagged) 
The dependent variable is the log of total compensation including salary, bonus, 
pension, other and LTIPs. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% 
(***) levels. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Degree 0.428
***
     
 (3.56)     
Closeness  0.649
**
    
  (2.76)    
Betweenness   0.482
**
   
   (2.22)   
Eigenvector    1.497
***
  
    (3.85)  
Information  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.361
***
 
(3.94) 
Lag_Comp 0.683
***
 
(3.29) 
0.383
*** 
(3.19) 
0.032
**
 
(2.59) 
0.182
***
 
(3.55) 
0.348
*** 
(3.95) 
Audit 0.151 0.948 0.312 0.219 0.592 
 (0.53) (0.05) (0.59) (0.37) (0.91) 
Nomination 0.256 0.459 0.250 0.259 0.250 
 (0.89) (0.09) (0.62) (0.54) (0.38) 
Remuneration 0.295
**
 0.640
**
 0.840
**
 0.239
**
 0.591
**
 
 (2.60) (2.32) (2.51) (2.44) (2.57) 
BS 0.029
**
 0.067
**
 0.064
**
 0.224
**
 0.120 
 (2.36) (2.63) (2.77) (2.50) (1.05) 
BI 1.294
***
 1.640
***
 1.312
***
 1.356
***
 1.124
***
 
 (3.44) (3.19) (3.33) (3.69) (4.53) 
Duality 0.649 0.150 0.552 0.342 0.576 
 (1.32) (1.06) (1.02) (1.32) (1.19) 
Tenure 0.659 0.395 0.921 0.313 0.396 
 (1.21) (1.67) (1.31) (1.50) (1.27) 
Age 0.031 0.053 0.056 0.251 0.132 
 (1.42) (1.26) (1.23) (1.27) (1.43) 
Education 0.151
**
 0.133
**
 0.122
**
 0.224
**
 0.423
**
 
 (2.31) (2.55) (2.32) (2.42) (2.42) 
Gender 0.128 0.142 0.055 0.143 0.321 
 (0.14) (0.32) (0.63) (0.32) (0.53) 
BusyBoard -0.453 -0.344 -0.325 -0.222 -0.432 
 (-0.43) (-0.66) (-0.27) (-0.53) (-0.54) 
MV 0.484
***
 0.255
***
 0.232
***
 0.453
***
 1.131
**
 
 (4.11) (4.642) (4.21) (3.11) (2.11) 
MTBV -0.322 -0.324 -0.326 -0.732 -0.395 
 (-0.32) (-0.55) (-0.71) (-0.84) (-0.56) 
Leverage 0.632 0.402 0.588 0.653 0.643 
 (1.23) (1.50) (1.43) (1.34) (0.43) 
Intercept 14.32
***
 14.54
***
 13.47
***
 12.45
***
 17.33
***
 
 (19.32) (21.96) (15.75) (22.47) (22.42) 
Industry and 
Time  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R
2
 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.32 
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4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the relationship between director networks and CEO 
compensation. Two competing theories about the role of compensation dominate the 
literature: the optimal contracting theory and the managerial power theory. 
According to the optimal contracting theory, the compensation plan is designed to 
reduce agency costs and align the interests of directors and shareholders. In contrast, 
based on the managerial power theory (Bebchuk et al., 2002) directors of firms will 
use their power to design their remuneration package which leading to inefficiently 
high levels of compensation.  
 
This chapter carries out an investigation based on CEO networks (individual level) 
and board networks (firm level). At the individual level, we generate network 
measures that capture several dimensions of CEO networks by collecting data 
across the entire network of all CEOs of non-financial FTSE 350 firms over the 
period 2007-2010. Controlling for CEO characteristics, corporate governance 
characteristics, firm characteristics and performance characteristics, we find that the 
more central the position of CEO, the higher the CEO total compensation. This 
result supports the managerial power theory (Bebchuk et al. 2002), which suggests 
that powerful CEOs can set their own compensation. In particular, we also 
investigate the effect of CEO networks on two components of CEO compensation, 
i.e. basic salary and LTIPs compensation. We find a significant positive relationship 
between basic salary compensation and CEO networks, but we do not find evidence 
of a relationship between LTIPs compensation and CEO networks. The results 
suggest that powerful CEO would like to increase their basic salary rather than 
LTIPs compensation, since salary compensation does not require any additional 
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effort from the CEO, whereas incentive based compensation normally depends on 
firm performance.  
 
At the firm level, we find a positive and significant relationship between board 
networks and CEO total compensation and LTIPs compensation. However, we find 
no evidence that a CEO’s basic salary compensation is positively related to board 
networks at the firm level. This suggests that firms tend to reward the CEO with 
more equity-based compensation if the firm has better access to resources and 
information through their overall director networks. 
  
 121 
 
Chapter 5 The effects of directors’ business and social networks and 
corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance 
5.1 Introduction 
The board of directors plays an important role in corporate governance, acting as a 
formal link between shareholders and managers. Recently, the 2008 global financial 
crisis has revealed shortcomings, and questions are being asked about the 
responsibility of boards of directors for failings that led to the crisis and turbulence 
in the global financial world. Growing research on board characteristics has focused 
on whether directors with multiple directorships are too busy to manage their 
business effectively. Using a sample of U.S. firms in 1999, Ferris et al. (2003) fail to 
find that the average number of directorships held by directors is associated with 
firm performance. However, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that boards where 
more than half the outside directors hold more than three directorships exhibit a 
lower market to book ratio. Their results are based on panel data for U.S. firms over 
the period from1989 to 1995.  
 
There is another strand of studies that focus on the relationship between firm 
performance and corporate governance mechanisms, such as board size, the 
proportion of independent directors, the frequency of board meetings and CEO 
duality (Yermark, 1996; Bhagat, and Black, 2002; Vafeas, 1999; Rechner and 
Dalton, 1991; Core et al., 1999). However, the results are mixed. Explanations for 
the conflicting results include different time periods and variations in the 
measurement of board characteristics and corporate performance.  
 
This study extends previous studies by combining the two strands of studies 
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together using a UK dataset of board characteristics and investigating the effects of 
board networks and corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance. 
Whereas in chapter 3 we have discussed the effects of board networks through 
director interlocks measured by “centrality” on firm performance, we extend this 
analysis by taking into account social networks in this chapter. Specifically, we 
investigate the business and social connections of the non-financial FTSE 350 firms 
listed on the London Stock Exchange and measure board networks not only taking 
into account director interlocks (business connections) but also other social 
activities (social connections) to find out whether board networks improve or hurt 
the performance of the firms they manage, while controlling for the effects of 
corporate governance mechanisms.  
 
There are two main theories relating to director interlocks in the existing literature. 
On the one hand, the “Reputation Hypothesis” suggests that the number of outside 
board seats may proxy for director reputation (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Directors 
are motivated to improve their reputation since they can use their directorships to 
signal to the market that they are good at decision-making, and at providing advice 
and monitoring management. Thus, a firm with more multiple directors could lead 
to an increase in firm value. The “Busyness Hypothesis” (Ferris et al. 2003), on the 
other hand, states that directors who hold more directorships are more likely to be 
overcommitted and thus lack time to adequately monitor management, which could 
increase agency problem and therefore adversely affect firm value. There are some 
concerns with directors who hold multiple directorships in the UK and US. For 
example, the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010, p15) states that “full-time 
executive directors should not take on more than one non-executive directorship in a 
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FTSE 100 company nor the chairmanship of such a company”. In the U.S., the 
Council of Institutional Investors (2004) suggests that “absent unusual, specified 
circumstances, directors with full-time jobs should not serve on more than two other 
boards”.  
 
Despite the growing literature on director networks and firm performance, most 
studies only look at director interlocks (business networks) when measuring director 
networks and no research has focused on the relationship between board business 
and social networks and firm performance in the UK context. Therefore, the 
research reported here is unique in several ways. First, to the best of my knowledge, 
this chapter is the first to examine the influence of the board networks (business and 
social networks) on firm performance in the UK context. Second, director networks 
are usually measured by formal business networks (directorships) while this chapter 
also includes a multitude of business and social networks, including current and past 
employment, education background, and other types of social activities 
(membership of golf clubs, membership of charity organizations, universities 
alumni, etc). Finally, this chapter examines the effects of corporate governance 
mechanisms on firm performance using recent data (2009). The findings are 
important to regulators since they provide empirical evidence that network 
connections are valuable to firms, whereas one of the UK Corporate Governance 
Code (2010) best practice recommendations is that “full-time executive directors 
should not take on more than one non-executive directorship in a FTSE 100 
company nor the chairmanship of such a company”. The code does not therefore 
acknowledge the benefits that multiple board memberships may provide. 
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section two provides an 
overview of the literature on directors’ interlocks and corporate governance 
mechanisms and develops the hypotheses. Section three describes the data and 
methodology. The results are presented in Section four and conclusions are 
presented in Section five.  
 
5.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses 
5.2.1 Director interlocks 
A board of directors is a team elected by shareholders to oversee the activities of a 
firm. The roles of boards can mainly be categorized into three types (Johnson et al., 
1996). The first role of boards, called the “control role”, which monitors 
management representing the interests of shareholders. The second role of boards is 
the “service role”, which provides the directors some advice on administrative, 
managerial issues and strategy. The third role, called the “resource dependence role”, 
treats boards as one of the instruments which management might use to access 
resources which are critical to a firm’s development.  
 
Boards typically consist of a combination of executive (inside) directors and 
non-executive (outside) directors. An executive director is a full-time employee of 
the firm who is involved in day-to-day running of the business while a 
non-executive director is not employed full-time and has a duty to monitor 
executive activity and develop strategy. One of the most obvious characteristics of 
non-executive directors is that they often sit on several boards at the same time. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the number of directorships may proxy for 
director reputation. Directors have the motivations to improve their reputation since 
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they can use their board positions to signal that they have expertise in 
decision-makings and can provide better advice and monitoring to the board.  
 
Miwa and Ramseyer (2000) find that the board with directors holding six or more 
directorships are positively and significantly related to firm performance in the 
Japanese cotton textile industry. The findings suggest that multiple directorships 
could improve firm performance which is in line with shareholders’ interests. 
 
Bouwman (2009) investigates whether directors with multiple directorships may 
cause similarities in corporate governance structures across the firms where they 
have board positions. A set of eight corporate governance variables
2
 for U.S. firms 
over the period 2002 to 2007 was regressed (one at a time) on the weighted average 
governance practices of firms sharing the same directors, while controlling for other 
factors, such as CEO and firm characteristics. The results show that director 
overlaps matter and help design corporate governance principals. 
 
On the other hand, some studies argue that too many directorships might lower 
directorial effectiveness. Core et al. (1999) find that outside directors who hold 
more than three directorships provide higher compensation to CEOs, which leads to 
agency problem and lower firm performance. In the U.S., professional bodies have 
also recognized the possible detrimental effects of multiple directorships. The 
Council for Institutional Investors (2003)
3
 has recommended that the number of 
                                                             
2
 The governance variables were: (1) board size measured as the number of directors; (2) the percentage of 
outside directors; (3) the number of board meetings; (4) director base pay; (5) log (CEO total pay); (6) the 
percentage of directors who are active CEOs; (7) the percentage of directors over the age of 70; and (8) CEO 
duality, a dummy that equals 1 if the CEO is the chairman. 
3
 The Council of Institutional Investors (CII) is a nonprofit association of public, union and corporate pension 
funds. Member funds are major long-term shareowners with a duty to protect the retirement assets of millions of 
American workers. 
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directorships held by directors in publicly traded companies should be restricted. 
Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) provide evidence which suggests that busy 
directors are dominated by the CEO, thus compromising their monitoring role. If 
this indeed is the case, busy directors may not fully represent shareholder interests.  
 
Ferris et al. (2003) argue that directors who hold more directorships are more likely 
to be overcommitted and thus lack time to adequately monitor management, which 
could increase agency problem and therefore adversely affect firm value. Although 
they didn’t find that the relationship between the firm performance and the average 
number of board seats held by directors, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that busy 
boards do adversely affect firm performance between 1989 and 1995. They find that 
firms with busy boards which measured by the majority of outside directors who are 
holding three or more directorships are associated with weak corporate governance, 
lower market-to-book ratios, weaker profitability, and lower sensitivity of CEO 
turnover to firm performance. Jiraporn et al. (2009), examining the effects of 
multiple directorships on directors’ meeting attendance using a sample of 1,510 U.S. 
firms over the sample period of 1998 to 2003, find that directors with more 
directorships are more likely to be absent from board meetings. The results suggest 
that directors with multiple directorships are overcommitted and so they are not able 
to attend all board meetings. 
 
Kirchmaier and Stathopolous (2008) investigate the relationship between CEO’s 
social networks and firm performance for 363 UK non-financial firms in 2005. 
CEO’s social networking is measured by the total number of directorships in 
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publicly-listed firms and memberships of other non-profit organizations. They find 
that CEO’s social network hurts firm performance. 
 
Ahn et al. (2010) examine the impact of multiple directorships on the performance 
of mergers and acquisitions using U.S. firms’ data over the period 1998 to 2003. 
They find that acquiring firms whose directors hold more directorships show more 
negative abnormal returns upon an M&A announcement. 
 
In conclusion, based on the theory (reputation hypothesis) suggested by Fama and 
Jensen (1983) the number of directorships serves as a proxy for director reputation 
and so directors have the motivations to improve their reputation since they can use 
their directorships to signal to the market that they are good at making decision, 
providing good advice and monitoring to the board. Multiple directorships can add 
value by allowing directors to establish (or widen) their networks, which can be 
valuable to the firm. Thus, a board with more connected directors could lead to an 
increase in firm value. However, based on the theory (busyness hypothesis) 
suggested by Ferris et al. (2003) directors who serve on several boards are 
overcommitted and lack of time to adequately monitor management. We can 
imagine that directors’ managerial performance might be affected if they join too 
many institutions and clubs, thus adversely affecting firm value. Hence the null 
hypothesis and alternative hypotheses are as follows: 
The null hypothesis: 
H0: The total number of board networks including business connections and social 
connections has no influence on firm performance. 
 
 128 
 
The alternative hypotheses: 
H1a: The total number of board networks including business connections and social 
connections has a positive influence on firm performance. 
H1b: The total number of board networks including business connections and social 
connections has a negative influence on firm performance. 
 
5.2.2 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
5.2.2.1 Board Size 
It is argued that firms with larger boards experience higher firm performance since 
they bring a range of expertise and possibly make good decisions (Pfeffer, 1973; 
Singh and Harianto, 1989). Based on the resource dependence theory, the ability of 
accessing external resources is crucial to the development of the company. 
Therefore, the chance to access to the external resources will increase as the board 
size increases (Goodstein et al., 1994). Bazerman and Schoorman (1983) argue that 
the benefit of having a large board is that firm could have more possibilities to 
access to valuable information through board interlocks, which leads to improving 
corporate performance. 
 
However, some research has leaned towards smaller boards enhancing firm 
performance. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue that large boards are difficult to 
manage and control. Co-ordinating and free riding issues will arise if board getting 
too big. Firms could reduce these issues by having smaller board. Some literature 
supporting this argument includes Yermack (1996) who finds that the market values 
more highly U.S. firms that have smaller boards over the period 1984 to 1991. 
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Eisenberg et al. (1998) find that board size has a negative effect on firm financial 
performance when using a sample of Finnish firms. By studying a sample of the 
FTSE 100 firms between 2003 and 2005, Clacher et al. (2008) also find that board 
size is negatively associated with firm performance. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) 
argue that when the board becomes large, the problem of free-riding by directors in 
monitoring management will increase. Thus, they expect the relationship between 
board size and firm performance to be negatively correlated. 
 
Based on the above arguments, board size can either positively or negative affect 
performance, hence, the null hypothesis and alternative hypotheses are as follows: 
The null hypothesis: 
H0: Board size is not associated with firm performance. 
 
The alternative hypotheses: 
H2a: Board size is positively associated with firm performance. 
H2b: Board size is negatively associated with firm performance. 
 
5.2.3.2 Board independence 
Board independence is a type of mechanism used to assess the effectiveness of 
corporate governance by previous studies. The board should be comprised of an 
appropriate combination of executive and non-executive directors in order to make 
sure no one dominates board decision making. In particular, non-executive directors 
can be considered as an independent non-executive director if he or she can meet 
specific criteria (see the UK Corporate Governance Code section B.1.1). The 
assumption is that if the board consists of a majority of independent non-executive 
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directors, it can monitor managers more effectively and therefore decrease the 
agency costs. According to the provisions of the UK Corporate Governance Code 
(2010), all FTSE 350 firms should comprise a board with half of its members to be 
independent non-executive directors in character and judgement. 
 
Although the relationship between the proper combination of executive and 
non-executive directors and firm performance has been well researched, the findings 
are still mixed (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Forsberg, 1989; Agrawal and Knoeber, 
1996).  
 
On the one hand, non-executive directors are considered as independent directors 
and supposed to monitor the performance of executive directors, which make sure 
the objective of executive directors is to maximize shareholders’ wealth (Fama, 
1980). John and Senbet (1998) argue that the firm should have a majority of 
non-executive directors sitting on the board which could increase the board 
independence. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) find that stock price is positively 
correlated to the appointment of outside directors. Hillman et al. (2003) argue that 
firms are more likely to hire outside directors during difficult time because outside 
directors could bring outside resources and information to the firms.  
 
On the other hand, executive directors are involved in day to day operation of the 
company and should be familiar with the firm’s activities. Harris and Raviv (2008) 
find that if executive directors know important information about the company, 
giving control to non-executive directors may result in a loss of information that is 
more costly than the agency cost associated with executive directors’ control. Thus, 
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shareholders will prefer executive directors can control the board. This result is 
contrary to conventional opinion that non-executive directors are responsible for 
monitoring the performance of executive directors. 
 
Based on above arguments, we therefore hypothesize that: 
The null hypothesis: 
H0: Board independence is not associated with firm performance. 
The alternative hypotheses: 
   H3a: Board independence is positively associated with firm performance. 
   H3b: Board independence is negatively associated with firm performance. 
 
5.2.3.3 CEO Duality 
As noted earlier, CEO duality exists when the CEO also holds the position of 
Chairman of the board. Fama and Jensen (1983, p314) argue that “CEO duality 
signals the absence of separation of decision management and decision control”, so 
agency problems are going to arise when the same person holds both CEO and 
chairman positions. CEO duality hurts board independence and diminishes the 
ability of the board to effectively monitor and evaluate the CEO (Fizel and Louie, 
1990). Berg and Smith (1978) find that CEO duality has a negative effect on return 
on investments (ROI) when studying Fortune 200 firms in 1976. Yermack (1996) 
finds that firms are more valuable when the roles of CEO and chairman are separate 
using data for 452 U.S. firms over the period of 1984 to 1991. Sanda et al. (2003) 
find that Nigerian firms where the CEO and Chairman are separate tend to perform 
better than those with a combined role for the two posts.  
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Despite agency theory suggesting that there is a negative relationship between CEO 
duality and firm performance, stewardship theory assumes that CEO duality can 
improve the board effectiveness by making better and faster decisions and perform 
better compared to when the CEO and chairman roles are separated (Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991). Rechner and Dalton (1991) find that companies with CEO duality has 
stronger financial performance relative to other companies over the period of 
1978-1983. Goyal and Park (2002) find that the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm 
performance is higher for companies with CEO duality using a sample of U.S. 
companies. 
 
Based on the two competing theories (agency theory and stewardship theory) we 
hypothesize that: 
The null hypothesis: 
H0: CEO duality is not associated with firm performance. 
 
The alternative hypotheses: 
    H4a: CEO duality is negatively associated with firm performance. 
    H4b: CEO duality is positively associated with firm performance. 
 
5. 3 Data and Methodology 
5.3.1 Sample and Data 
Based on a sample of the FTSE 350 non-financial firms on the London Stock 
Exchange in 2009, we collect the following data from the BoardEx database: board 
networks, board size, board independence, CEO duality, average number of 
directorships held by directors and outside directors, inside (outside) director’s age 
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and inside (outside) director’s tenure. According to the UK corporate governance 
code (2010), full-time employees of the firm are designated as executive directors 
(inside directors).  
 
In addition to the data on corporate governance, we also source data from 
Datastream and FAME on accounting performance, leverage, market value, and 
growth opportunities. We measure firm performance using both Return on Assets 
(ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE), as in Core et al., (1999) and Tian and Lau 
(2001). Financial firms are excluded from the sample due to their special financial 
structure and accounting practices, Table 5.1 shows the industry distribution of the 
sample firms. 
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Table 5.1: Industry Distribution of the Sample Firms 
The sample is made up of 196 firm-year observations collected in 2009. Industries 
are classified by the four-digit code based on the SIC (Standard Industrial 
Classification) Code collected from Datastream. 
Industry Number of Firms Percentage 
Mining and Quarrying  12 6% 
Manufacturing  69 35% 
Wholesale and Retail  31 16% 
Transportation and Communication 29 15% 
Utilities 10 5% 
Construction 17 9% 
Other 28 14% 
Total 196 100% 
 
5.3.2 Methodology 
We examine the impacts of board networks on firm performance by running three 
regression models using both ROA and ROE as measures of firm performance 
while controlling for corporate governance mechanism variables and firm 
characteristics. For each firm, we apply three different measures of board networks. 
Each measure is calculated at the level of the firm’s board, thereby allowing a match 
with firm level data for the other variables.  
 
5.3.2.1 Board networks (business and social connections) and firm performance 
We ran regression models in which the dependent variables are Return on Assets 
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(ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE). The independent variables include board 
networks, corporate governance mechanisms and firm characteristics. The full 
generic model is as follows: 
 
ROAit and ROEit = ß0+ ß1Board Networksit+ ß2Board_Sizeit+ 
ß3Board_Interdependenceit+ ß4CEO_Dualityit + ß5 Director’s_Tenure it+ 
ß6Director’s_Age it+ ß7Mark_Valueit+ ß8Leverageit + εi                    5-1                           
 
Here, the dependent variable is firm performance which is measured by both the 
ratio of net income to total assets (ROA) and the ratio of net income to total equity 
(ROE). In this study, we not only take into account business connections 
(directorships) but also social connections (memberships of organisations) when 
measuring board networks. Specifically, the board networks is the accumulated 
number of firms and organisations with which directors are acquainted, through 
their current and past employment, their education, and other types of social 
activities (membership of golf clubs, membership of charity organizations, 
universities alumni, etc). The values of the board networks are calculated using the 
following steps: 
1. Six different types of ties that linking board members are identified. These are 
quoted firm, private firm, club, universities, NFP (Non-for-profit), and others. 
 
2. For each firm, the total number of ties (any of the six different types of the ties 
described above that actually exist) among board members is calculated.  
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Corporate governance mechanisms variables include board size, board 
independence, CEO duality, inside (outside) directors’ age and inside (outside) 
directors’ tenure. Firm characteristics consist of market value and leverage (see 
Table 5.2 for the definitions). 
 
Table 5.2 Control Variable Definitions 
Variable Name  Definition 
Board size (BS) The total number of directors on the board. 
Board Independence (BI) Number of non-executive directors divided by the total 
number of directors. 
CEO Duality A dummy variable taking the value of one if the roles of 
CEO and Chairman are split, zero otherwise. 
IDT and ODT The number of years the inside and outside directors has 
retained their current position. 
IDA and ODA The age of the inside and outside directors in calendar 
years. 
Market Value (MV) Market value of the firm in 2009. 
Leverage Total debt divided by total equity. 
 
5.3.2.2 Multiple directorships and firm performance 
We apply the methodology used by Ferris et al. (2003) in which they use the 
average number of directorships held by directors and the average number of 
directorships held by outside directors to capture the busyness of boards. Return on 
assets and Return on Equity are used to proxy for firm performance in this study 
whereas Ferris et al. (2003) use the market to book ratio. We also control for the 
effects of corporate governance mechanisms and firm characteristics. We estimate 
the following equation to examine the relationship between multiple directorships 
and firm performance: 
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ROAit and ROEit = ß0 + ß1ANOODit + ß2ANODit + ß3Board_Sizeit+ 
ß4Board_Interdependenceit + ß5CEO_Dualityit + ß6 Director’s_Tenure it + ß7 
Director’s_Ageit + ß8Mark_Valueit + ß9Leverageit + εi                     5-2                                     
 
The dependent variable is firm performance which is measured by both the ratio of 
net income to total assets (ROA) and the ratio of net income to total equity (ROE). 
ANOOD is the average number of directorships held by outside directors and 
ANOD is the average number of directorships held by all directors (executive and 
non-executive). Corporate governance mechanism variables include board size, 
board independence, CEO duality, inside (outside) directors’ age and inside (outside) 
directors’ tenure. Firm characteristics consist of market value and leverage (see 
Table 5.2 for the definitions). 
 
5.3.2.3 Busy board and firm performance 
The third measure we use in this study is derived from the methodology of Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006). Here, busy board is measured by a dummy variable which takes 
the value of one if 50 percent or more of the board’s directors hold three or more 
directorships and zero otherwise. The full model is as follows: 
ROAit and ROEit=ß0+ß1Busy_Boardit +ß2Board_Sizeit+ ß3Board_Interdependenceit 
+ ß4CEO_Dualityit + ß5 Director’s_Tenure it + ß6 Director’s_Age it + 
ß7Mark_Valueit + ß8Leverageit + εi                                    5-3                       
 
As before, the dependent variable is firm performance which is measured by both 
the ratio of net income to total assets (ROA) and the ratio of net income to total 
equity (ROE). Busy board is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if 50 
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percent or more of the board’s directors hold three or more directorships and zero 
otherwise. Corporate governance mechanism variables include board size, board 
independence, CEO duality, inside (outside) directors’ age and inside (outside) 
directors’ tenure. Firm characteristics consist of market value and leverage (see 
Table 5.2 for the definitions). 
 
5.4 Empirical results 
5.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.3 presents the summary statistics for all of the variables used in this part of 
the empirical analysis. In terms of board networks (business and social connections), 
the average board in the sample had established 47 (mean = 46.59) business and 
social connections at the time of measurement, with firm connections ranging from 
4 to 234 ties. These results reflect the fact that larger firms have bigger boards, but 
also that larger firms have more connections than smaller firms. The average board 
size in the sample is 10 (mean = 9.5) and ranges from 6 to 20. The percentage of 
non-executive directors is 55% (0.55).  
To capture the prevalence of busy directors on the board, we employ a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if 50% or more of the board’s directors are busy. 
We refer to this variable as the “busy board” indicator and find that 48% of firms 
have a board with more than half of the directors holding more than three 
directorships. 
 
The average number of directorships held by non-executive directors is 2.65 while 
the average number of directorships held by all directors is 2.12. The average CEO 
duality is 95% which indicates that 95% of firms separated the roles of CEO and 
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Chairman. This indicates that the vast majority of firms comply with the 
recommendation of the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) on this issue. 
Non-executive directors are older than executive directors: the average age of 
non-executive directors is 60 and that of executive directors is 51. Executive 
directors have a longer average tenure (5.19 years) when compared with the average 
tenure of non-executive directors (4.49 years) which indicates that executive 
directors have slightly more stable tenures than non-executive directors.  
 
Table 5.4 depicts the Pearson correlation matrix for the variables we employ in this 
part of the study. The Pearson correlation matrix is used to examine the possible 
multicollinearity issue in our model. Standard errors of coefficients tend to become 
very large as the level of multicollinearity increases. Gujarati (2003) indicates that 
multicollinearity may affect the accuracy of results if the correlation coefficient is 
larger than 80% (p359). We find that BoardNetworks is positively and significantly 
correlated with board size (0.45) and BusyBoard (0.37), suggesting that larger 
boards have larger connections and tend to be boards where more than half of 
directors hold more than three directorships. Board size is positively and 
significantly associated with market value (0.47). ANOOD, ANOD, IDA and ODA 
are all positively correlated with BoardNetworks, although the coefficient of ADOD 
is not significant. BusyBoard is positively and significantly correlated with 
ANOOD (0.42). This makes sense as we expect that boards will become busier 
when the directorships of non-executive (outside) directors increase. We do not find 
a multicollinearity problem in our correlation matrix as no excessively high 
coefficient is observed. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test was also used to 
examine the level of multicollinearity. Table 5.5 shows that the mean VIF value is 
1.72 and the overall tolerance level is 0.58 (1/1.72). Based on the suggestion of 
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O'Brien (2007), the multicollinearity problem does not exist if VIF is less than 10 or 
the tolerance level (1/VIF) more than 0.10. Table 5.5 demonstrates that there is no 
multicollinearity issue with the data.  
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Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of our sample. The total number of observations 
is 196. Board Networks is the total number of firms and organizations the board of directors 
is acquainted with, through their current and past employment, their education, and other 
types of social activities (golf clubs, charity organizations, universities, etc). Board size is 
the number of directors sitting on the board. Board Independence is the percentage of 
non-executive directors sitting on the board. CEO Duality is a dummy variable taking the 
value of one if the roles of CEO and Chairman are split, zero otherwise. Busy Board is a 
dummy variable for firms in which 50 percent or more of the board’s directors hold three or 
more directorships. ANOOD is the average number of directorships held by outside 
directors. ANOD is the average number of directorships held by directors. Duality is a 
dummy variable identifying firms in which the roles of CEO and Chairman are split. IDA 
(ODA) shows the age of the inside (outside) directors in calendar years. IDT (ODT) is the 
number of years the inside (outside) directors has retained their current position. Leverage 
is the ratio of total debt to total equity. MV is market capitalization in 2009. The Return on 
Equity (ROE), Return on Assets (ROA) and market to book (MTB) annual figures are in 
percentages. 
 
Variable Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev 
Board networks 47.59 51.00 4.00 234.00 32.62 
Board size 9.50 10.21 6.00 20.00 0.84 
Board Independence 0.55 0.61 0.28 0.90 0.23 
CEO Duality 0.95 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.23 
BusyBoard 0.48 0.46 0.00 1.00 0.50 
ANOOD 2.65 2.71 1.78 8.88    0.41 
ANOD 2.12 2.35 1.00 6.43    0.62 
IDA 51.17 54.29 42.00 60.50    3.25 
ODA 59.77 58.28 53.20 64.00    2.79 
IDT 5.19 5.28 0.40 15.70    3.11 
ODT 4.49 4.68 1.00 9.80    1.64 
Leverage 0.41 0.45 0.00 1.53    0.34 
MV 4,420.44 941.07 100.16 95,776.12    11,049.99 
ROE 
ROA 
19.43 
8.26 
9.28 
7.42 
-76.03 
-95.88 
673.17 
123.75 
   95.54 
   12.65 
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Table 5.4 Pearson Correlation Matrix 
This table presents the correlation coefficients for all the variables used in this study. Board Networks is the total number of firms and organizations the board 
of directors is acquainted with, through their current and past employment, their education, and other types of social activities (golf clubs, charity 
organizations, universities, etc). Board size is the number of directors sitting on the board. Board Independence is the percentage of non-executive directors 
sitting on the board. CEO Duality is a dummy variable identifying firms in which the roles of CEO and Chairman are split. Busy Board is a dummy variable 
that is one if 50 percent or more of the board’s directors hold three or more directorships and zero otherwise. ANOOD is the average number of directorships 
held by outside directors. ANOD is the average number of directorships held by directors. IDA (ODA) shows the age of the inside (outside) directors in 
calendar years. IDT (ODT) is the number of years the inside (outside) directors has retained their current position. Leverage is the ratio of Total Debt to Total 
Equity. MV is the market capitalization in 2009. The asterisks ***, ** and * show statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
(1)BoardNetworks 1.00 
        
 
  
 
(2)BoardSize 0.45*** 1.00 
       
 
  
 
(3)BoardIndependence 0.23*** 0.09*** 1.00 
      
 
  
 
(4)CEO Duality 0.01*** -0.08*** 0.03** 1.00 
     
 
  
 
(5)BusyBoard 0.37*** 0.39*** 0.12** 0.02** 1.00 
    
 
  
 
(6)ANOOD 0.14** 0.16** 0.10** 0.07 0.31** 1.00 
   
 
  
 
(7)ANOD 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.02 0.42** 0.26** 1.00 
  
 
  
 
(8)IDA 0.10** 0.16** 0.12** 0.01 0.21** 0.30** -0.05 1.00 
 
 
  
 
(9)ODA 0.25** 0.23** 0.13** 0.05** 0.25** 0.16** 0.07 0.10** 1.00  
  
 
(10)IDT -0.29** 0.27** 0.18** 0.02** 0.13** 0.09* 0.04* -0.03 0.36* 1.00 
  
 
(11)ODT -0.28** 0.26** 0.15** 0.09** 0.11** 0.14* 0.10** 0.01* 0.20** -0.37** 1.00 
 
 
(12)Leverage 0.12** 0.19** 0.03** 0.02 0.25** 0.08 -0.03 0.01 0.13* -0.07* -0.15* 1.00  
(13)MV 0.36** 0.47** 0.17** 0.08** 0.25** 0.16* 0.07 0.20* 0.18* 0.05 0.19* 0.05 1.00 
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Table 5.5 Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Test Results 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
BoardSize 2.56 0.39 
BusyBoard 2.45 0.41 
MV 2.01 0.49 
Board Independence 1.87 0.54 
BoardNetworks 1.75 0.57 
ODA 1.68 0.59 
IDT 1.63 0.61 
ODT 1.61 0.62 
CEO Duality 1.57 0.64 
IDA 1.46 0.68 
ANOD 1.38 0.72 
ANOOD 1.25 0.80 
Leverage 1.18 0.85 
Mean 1.72 0.58 
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5.4.2 Empirical Tests of Reputation Hypothesis and Busyness Hypothesis 
In this section, we test the reputation hypothesis and the busyness hypothesis by 
means of three different empirical tests. We first examine the relationship between 
board networks and firm performance using a multivariate model. The results are 
depicted in Table 5.6. We find that board networks including both business and 
social connections have a significant and positive impact on firm performance at the 
1% level using both ROA and ROE. The finding suggests that networked directors 
use their connections to access internal and external information and resources, thus 
improving firm performance. Although we find the average number of directorships 
held by outside directors (ANOOD) and all directors (ANOD) to have a positive 
effect on firm performance the results are not significant (Table 5.7). Finally, we 
find that busy board has a negative and significant effect on firm performance at the 
1% level (Table 5.8). The result suggests that boards with half of the directors 
holding more than three directorships might be too busy to effectively perform their 
duties, thus hurting firm performance. This result is consistent with previous 
empirical evidence that firms with busy directors have lower performance (Fich and 
Shivdasani, 2006; Jackling and Johl, 2009). 
 
5.4.3 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
We find that board size is negatively and significantly associated with firm 
performance at the 5% level (Tables 5.6 to Table 5.8), therefore hypothesis 2b is 
supported. These results support the argument that when a board gets bigger, it is 
difficult to co-operate and manage, thus reducing its effectiveness. Board 
independence is positively and significantly related to firm performance (Tables 5.6 
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to Table 5.8), hence hypothesis 3a is supported. The percentage of non-executive 
directors is used to proxy for board independence in this thesis. The 
recommendation in the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) that boards should 
comprise appropriate independent non-executive directors in order to make sure no 
individual director can dominate the board’s decision thus appears to make sound 
financial sense. However, we do not find that CEO duality has any effect on firm 
performance, so neither hypothesis 4a nor 4b is supported. This result is contrary to 
what the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) implies.  
 
In conclusion, for both measures of performance, ROA and ROE, we find that our 
overall results support hypothesis 3 that the total number of board network 
connections (comprising business connections and social connections) has a 
positive influence on firm performance. We also find evidence that if a board is too 
busy firm performance is adversely affected.  
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Table 5.6 Board Networks and Firm Performance 
This table presents the regression results for the impact of Board Networks on firm 
performance. The dependent variable is firm performance, measured by Return on Assets 
(ROA) ratio and Return on Equity (ROE). Board Networks is the total number of firms and 
organizations the board of directors is acquainted with, through their current and past 
employment, their education, and other types of social activities (golf clubs, charity 
organizations, universities, etc). Board size is the number of directors sitting on the board. 
Board Independence is the percentage of non-executive directors sitting on the board. CEO 
Duality is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the roles of CEO and Chairman are 
split, zero otherwise. Inside (outside) director’s Age shows the age of the inside (outside) 
directors in calendar years. Inside (outside) director’s Tenure is the number of years the 
inside (outside) directors has retained their current position. Leverage is the ratio of Total 
Debt to Total Equity. MV is the market capitalization in 2009. Asterisks indicate 
significance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. 
 
 Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable (1)Return On Assets (2)Return On Equity 
 Board Networks 0.12*** 
(3.51) 
 0.18*** 
(3.15) 
Board Size -1.94** 
(-2.04) 
-1.47** 
(-2.35) 
Board Independence 0.57** 
(2.58) 
0.86** 
(2.45) 
CEO Duality 0.12 
(0.56) 
0.16 
(0.34) 
Inside Director's age 0.08 
(0.20) 
0.25 
(0.25) 
Outside Director's age 0.18  
(0.24) 
0.87 
(0.60) 
Inside Director's Tenure 0.29 
(0.27) 
0.61 
(0.27) 
Outside Director's Tenure 0.31 
(0.38) 
0.97 
(.24) 
Leverage  -0.78  
(-1.61) 
-0.98 
(-1.17) 
MV  
 
Intercept 
 
Adj R
2 
F 
0.75 
(0.14) 
5.94 
(4.97) 
0.13 
3.55 
0.02 
(0.40) 
6.24 
(4.32) 
0.16 
3.99 
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Table 5.7 Multiple Directorships and Firm Performance 
This table presents the regression results for the impact of multiple directorships on firm 
performance. The dependent variable is firm performance, measured by Return on Assets 
(ROA) ratio and Return on Equity (ROE). ANOOD is the average number of directorships 
held by outside directors. ANOD is the average number of directorships held by all 
directors. Board size is the number of directors sitting on the board. Board Independence is 
the percentage of non-executive directors sitting on the board. CEO Duality is a dummy 
variable taking the value of one if the roles of CEO and Chairman are split, zero otherwise. 
Inside (outside) director’s Age shows the age of the inside (outside) directors in calendar 
years. Inside (outside) director’s Tenure is the number of years the inside (outside) directors 
has retained their current position. Leverage is the ratio of Total Debt to Total Equity. MV 
is the market capitalization in 2009. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 
1% (***) levels. 
 
 Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable (1)Return On Assets (2)Return On Equity 
 ANOOD 1.26 
(0.37) 
1.47 
(0.24) 
ANOD 0.18 
(0.48) 
0.98 
(0.57) 
Board Size -0.23** 
(-2.31) 
-0.19** 
(2.23) 
Board Independence 0.12*** 
(3.28) 
0.36*** 
(3.29) 
CEO Duality 0.25 
(0.51) 
0.27 
(0.43) 
Inside Director's age 1.70 
(0.44) 
3.23 
(0.48) 
Outside Director's age 1.85 
(0.46) 
4.49 
(0.64) 
Inside Director's Tenure 0.80  
(0.22) 
0.65 
(0.10) 
Outside Director's Tenure 0.93  
(0.64) 
0.85  
(0.73) 
Leverage  -0.32 
(-0.07) 
-0.41  
(-0.75) 
MV   
 
Intercept 
 
0.37 
(0.36) 
5.59*** 
(4.39) 
0.35 
(0.44) 
6.48*** 
(3.58) 
 Adj R
2
 0.11 0.09 
 F 3.92 3.37 
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Table 5.8 Busy Board and Firm Performance 
This table presents the regression results for the impact of Busy Board on firm performance. 
The dependent variable is firm performance, measured by Return on Assets (ROA) ratio 
and Return on Equity (ROE). Busy Board is a dummy variable that is one if 50 percent or 
more of the board’s directors hold three or more directorships and zero otherwise. Board 
size is the number of directors sitting on the board. Board Independence is the percentage of 
non-executive directors sitting on the board. CEO Duality is a dummy variable taking the 
value of one if the roles of CEO and Chairman are split, zero otherwise. Inside (outside) 
director’s Age shows the age of the inside (outside) directors in calendar years. Inside 
(outside) director’s Tenure is the number of years the inside (outside) directors has retained 
their current position. Leverage is the ratio of Total Debt to Total Equity. Market Value is 
the market capitalization in 2009. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% 
(***) levels. 
 
 Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable (1)Return On Assets (2)Return on Equity 
 
Busy Board -3.45*** 
(-3.72) 
-3.61*** 
(-3.61) 
Board size -1.62** 
(-2.39) 
-2.28** 
(-2.57) 
Board Independence 0.37*** 
(3.85) 
0.48*** 
(3.57) 
CEO Duality 0.39 
(0.34) 
0.64 
(0.56) 
Inside Director's age 0.19 
(0.32) 
0.36  
(0.05) 
Outside Director's age 0.80 
(0.47) 
0.30 
(0.64) 
Inside Director's Tenure 0.83  
(0.23) 
0.93  
(0.15) 
Outside Director's Tenure 0.51  
(0.74) 
0.21 
(0.78) 
Leverage  -0.11 
(-1.39) 
-0.20 
(-0.98) 
MV  
 
Intercept 
 
Adj R
2 
F 
0.27 
(0.13) 
4.29*** 
(3.49) 
0.12 
3.43 
0.20 
(0.40) 
3.59*** 
(3.21) 
0.19 
3.78 
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5.5 Further analysis: business networks and social networks 
In order to further understand the relationship between board networks and firm 
performance, we examine the separate effects of business and social networks on 
firm performance to establish whether the social capital built by director networks 
plays a more or less important role than business networks in affecting firm 
performance.  According to Coleman (1990) social capital can be defined as a 
useful resource created from a network of social ties that allow members of 
organizations to trust each other and co-operate. Directors are not just members of 
the board but have various social connections, for example they are often common 
members of golf clubs or the alumni of the same university. A high level of social 
connections is associated with a high level of social capital, therefore possibly 
enhancing firm performance. Other prominent definitions of social capital include 
that of Burt (1992) who views it as consisting of relationships with others, both 
friends and colleagues, through which opportunities arise to use financial and 
human capital; and Putnam (1993) who views it as a property possessed by groups 
or communities, rather than by individuals, consisting of features of social 
organization, such as trust, that facilitate coordinating actions by these groups. 
 
In this study business networks are defined as those that arise from director 
interlocks while social networks arise from common membership by directors of 
other organisations, be they alumni of a university, a golf club, etc. The 
organizations in our board networks include public firms, private firms, universities, 
clubs, charities, governments, the army and sports organisations. Therefore, we 
separate our board networks into two components depending on the types of 
organization: 
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1. Business networks: public firms and private firms.  
2. Social networks: universities, clubs, charities, governments, the army and 
sports. 
 
This breakdown of board networks into two categories mirrors the division of social 
capital into internal and external categories by Kim and Cannella (2008) in their 
theory of director selection. They argue that much board research tends to be 
dominated by the agency theory perspective which emphasises the monitoring role 
of the board and therefore fails to take account of additional attributes that directors 
bring to their role. Kim and Cannella (2008) distinguish between internal social 
capital, which they define as ties and relations with others within the firm, mainly 
other directors, and external social capital, which they define as ties and relations 
with various contacts outside the firm such as investors, customers, suppliers, legal 
authorities and political elites. They argue that each type of social capital represent 
different types of network linkages and provides different resources to the board. 
High internal social capital improves trust between directors and thus reduces costs 
of communication and cooperation at the firm level. By enhancing the efficiency of 
knowledge sharing among directors, internal social capital can be a crucial source of 
competitive advantage. Those possessing high external social capital act as linkage 
linking their firm to critical resources or information in the environment. Directors 
collect external information and make sure the objectives of the organization fit in 
with the industry environment.  
 
Table 5.9 lists the top 10 most well-connected non-financial FTSE 350 firms in 
2009. ROLLS ROYCE, for example, a power system provider, had a total of 234 
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board networks in 2009, of which 176 (49+127) were business networks and 58 
(21+18+8+11) were social networks. Table 5.10 presents the separate effects of 
business and social networks on firm performance. We find that business networks 
have positive and significant effects on firm performance, but only at the 10% 
significant level (and only for ROA). However, social networks are found to have a 
positive and significant effect on firm performance at the 5% significance level for 
both ROA and ROE. The results suggest that social networks play a more important 
role than business networks in affecting firm performance.  
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Table 5.9 
Top 10 Well-Connected FTSE 350 Non-Financial Firms in 2009 
 
Company Name Public Private University Charity Club Government Army Sport 
Total 
networks 
ROLLS-ROYCE 49 127 21 18 8 11 0 0 234 
WPP  25 157 18 17 10 3 0 0 230 
TESCO  18 163 6 11 2 4 0 0 204 
ITV  9 162 2 8 1 3 0 0 185 
VODAFONE GROUP 29 111 14 9 3 7 0 0 173 
BP 27 97 24 13 3 6 1 0 171 
GLAXOSMITHKLINE 24 98 17 10 10 5 3 0 167 
UNILEVER 36 94 13 7 6 6 0 0 162 
BT GROUP  27 92 12 17 4 3 2 0 157 
AVIVA  24 71 9 15 6 5 0 1 131 
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Table 5.10 
The effects of Business and Social Networks on Firm Performance 
This table presents the regression results for the impact of business and social networks on 
firm performance. The dependent variable is firm performance, measured by Return on 
Assets (ROA) ratio and Return on Equity (ROE). Business networks are the total number of 
connections with public and private firms. Social networks are the total number of 
connections with universities, clubs, charities, governments, armies and sports. Board size 
is the number of directors sitting on the board. Board Independence is the percentage of 
non-executive directors sitting on the board. CEO Duality is a dummy variable taking the 
value of one if the roles of CEO and Chairman are split, zero otherwise. Inside (outside) 
director’s Age shows the age of the inside (outside) directors in calendar years. Inside 
(outside) director’s Tenure is the number of years the inside (outside) directors has retained 
their current position. Leverage is the ratio of Total Debt to Total Equity. MV is the market 
capitalization in 2009. Asterisks indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) 
levels. 
 
 Dependent Variable 
Independent Variable Return On Assets Return On Equity 
 Business networks 0.06* 
(1.98) 
0.15  
(1.48) 
Social networks 0.05** 
(2.58) 
0.13** 
(2.24) 
Board Size -2.32** 
(-2.56) 
-1.66** 
(-2.47) 
Board Independence 3.27** 
(2.83) 
1.48** 
(2.58) 
CEO Duality 0.64 
(0.42) 
0.72 
(0.28) 
Inside Director's age 0.23 
(0.84) 
0.35 
(0.21) 
Outside Director's age 0.28  
(0.68) 
0.75 
(0.47) 
Inside Director's Tenure 0.36 
(0.47) 
0.56 
(0.37) 
Outside Director's Tenure 0.41 
(0.68) 
0.39 
(.64) 
Leverage  -0.68  
(-1.31) 
-0.88 
(-1.27) 
MV   
 
Intercept 
 
Adj R
2 
F 
0.55 
(0.34) 
3.29 
(1.87) 
0.18 
3.73 
0.22 
(0.46) 
5.14 
(1.36) 
0.19 
3.88 
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5.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we investigate the effects of directors business and social networks 
on firm performance using three different measures: board networks including 
business and social connections; the average number of directorships held by 
outside directors; and the busyness of a board, where more than half of the directors 
hold more than three directorships.  
 
Overall, our findings are consistent with the “Reputation Hypothesis” (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983) which argues that the number of directorships may proxy for director 
reputation. Directors are motivated to improve their reputation since they can use 
their directorships to signal to the market that they are good at decision-making, and 
at providing advice and monitoring management. Therefore, a board with more 
multiple directors increases firm value. In particular, we find that board networks 
(both business and social networks) have a positive and significant effect on firm 
performance. However, the average number of board seats (i.e. business networks) 
held by directors is not significantly related to firm performance. This suggests that 
social networks play a more significant role in affecting firm performance, given 
that board networks in general (including both social and business networks) are 
positively related to firm performance. In addition, we find that if the board is 
recognized as a “busy board”, firm performance is adversely affected.  
 
We also test the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance. 
We find that board size is negatively and significantly associated with firm 
performance. This result suggests that smaller boards could be more effective and 
perform better than larger boards. Board independence is found to be positively and 
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significantly associated with firm performance in line with the recommendations of 
the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010). However, we do not find that CEO 
duality has any effect on firm performance.  
 
We further split the effects of board networks into business networks and social 
networks. We find that social networks play a more important role than business 
connections in improving firm performance. The results support social capital 
theory (Coleman, 1990) which argues that networks of social connections can 
provide firms with valuable resource and information. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
This thesis tests the effect of director networks and corporate governance 
mechanisms on firm performance and CEO compensation. In this final chapter we 
summarize the major contributions and findings of the three empirical studies and 
the practical implications of the findings. We also discuss the limitations of the 
study and provide suggestions for future research. 
 
6.2 Summary 
An interlock occurs when a director of one firm sits on the board of another firm. 
As a result, director interlocks, or networks, generate connections between firms. 
Unlike the conventional measure of director networks, namely the total number of 
directorships, which only captures the quantity of directors’ obligations not their 
quality, this thesis measures director networks based on five different centrality 
measures. In contrast to simply calculating the number of directorships, centrality 
measures take into account not only the quantity of directors’ obligations but also 
their quality. In addition, director networks are measured not only in terms of 
current employment but also take account of past employment, education, and other 
types of social activities (golf clubs, charity organizations, universities, etc).  
 
Chapter two explains the terminology and methodology used in this thesis. Chapter 
three presents the extent of board networks among non-financial FTSE 350 firms 
listed on the London Stock Exchange and shows whether board networks measured 
by “centrality” are related to firm performance. Our study applies a set of very 
comprehensive measures of director networks, namely degree centrality, 
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betweenness centrality, closeness centrality, eigenvector centrality and information 
centrality. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to test the effects of board 
networks on firm performance in the UK context using all of these measures. We 
find that firms with well-connected directors are positively correlated with firm 
performance. Consistent with the arguments (Fama and Jensen, 1983) that the 
number of connections may proxy for director reputation. Directors have the 
motivations to improve their reputation since they can use their directorships to 
signal to the market that they are good at making decision, providing good advice 
and monitoring to the board. Thus, a firm with more multiple directors can 
experience an increase in firm value.  
 
Chapter four investigates the effects of CEO and board networks on CEO 
compensation using a sample of non-financial FTSE 350 firms between 2007 and 
2010 while controlling for CEO characteristics, corporate governance characteristics, 
firm characteristics and performance characteristics. In contrast to most prior studies, 
this study examines not only the total remuneration of the CEO but also two 
important components of the remuneration package, i.e. basic salary and long-term 
incentive plan (LTIPs). At the individual level, we find that if the CEO is 
well-connected, as measured by five centrality measures, the CEO receives higher 
total compensation. This result supports the managerial power theory (Bebchuk et 
al., 2002) which suggests that powerful CEOs can effectively influence their 
compensation decisions. Although we find a positive relationship between basic 
salary and CEO networks, we do not find evidence of a relationship between LTIPs 
compensation and CEO networks. The results suggest that powerful CEOs would 
like to increase their basic salary rather than LTIPs compensation, since basic salary 
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does not require any additional effort from the CEO, whereas incentive-based 
compensation is normally dependent on firm performance. At the firm level, there is 
a positive relationship between board networks and CEO total compensation and 
LTIPs compensation. However, we find no evidence that a CEO’s basic salary 
compensation is positively related to board networks at the firm level. The results 
suggest that firms tend to reward the CEO with more equity-based compensation if 
the firm has better access to resources and information through their overall director 
networks. 
 
Chapter five examines the effects of directors’ business and social networks and 
corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance. Most previous studies only 
consider director interlocks (business connections) while this study measures both 
business connections and social connections, such as current and past employment , 
education background, and other types of social activities (membership of golf clubs, 
membership of charity organizations, universities alumni, etc). We find that firms 
with well-connected directors seem to use their networks to enhance firm 
performance and therefore in line with the interest of their shareholders. In addition, 
we separate board networks into business and social connections and then examine 
the effects of these two sets of connections on firm performance. We find that social 
connections play a more important role in improving firm performance. This is in 
line with social capital theory (Coleman, 1990) which argues that the network of 
social connections can provide firms with valuable resource and information.  
 
6.3 Practical implications 
This thesis provides some practical implications for regulators, firms and 
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individuals. Our results suggest that firms with well-connected directors can 
improve their performance by obtaining a central position in a network, giving them 
more opportunities to access different kinds of information and resources. Hence, it 
is not always necessary to restrain the number of the directorships held by executive 
directors as stated in Section B.3.3 of the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010). 
Director networks comprise not just business connections but also common social 
connections (e.g. charity, education and sporting activities). The UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2010) recommends that “evaluation of the board of FTSE 350 
companies should be externally facilitated at least every three years”. This makes it 
easier for companies to get rid of bad directors.  The results of this thesis would 
suggest that the value of network connections should also be taken into account 
when companies are evaluating the worth of incumbent directors. The ability to 
access external resources and information becomes even important to firms during 
difficult financial times, so firms should pay attention to both business and social 
network connections when selecting, appointing and reviewing the performance of 
directors. Similarly, individual directors need to develop not only their business 
connections but also their social network connections if they wish to fully enhance 
their managerial ability and career mobility.  
 
6.4 Limitations 
6.4.1 Sample limitation 
In this thesis, we employ a sample based on the FTSE 350 index which includes the 
largest 350 firms in the UK. Therefore, the sample is not randomly selected. This 
could result in a sample size bias since the sample is limited to the largest firms in 
terms of size. However, there are several reasons why we chose the FTSE 350 index. 
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First, although the sample only consists of the top 350 UK firms, the sample 
represents about 97% of UK market capitalisation data. Second, all of the FTSE 350 
firms are required to report their accounting and corporate governance data publicly 
according to the UK Corporate Governance Code, while some requirements of UK 
Corporate Governance Code give permission for small firms not to opt out. 
Therefore, we would not be able to collect all of the accounting and corporate 
governance data for the smaller firms.  
 
6.4.2 Variable limitations 
Although we include a number of variables to control for the effect of corporate 
governance, it is possible that other factors not included in the multivariate 
regression models may also affect firm performance and the level of CEO 
compensation. For example, even if we control for some CEO characteristics in our 
model, i.e. CEO age, CEO tenure, CEO gender, the CEO’s share ownership may 
also affect the CEO’s compensation. If the CEO owns a large amount of shares in 
his firm, a large percentage of his pay is tied up with firm performance. The 
omission is mainly because the data is not available on Datastream (Basic version).  
 
6.5 Suggestions for future research 
Although the results of this thesis provide some evidence that director networks and 
corporate governance mechanisms significantly affect firm performance and CEOs 
compensation, some factors not covered in this thesis might be pursued in future 
research.  
 
When measuring firm performance, we use both Return on Equity (ROE) and 
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Return on Assets (ROA) to measure the firm financial performance. The results can 
be strengthened by using alternative variables to proxy for the financial performance, 
such as Tobin’s Q, the market to book ratio, etc. Besides, in order to capture 
different aspect of firm performance, stock returns can also be used to proxy for 
financial performance. Furthermore, although the sample includes the largest 350 
UK firms and excludes all the financial firms, it might be worth looking at the 
effects when including small firms and financial firms. Although we use a lagged 
values approach to deal with the endogeneity issue in the thesis, there is another 
way to deal with the endogeneity issue, namely by using the instrumental variable 
approach (Fang et al, 2012). To use this approach, we need to find an instrumental 
variable which is strongly correlated with the independent variable (the potential 
endogenous variable) but is not directly correlated with dependent variable. The 
death and retirement of directors, as suggested by Fracassi and Tate (2012), could be 
appropriate instrumental variable because both events are exogenous shocks that 
affect networks directly but not firm value and CEO compensation. Another 
interesting topic for the future research would be undertaking a comparative study 
between one-tier board where all directors (both executive directors and 
non-executive directors) are sitting on the same board (e.g. UK) and two-tier board 
where executive directors and non-executive directors are sitting on two different 
boards: executive board and supervisory board (e.g. Germany) on the effects of 
director networks and corporate governance mechanisms. Last but not least, 
although this study employs quantitative method to examine the effects of director 
networks and corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance and CEO 
compensation, it can be supplemented with qualitative method to conduct the 
interviews with board members. It will be useful for the researchers to know what 
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actually happens in the corporations and therefore provide further explanations for 
the results and also increase the reliability. 
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